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If there is no struggle there is no progress. Those who
profess to favorfreedom and yet depreciate agitation... want
crops without plowing up the ground, they want rain without
thunder and lightening. They want the ocean without the
awful roar of its many waters ....
Power concedes nothing
without a demand. It never did and it never will.'

I.

INTRODUCTION

Few people can deny the social and legal importance of civil marriage
as an institution. "Because it fulfills yearnings for security, safe haven, and
connection that express our common humanity, civil marriage is an
esteemed institution, and the decision whether and whom to marry is
among life's momentous acts of self-definition. 2 Those words, found in a
recent court decision from the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
reflect the sentiment that supports extending the protections, benefits, and
duties of civil marriage to "same-sex couples ' 3 that have traditionally been

I.
Susan Arnold, Countdown to Gay Marriage: Massachusetts Embraces SameSex Civil Marriages, PINK PAGES 27 (Winter 2004) (interview with Hillary Goodridge, lead
plaintiff in the Massachusetts same-sex marriage case, who quoted these words from
Frederick Douglass).
2.
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,955 (Mass. 2003).
3. This article will generally use the terms "same-sex couples" or "same-sex
marriage" rather than "gay marriage" or "homosexual marriage" to describe two men or two
women who wish to marry. The term "same-sex marriage" recognizes that a marriage may
be between two persons who are gay or lesbian, or between two persons who are each
bisexual, or between a gay person and a person who is bisexual. See, e.g., Goodridge, 798
N.E.2d at 953 n. 11; Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 55 n.lI (Haw. 1993). The term also
recognizes some - but not all - of the legal issues that may arise with the marriages of
transgendered persons, both before and after sex change surgery. Discussions of transsexual
marriage provide valuable insights on ideas and presumptions surrounding gender roles,
gender equality, and the fundamental values of love and personal commitment for a happy
and successful marriage. See generally, e.g., Helen G. Berrigan, Transsexual Marriage: A
Trans-Atlantic Judicial Dialogue, 12 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 87 (2003). See also Taylor
Flynn, Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include Transgender Rights in the
Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 392 (2001). Legal
and political issues surrounding transgender marriage continue to develop in the United
HeinOnline -- 24 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 590 2003-2004
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denied the right to marry. 4 The court ordered that same-sex couples in
Massachusetts should have the right to marry as of May 17, 2004,5 the date
that marks the fiftieth anniversary of the6 U.S. Supreme Court's landmark
decision in Brown v. Board of Education.
The same-sex marriage debate in the United States and other countries
has been characterized by a good deal of misinformation,
misunderstanding, and false fears. Same-sex marriage has also been one of
the most passionately debated subjects in our law, religion, politics, and
culture.7 The debate is not only in legislatures and courtrooms, but also on
the streets and in society at large. 8 For their part, same-sex couples wonder
about the hypocrisy of those who claim a need to preserve the "sanctity" of
opposite-sex marriage, 9 particularly in light of "Marriage Reality Shows"

States and other countries. See, e.g., In re Marriage License for Nash, Nos. 2002-T-0149,
2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio. App. 2003) (denying transsexual the right to
marry); Rex Wockner, Chinese Trans Gets Married,WINDY CITY TIMEs, Jan. 28, 2004, at 9.
Issues arise not only in the right to marry, but also in all aspects of daily life. See, e.g.,
Goins v. West Group, 635 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 2001).
4.
A similar sentiment can be found in part of a court decision from Ontario:
Marriage is, without dispute, one of the most significant forms of
personal relationships. For centuries, marriage has been a basic element
of social organization in societies around the world. Through the
institution of marriage, individuals can publicly express their love and
commitment to each other. Through this institution, society publicly
recognizes expressions of love and commitment between individuals,
granting them respect and legitimacy as a couple. This public
recognition and sanction of marital relationships reflect society's
approbation of the personal hopes, desires and aspirations that underlie
loving, committed conjugal relationships. This can only enhance an
individual's sense of self-worth and dignity.
Halpem v. Toronto (City), 172 O.A.C. 276, 1 5 (2003).
5.
See, e.g., Frank Langfitt, Court Says Gays Entitled to Marriage-Massachusetts
Sets Stage for 1st Same-Sex Wedding, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 5, 2004, § 1,at 1;Jennifer Peter,
Court Demands Gay Marriage- Massachusetts Opinion Says Civil Unions Won't Cut It,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 5, 2004, at 3.
6.
347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also, e.g., Dennis W. Archer, The Blessings of
Brown, A.B.A. J.,
Apr. 2004, at 8.
7. See, e.g., Karen Breslau, A 'Wildfire' Burns On, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 15, 2004, at
10; Michael Slackman, PartyLines Blur as Gay Activists Take the Same-Sex MarriageIssue
Front and Center, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 2004, at 21; Stevenson Swanson, Same-Sex
Marriage Leaping Into Election, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 15, 2004, § I, at 1, 17; Nikki Usher, Gays
Rally for Marriage,CHI. TRIB., Feb. 15, 2004, § 4, at 3.
8. See, e.g., Andrew Jacobs, Gay Legislatorat the Center of a Storm in Georgia,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2004, at A18; Lisa Neff, U.S. House Holds Marriage Hearing, CHI.
FREE PRESS, Apr. 7, 2004, at 7; Gina Kim, Gay ProtestersTake to Street, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 5,

2004, § 2, at I.
9.
See, e.g., Andrew Sullivan, The Sacred and the Pop Star, THE ADVOC., Feb. 17,
2004, at 72 ("Newt Gingrich was defending civilization against gay marriages while
HeinOnline -- 24 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 591 2003-2004
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on U.S. television and well-publicized marital fiascos such as the midnight
spur-of-the-moment marriage of singer Britney Spears to Jason Allen
Alexander (and annulment of that marriage about fifty-five hours later).'
Before there was intense national news coverage on the issue of samesex marriage, many people wrongly believed that lawful same-sex marriage
had already been available in the United States and other countries for
many years." This confusion was, perhaps, understandable, given the
variety of misleading press reports about registered partnerships and samesex marriages in other countries, reports about the legal effect of "domestic
partnership registries" in various local jurisdictions in the United States,
and descriptions of Vermont Civil Unions as being the functional
equivalent of marriage all except in name. The confusion was perhaps also
attributable to popular television shows featuring gay and lesbian
characters; such shows only rarely focus on the legal difficulties regularly
faced by gay and lesbian persons, such as employment discrimination,
housing discrimination, or violent hate crime. 12 Finally, the public
confusion may have arisen because an increasing number of same-sex
couples were "getting married" in private religious ceremonies that had no
legal effect, although they might be recognized by private employers and
others. Despite the popular belief that same-sex marriage was already legal
in the United States, the first state court decision to allow same-sex
marriages was issued only in November 2003, and even that decision was
stayed for 180 days until May 17, 2004.13
When, then, did same-sex civil marriages become legal? In 2001, the
Netherlands became the first country in the world to give same-sex couples
the full equivalent of rights of civil marriage available to opposite-sex
couples. 14 Earlier legislation came close to providing most of the important

carrying on an adulterous affair.").
10.
See, e.g., William Hageman, Wedding Fling Leaves Nothing But Regret, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 11, 2004, § 13, at I; Jack B. Harrison, Britney's Fling: Taking Marriage
Seriously, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 26, 2004, at 26.
11.
See, e.g., YUVAL MERIN, EQUALITY FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES: THE LEGAL
RECOGNITION OF GAY PARTNERSHIPS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 3 (U. Chicago

Press 2002).
12.
See, e.g., Christopher Healy, Marriage'sBloody Backlash-Legal Victories and
the Movement to Legalize Gay Marriage Have Meant an Increase in Gay Bashing, THE
ADVOC., Apr. 27, 2004, at 38, 38-40. See also FBI Investigating Hate Mail Targeting
Denver-Area Gays, CHI. FREE PRESS, Apr. 7, 2004, at 3.
13.
See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955.
14.
See MERIN, supra note I1, at 56, 111. See also Kees Waaldijk, Small Change:
How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got Paved in the Netherlands, in LEGAL RECOGNITION
OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

437 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenaes, eds., 2001).
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benefits and protections of civil marriage, but that earlier legislation fell
short. It was, accordingly, only in 2001 that same-sex civil marriagewithout any restrictions-became legal anywhere in the world, and that
was then only in the Netherlands. 5 Belgium followed the Netherlands in
allowing same-sex civil marriage, but gay and lesbian couples married in
Belgium are still prohibited from adopting children.' 6 Some individuals
would say that Belgium has allowed same-sex marriage; others would say
that Belgium has "almost" allowed same-sex marriage.
Canada was the next country to legalize same-sex marriage. In the
summer of 2003, courts in British Columbia and Ontario found that the
denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples violated the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 7 (In 2004, the Quebec Court of Appeal
also affirmed a lower court ruling that recognized the rights of same-sex
couples to marry. 8) Same-sex couples in Canada took immediate
advantage of this right to marry, as did hundreds of same-sex couples from
the United States and other countries that have not yet recognized same-sex
marriage. 19
But even where same-sex civil marriages were not recognized,
progress was being made toward recognizing that same-sex couples should
enjoy the rights and privileges of civil marriage. Other European nations
not yet ready for full marriage had enacted Registered Domestic
Partnerships that conferred most-but not all-of the important benefits
and security of marriage. 20 Hawai'i, 2 1 Vermont, 22 California, 23 and, most

15.

See Waaldijk, supra note 14.

16.
Id.
17.
See infra Part II G and accompanying text for a discussion of same-sex
marriage decisions from Canada.
18.

See, e.g., Colin Campbell, Canada: Quebec Court Upholds Gay Marriage,

N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2004, at A5; Mike King, Canada: Marriage Comes to Quebec,
Oregon, THE ADVOC., Apr. 27, 2004, at 20.
19.
See, e.g., Alan Bayless, Chicago Gay Couple Ties the Knot in Canada, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Jan. 14, 2004, at 4; Justice Harvey Brownstone, Marrying Man, OUT, Jan.
2004, at 10 (letter from the first openly gay judge in Canada reporting personally on dozens
of marriages of same-sex couples, "approximately half of whom have been Americans").
20.
See infra Part II B and accompanying text for a discussion of the domestic
partnerships in Europe.
21.
See infra Part II C and accompanying text.
22.
See infra Part II F and accompanying text.
23.
California enacted legislation that allows same-sex couples to register with the
Secretary of State as domestic partners, and almost 20,000 couples reportedly registered in
the past three years. Lisa Neff, PartnerBill Passes [California]Senate, CHI. FREE PRESS,
Sept. 3, 2003, at 1, 8. Many same-sex couples in California did not register, however; the
2000 census figures showed that there were 92,138 same-sex couples in California. Id. The
United States Census also showed that California had the highest number of same-sex
HeinOnline -- 24 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 593 2003-2004
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recently, New Jersey 24 offer versions of Civil Unions or Domestic
Partnership that portend to confer the benefits of marriage but also fall
short in their delivery of legal rights and protections. Elsewhere in the
United States, local Domestic Partnership Registries in places such as Cook
County, Illinois, offer a mechanism for societal and private recognition of
same-sex relationships, 5 but the registries confer no real enforceable legal

couples in the United States. Id. Most recently, California further expanded the rights
available to allow domestic partners to make funeral arrangements for a partner; to make a
partner responsible for sharing the other's debts; to recognize a partner's community
property rights if the partners break up; to allow a partner to seek child custody and support
payments if the partners separate; and to allow a partner to refuse to testify against the other
in court. Id. The domestic partner benefits now offered in California still fall short of
marriage, but they provide legal rights in an influential American jurisdiction. A lawsuit to
challenge the new California legislation failed to win a preliminary injunction that would
have blocked implementation of the domestic partner law, an indication that the litigation
may also be unsuccessful in challenging the new state law. California PartnerBill Faces
Suit, CHI. FREE PRESS, Jan. 7, 2004, at 7. Legislation was also introduced in California to
allow same-sex couples to obtain marriage licenses. See Lisa Neff, California Marriage
License Bill Drafted, CHI. FREE PRESS, Jan. 21, 2004, at 10. The introduction of that bill,
however, was quickly followed by the marriages of thousands of same-sex couples in San
Francisco. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
24.
See infra Part III and accompanying text.
25.
On October 1, 2003, Cook County, Illinois, began to allow same-sex couples to
register as domestic partners. See, e.g., Bonnie Miller Rubin, Gays, Lesbians View Registry
as Progress--Cook County's Enrollment of Same-Sex Couples 'A Step Forward, Not
Completion of the Journey,' CHI. TRIB., Oct. 1, 2003, § 1, at 1; COOK COUNTY, ILL.
ORDINANCES, Domestic Partnership Registry Ordinance, available at http://www.
thirdcoastmarketing.com/ CookDomesticPartners.doc (visited April 12, 2004). The county
ordinance, introduced by Cook County Commissioner Michael Quigley, requires that at
least one of the partners live or work in Cook County. COOK COUNTY, ILL. ORDINANCES,
Domestic Partnership Registry Ordinance, available at http://www.thirdcoastmarketing.
com/CookDomesticPartners.doc (visited April 12, 2004). Couples register with the Bureau
of Vital Records located in the Cook County Building in Chicago. Id. The couples must
present valid identification and pay a thirty-dollar fee. Id. The registry provides no formal
legal benefits or protections for couples that register, but private employers and other nongovernmental organizations can voluntarily recognize the partnership for various purposes.
See id. For example, a private employer may accept the certificate of domestic partnership
as a way of establishing eligibility for health insurance coverage or other benefits for a
same-sex partner. The Cook County Ordinance does not allow opposite-sex partners to
register; opposite-sex partners can marry, however, and receive many more benefits than
those available to same-sex couples that utilize a domestic partnership registry. There was a
question as to whether providing a registry only for same-sex couples would be
discriminatory against opposite-sex couples. The legality of limiting the registry to samesex couples has support in a federal court decision that upheld a City of Chicago ordinance
that provided benefits for the qualified same-sex domestic partner of a city employee. See
CHI. MUNICIPAL CODE § 2-152-072. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit found that the city ordinance was not discriminatory against heterosexuals, because
opposite-sex partners had the option to marry and obtain the same benefits. Irizarry v.
HeinOnline -- 24 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 594 2003-2004
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benefits on the couple, particularly when the couples who register travel
outside of the area where the registry is located.
But as important as the new domestic partnership registries may be as
a local government's recognition of a same-sex union, their potential
significance was soon dwarfed by the acts of local governments that began
to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, even though there were
significant questions about the legal validity of those acts. a6 In a short burst
of activity that started in February 2004, thousands of same-sex couples
were married in a frenzy of wedding ceremonies in California,27 New

Board of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 251 F.3d 604, 606 (7th Cir. 2001).
Although Illinois has made some progress on the local level toward protecting
the rights of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered persons, it is similar to other states
that do not yet provide statewide protections against based on sexual orientation and gender
identity.

See, e.g., Gary Barlow, Capital Clout--GLBT Rights Advocates Lobby in

Springfield, CHI. FREE PRESS, Apr. 9, 2003, at 1; Gary Barlow, Illinois Senate Fails to Act
on Rights Bill, CHI. FREE PRESS, Nov. 26, 2003, at 1. Illinois has come close to passing
nondiscrimination legislation, however, even as recently as November 2003. See, e.g.,
Tracy Baim, [Governor] Puts Gay-Rights Law on Frontburner, WINDY CITY TIMES, Nov.
12, 2003, at 1; Gary Barlow, [Governor] Pushes SBIO1, CHI. FREE PRESS, Nov. 12, 2003, at
1. In the week that the nondiscrimination legislation should have come to a vote in the
Illinois Senate, however, a vote on the legislation was postponed because of an
announcement of a court decision from Massachusetts allowing same-sex marriage. See,
e.g., Ray Long & John Chase, Gay-Rights Proposal Shelved in Legislature-Democrats

Cite Marriage Backlash, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 20, 2003, § 1, at I; Statewide LGBT Human
Rights Bill Stalls in Illinois Senate, ILL. GENDER ADVOC. [NEWSL.], Dec. 2003, at 1.
26.
See, e.g., Lisa Leff, 87 Gay Couples Wed in San Francisco-Mayor Defies
State Law Defining Marriage as Union of Man, Woman, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at
30 (reporting that San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom and other city officials had begun
performing marriage ceremonies for same-sex couples despite an earlier California ballot
initiative that defined marriage as the union between a man and a woman); Bob Roehr,
1O00s Marry in San Francisco, WINDY CITY TIMES, Feb. 18, 2004, at 1.
27.
See, e.g., Lisa Leff, 87 Gay Couples Wed in San Francisco-Mayor Defies
State Law Defining Marriage as Union of Man, Woman, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at
30 (reporting that San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom and other city officials had begun
performing marriage ceremonies for same-sex couples despite an earlier California ballot
initiative that defined marriage as the union between a man and a woman). See also Carolyn
Marshall, More than 50 Gay Couples Are Married in San Francisco, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13,
2004, at A19; Jane Meredith Adams, Marriage Mania in Calif., CHI. TRIB., Feb. 14, 2004, §
1, at 11; Dean E. Murphy, Bid to Stop San Francisco From Letting Gays Marry, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2004, at A8; Gay Couples Tie Knot By Dozens, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 16, 2004, §
1, at 8; Bob Roehr, lO00s Marry in San Francisco, WINDY CITY TIMES, Feb. 18, 2004, at 1;
Dean E. Murphy, San Francisco Sues State Over Same-Sex Weddings, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20,
2004, at A12; Mike McKee, California - State Justices May Wait and See on Gay
Marriage, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 1, 2004, at 7. The marriages were halted in March. See Dean E.
Murphy, San Francisco Forced to Halt Gay Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2004, at AI;
Jane Meredith Adams, California Supreme Court Halts Same-Sex Marriages, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 12, 2004, § 1, at 13; Scott Morrison, California Same-Sex Marriages - Court Order
HeinOnline -- 24 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 595 2003-2004
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York, 28 and Oregon, 29 and even a small number in New Mexico. 30 There
were protests in other jurisdictions that refused to follow suit by also
issuing marriage licenses. 31 Although the gay and lesbian community
celebrated and hailed the officials who did issue the marriage licenses to
same-sex couples, 32 some others thought that the actions were counterproductive and harmful to the goal of eventual recognition of full rights of
same-sex marriage. And although the legal status of those marriages may
later be questioned in court and used as evidence of a need for a federal
amendment to ban same-sex marriage, 34 there were places where the

Leaves Gay Couples in Legal Limbo, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 13-14, 2004, at 2.
28.
See, e.g., Sumathi Reddy, Gay Marriage Debate Moves to N.Y. - Green Party
Mayor Unites 20 Couples, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 28, 2004, § 1, at 11; Mayor: Same-Sex Weddings
to Go On, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 29, 2004, § 1, at 11; Thomas Crampton, Gay Weddings Bring
Division to an Upstate Village, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2004, at A21; Gay Marriages Bring
Charges - Mayor of Village in New York Faces 19 Criminal Counts, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 3,
2004, § 1, at 9; Robert D. McFadden, With Polite Refusals, Same-Sex Marriage Hits New
York, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2004, at A19; Michael Hill, Judge Calls Halt to Gay Marriages
in N.Y. Village, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 6, 2004, § 1, at 9. Although New York may not yet
perform same-sex marriages, lawful same-sex marriages from other jurisdictions may be
recognized there. See Marc Santora, New York's Laws Said to Support Some Gay Unions,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2004, at Al.

29.
More than 2,500 same-sex couples married in Multnomah County, Oregon,
which began issuing marriage licenses on March 3, 2004. See, e.g., Thomas Alex Tizon &
Josh Getlin, Gay Marriages Spread to Northwest, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 4, 2004, § 1, at 12;
Matthew Preusch, Oregon County, With Portland, Offers Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 4, 2004, at A22; Terry Bean, Only in Oregon, THE ADVOC., Apr. 27, 2004, at 10; John
Caldwell, Portland's Lifetime Commitment, Oregon, THE ADVOC., Apr. 27, 2004, at 32; Bob
Roehr, Wedding Bells Ring in Portland, WINDY CITY TIMES, Mar. 10, 2004, at 1, 6. See also
Oregon: Suit on Same-Sex Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2004, at A9.

30.
See, e.g., New Mexico Attorney General Asks Court to Intervene in Marriage
Fight, CHI. FREE PRESS, Apr. 7, 2004, at 7 (reporting that marriage licenses were issued to
66 same-sex couples on February 20, 2004).
31.
See, e.g. ,Mickey Ciokajlo & Gina Kim, Orr Won't License Gay Marriages,
CHi. TRIB, Mar. 3, 2004, § 2, at 3 (reporting that Cook County would not follow the lead of
San Francisco and issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples). See also Steve Patterson,
Gays Rip Denial of Marriage Licenses, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 5, 2004, at 8. Chicago Mayor
Richard Daley spoke in favor of same-sex marriage. See Gary Washburn & Dan
Mihalopoulos, Daley Supports Gay Marriages, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 19, 2004, § 2, at 1.
32.
See, e.g., Dean E. Murphy, San Francisco Mayor Exults in Move on Gay
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2004, at A14.
33.
See, e.g., Steve Chapman, Wrong Way to Achieve Gay Marriage, CH1. TRIB.,
Mar. 7, 2004, § 2, at 9 (comparing gay rights supporters who take the law into their own
hands to the discredited former Chief Justice of Alabama, Roy Moore, who took it upon
himself to install in the courthouse a replica of the 10 commandments, in disregard of the
U.S. Constitution). See also Steve Chapman, Compromise is in Order on Gay Marriage,
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 8, 2004, § 2, at 9.
34.
See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Backs Ban in Constitution on Gay Marriage,
HeinOnline -- 24 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 596 2003-2004
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marriages would be recognized.35 One county in Oregon was so confused
by the legality of what they could or couldn't do under current state law
regarding same-sex marriage that they suspended the issuance of marriage
licenses altogether to any couple, same-sex or opposite-sex, until there was
greater legal certainty on the issue.36
Opponents of same-sex marriage have sounded a national alarm,
claiming that the marriages of same-sex partners will destroy traditional
marriage and many other values that society holds sacred. Many opponents
base their arguments primarily on grounds of religion and tradition. They
argue that marriage must be recognized only between a man and a woman
because marriage has always been between only a man and a woman.38
They argue that the state should not recognize same-sex marriages because
homosexuality is sinful and perverse. 39 They see the main social and
biological purpose of marriage as the procreation of children, 4° and argue
that opposite-sex couples are more likely to have children, or more
children, than same-sex couples. 4' They also see the "optimal" situation

N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at Al; Bob Kemper, Bush: Protect Marriage - Calls for
ConstitutionalAmendment to Bar Gay Couples From Marrying, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 25, 2004, §
1,at I. See also Carl Hulse, Senate Hears Testimony on Gay Marriage Amendment, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2004, at A22.
35.
See [Seattle, Washington] City Workers' Same-Sex Spouses to Get Benefits,
CHI. TRIB., Mar. 8, 2004, § 1, at 16; San Jose [California]Recognizes Gay Marriages,CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 10, 2004, § 1,at 16.
36.
See Kate Zernike, Gay? No Marriage License Here. Straight? Ditto., N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2004, at A8.
37.
See, e.g., Dahleen Glanton, In South, Issue of Gay MarriageExposes Hate and
Fear, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 8, 2004, § 1,at 1, 18 ("While many Christians are calling for
tolerance, some evangelicals see homosexuality and same-sex marriage as an assault on the
most sacred values of their religion."); Elisabeth Bumiller, Why America Has Gay Marriage
Jitters, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2003, § 4, at 1 ("[M]ost Americans consider marriage
essentially a religious institution intended explicitly for a man and a woman"); Dean E.
Murphy, Gay Marriage Licenses Create a Quandaryfor the Clergy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6,
2004, at A7 (describing a same-sex couple who had been married in San Francisco, who
attended a service at the Santa Cruz Bible Church and later received messages on their
answering machine such as "We will stone you" and "Jesus will stone you.").
38.
See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, Courts Should Stay Out of the Gay Marriage
Arena, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 1, 2004, § I, at 17 ("Marriage has been around for, oh, 5,000 years.
In every society, in every place, in every time it has been defined as an opposite-sex-union).
39.
See, e.g., MERIN, supra note II, at 64.
40.
See, e.g., Maggie Gallagher, Rites, Rights, and Social Institutions: Why and
How Should the Law Support Marriage?, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 225,
232 (2004) ("Marriage arises in every known society out of the need to manage the
biological reality that sex between men and women produces children, the twin social
realities that societies need babies in order to survive, and babies need mothers and
fathers.").
41.
See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 95 1.
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for children as having a "traditional family" with a mother and father, and
that the purpose of civil marriage is to provide a framework for this optimal
situation.42 Opponents of same-sex marriage argue that state recognition of
same-sex unions would undermine the "sanctity of marriage" and
"demoralize[] society." 43 They see same-sex marriage as being harmful to
children, and as something that will lead to crime, illegal drugs, and
disease.44
There are also many opponents of same-sex marriage who oppose any
sort of legal protections whatsoever for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgendered individuals. 45 They believe that the GLBT community is not
"a deserving minority" that needs or is even worthy of "special civil rights
protections." 46 Because some portions of the Bible, the Book of Mormon,
and other religious texts have been interpreted as condemning
homosexuality, these opponents believe that law - as a reflection of
morality expressed in religious texts - should deny recognition to any form
of homosexual relationships.47
Although many opponents of same-sex marriage reject any
recognition of same-sex unions in any form,48 some of the opponents of

42.
43.

See, e.g., Ex parte J.M.F., 730 So.2d 1190, 1196 (Ala. 1998).
William B. Rubenstein & R. Bradley Sears, Toward More Perfect Unions, N.Y.

TIMFS, Nov. 20, 2003, at A31.

See also William B. Rubenstein, Hiding Behind the

Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2004, at A27.
44.
See, e.g., William B. Rubenstein & R. Bradley Sears, Toward More Perfect
Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2003, at A3 1; MERIN, supra note 11, at 65.
45.
See, e.g., Nancy J. Knauer, Science, Identity, and the Construction of Narrative,
12 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 1, 47 (2003).
46.
Id. at 47 (citing arguments of anti-gay organizations). Professor Knauer also
notes that "[bly drawing often crude analogies to African-Americans, pro-family
organizations attempt to establish that gay men and lesbians are undeserving of civil rights
protections based on sexual orientation, and they are actually demanding special rights, not
equal rights." Id.
47.
ROBERT A.J. GAGNON, THE BIBLE AND HOMOSEXUAL PRACTICE: TEXTS AND
HERMENEUTICS (2002). See Leviticus 18:22 (King James) ("Thou shalt not lie with mankind
as with womankind: it is abomination."); The LDS Church & Homosexuality: Past and
Present at http://www.religioustolerance.org/homlds.htm (visited April 12, 2004); Islam
and Homosexuality at http://www.religioustolerance.orghom-isla.htm (visited April 12,
2004); but cf Matthew Preusch & Laurie Goodstein, Jury of Methodists Clears Gay
Minister Over Relationship, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2004, § I, at 1, 14 (describing "several
eminent Methodist legal scholars and experts in Scripture, who argued that the Book of
Discipline and the Bible contain unclear and contradictory passages about homosexual
relationships.").
48.
The "slippery slope" argument against even the most benign recognition of a
same-sex relationship - or even any form of non-discrimination legislation - argues that any
positive step for homosexuals will lead to a situation where churches and other religious
institutions are forced to perform same-sex marriage ceremonies, where all landlords must
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same-sex marriage may favor "domestic partnerships," "civil union"
registries, or other forms of legal protection as an acceptable compromise
or substitute for marriage. 49
They recognize that granting some
recognition to same-sex couples is either the right thing to do or the
politically expedient thing to do to avoid a court decision or legislation that
might extend traditional marriage to same-sex couples. 50 These individuals
favoring some sort of social compromise are, ostensibly, not opposed to
state recognition of a same-sex union in principle, but they oppose calling
such a union or partnership a "marriage" because they believe that doing so
will weaken or trivialize the institution of traditional opposite-sex
marriage. 51
Proponents of same-sex marriage argue that same-sex couples should
be entitled to the same benefits (and burdens) of marriage as opposite-sex
couples, and that it is a denial of due process, equal protection, and
fundamental fairness to deny marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Under
the present law, even the existence of an "acceptable" substitute for
marriage, such as a civil union or registered partnership, is inadequate. The
"separate but equal" arrangements that are allegedly equivalent to civil
marriage still deny the full rights of marriage. As the Goodridge court
recognized, "[t]he benefits accessible only by way of a marriage license are
enormous, touching nearly every aspect of life and death. 5 2 Arrangements
that do not provide the full benefits of marriage necessarily fall short of full
equality and equal protection.

rent to gay and lesbian couples, where companies must have "affirmative action programs"
to hire gay and lesbian employees, and other similar fears. The slippery slope argument
against same-sex marriage also sometimes warns that the next changes to marriage will be
to recognize polygamous marriages, incestuous marriages, and marriages between people
and their pets. The arguments are seldom serious, but are raised in hopes of convincing
people that there is a danger to granting any form of recognition to same-sex couples or to
individuals who are gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender.
49.
See, e.g., Don Browning & Elizabeth Marquardt, A MarriageMade in History?,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9,2004, at A27 ("Rather than expanding the status and privileges of
marriage to same-sex couples and then gradually to other kinds of caring relationships, as
logic would soon require, society should find alternative ways of meeting the needs not only
of same-sex couples but also interdependent friends, and dependent but unmarried kin. Tax
benefits, legal adoption, welfare transfers, and more refined and accessible legal contracts
should all be used to meet these needs - but not the institution of marriage itself.").
50.
See, e.g., Pam Belluck, How Massachusetts Left Gay Marriage at the Altar,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2004, at A8.
51.
See, e.g., Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller, "Making a Mockery of Marriage" Domestic Partnershipand Equal Rights in Hawai'i, in SEXUALITY IN THE LEGAL ARENA
113, 115 (Carl Stychin & Didi Herman, eds., Anthlone Press 2000).
52.
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955. See infra Part III and accompanying text for a
discussion of particular benefits identified in the Goodridge decision.
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Some courts have now begun to reject arguments against same-sex
marriage and to accept the arguments that same-sex couples should have
the same right to marry as opposite-sex couples.
Courts that have considered the argument that the main purpose of
marriage is procreation recognize that many opposite-sex married couples
do not have children and never even intend to have children,5 3 while at the
same time many same-sex couples do have children from previous
marriages, artificial insemination, and adoption. If married couples are not
required to have children, the purpose of marriage cannot only be to have
children. "Persons do not marry solely for the purpose of raising
children." 54
Courts also distinguish civil marriage from religious marriage.55 In a
country that separates church from state, 6 the grant or denial of a marriage
license for a civil marriage ceremony cannot force any religious group to
perform a religious ceremony for the holders of that license.57 It should
also be noted that recent religious developments - such as the appointment
of openly gay clergy - have changed the minds of many people about

53.
E.g., Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp 1119, 1124-25 (C.D. Cal., 1980)
(recognizing that opposite-sex couples are not required to prove or declare willingness to
procreate in order to marry); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 881 (Vt. 1999) (noting that "[I]t
is equally undisputed that many opposite-sex couples marry for reasons unrelated to
procreation, that some of these couples never intend to have children, and that others are
incapable of having children.").
54.
Halpern v. Toronto (City), 172 O.A.C. 276, at 99 (2003).
55.
See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (1
lth Cir. 1997).
56.
U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion ....
").
57.
See, e.g., In re Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 570
(Mass. 2004) ("the State may not interfere ...
with the decision of any religion to refuse to
perform religious marriages of same-sex couples"); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 898 (Vt.
1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("This case concerns the
secular licensing of marriage."). See also EGALE Canada, Inc. v. Canada (Attorney
General), 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1, para. 181 (2003) ("the issue before us concerns civil marriage
only and the conclusion [to allow same-sex marriage] does not displace the rights of
religious groups to refuse to solemnize same-sex marriages that do not accord with their
religious beliefs."); Halpern v. Toronto (City), 172 O.A.C. 276, at para. 53 (2003) ("In our
view, this case does not engage religious rights and freedoms. Marriage is a legal
institution, as well as a religious and social institution. This case is solely about the legal
institution of marriage. It is not about the religious validity or invalidity of various forms of
marriage. We do not view this case as, in any way, dealing or interfering with the religious
institution of marriage."). The issue of whether a church might be ordered to perform a
same-sex wedding might perhaps arise in a country with a state-sponsored church, but any
requirements to perform a same-sex marriage would be under national laws of the particular
country.
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issues of religion and homosexuality.5 8 Some religious groups welcome
and embrace gay and lesbian persons; they also perform same-sex
commitment ceremonies.59
Courts also reject the argument that governments should not recognize
same-sex marriages because society traditionally has not accepted samesex marriage. 60 Three reasons support this rejection of an argument that
society must deny recognition to same-sex marriage because it previously
rejected same-sex marriage. First, to give weight to an argument based
only on "tradition" would mean that we should never have allowed
interracial or interfaith marriages. 6 1 It would also mean that we should still
allow slavery, that we should deny women the right to vote, and that we
should repeal a range of other social advances that have been hard-won
over the years. Second, "to the extent that state action historically has been
motivated by an animus against a class, that history cannot provide a
legitimate basis for continued unequal application of the law." 62 A law
enacted on the basis of hate and animus will not withstand constitutional
scrutiny. Third, recent anti-discrimination legislative advances on the state
and local level,63 state hate crime legislation,64 and other statutes or court
decisions allowing adoption by same-sex couples 65 (except in Florida 66 and

58.
See, e.g., Episcopalians Urged to Be Tolerant on Homosexuality, CHI. TRIB.,
Jan. 30, 2004, § 2, at 10.
59.
See, e.g., Dean E. Murphy, Gay Marriage Licenses Create a Quandaryfor the
Clergy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.6, 2004, at A7 (noting that some religious institutions have been
performing same-sex blessings "for many years").
60.
E.g., Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 n.23
(Mass. 2003).
61.
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal.
1948); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 958. See also David E. Rosenbaum, Race, Sex and
Forbidden Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2003, § 4, at 4 ("As a political, legal and social
issue, same-sex marriage seems to be now where interracial marriage was about 50 years
ago.").
62.
Baker, 744 A.2d at 885.
63.
E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (Michie 1978), amended by 2003 N.M. Adv.
Legis. Serv. 3513. Federal legislation known as the Employment Non-Discrimination Act
(ENDA) is unlikely to pass in the current Congress or to be signed by the current U.S.
president.
64.
E.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.1 (2002). A federal hate crimes bill is stalled
in the U.S. Senate. See Lisa Neff, Senate Feud Stalls Hate Crimes Bill, CHI. FREE PRESS,
Apr. 7, 2004, at 3.
65.
E.g., In re K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888 (I11.
App. Ct. 1995).
66.
Florida prohibits gay and lesbian couples - and individuals - from adopting.
The Florida statute provides that "No person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if
that person is a homosexual." See Lofton v. Dep't of Children and Family Serv., 358 F.3d
804 (11 th Cir. 2004) (affirming constitutionality of 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-140, § 1, FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1997)). See also Lisa Neff, FloridaAdoption Ban Upheld,
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Mississippi), 67 showed that there was a shift from the historical
discrimination against gay and lesbian persons.68 Similar shifts toward
acceptance are also evident69 in how private companies treat gay and lesbian
employees and customers.
The recognition of lawful same-sex marriage in the United States
raises many social, legal, and political issues, particularly in a country with
a federal government structure that rejects any recognition whatsoever of
same-sex civil marriage. 70 The debate is, not surprisingly, complicated and
contentious, involving the highest levels of government, 7' in society at
large, and even within the lesbian and gay community itself.72 Some of the
legal issues that will soon arise include: whether the denial of same-sex
marriage is a denial of due process or equal protection of the laws within a

CHI. FREE PRESS, Feb. 4, 2004, at 1; Gays Trying to Adopt Lose Case in Florida - State
Claimed Right to Require Marriage,CHI. TRIB., Jan. 29, 2004, § 1, at 8.

67.
Mississippi statutes prohibit same-sex couples from adopting. MISS. CODE
ANN. § 93-17-3(2) (Supp. 2003) ("Adoption by couples of the same gender is prohibited.");
S.B. v. L.W., 793 So.2d 656, 662 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (Payne, J., concurring).
68.
See Baker, 744 A.2d at 885.
69.
Associated Press, Survey: Most U.S. Companies Protect Gay Rights, NEWSDAY,
Aug. 14, 2002, at A47; Rebecca Carroll, Working Conditionsfor Gays and Lesbians Called
Better; An Advocacy Group Said It Found Improvementsfrom Last Year at One-Third of the

Firms Surveyed, THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Aug. 26, 2003, at C02. See also Human
Rights Campaign Foundation, 21 Companies Score 100 Percent on Second Annual HRC
Corporate Equality Index (Aug. 5, 2003) at http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section
=CorporateEqualityIndex&CONTENTID= 10124&TEMPLATE=/ContentManagement/C
ontentDisplay.cfm.
70.
Many of the benefits and protections of marriage are available only at the
federal level. Even where a state recognizes same-sex marriage, the married couple will be
unable to file a joint federal tax return or to apply for federal social security and other
federal benefits that are routinely available to opposite-sex married couples, such as
favorable immigration status for a non-citizen spouse. See, e.g., Gay & Lesbian Advocates
& Defenders, Protections,Benefits and Obligations of Marriage Under Massachusetts and
Federal Law: Some Key Provisions of a Work-In-Progress (June 21, 2001), at
http://www.glad.org/publications/civilrightproject/pbosofmarriage.pdf;
Denis Symington,
Kicked Out of America, THE ADVOC., Feb. 3, 2004, at 9; Elisabeth Bumiller, Why America
Has Gay Marriage Jitters, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2003, § 4, at 1, 4. In earlier years,
homosexuality was also a ground of exclusion under the Immigration and Nationality Act.
See generally Robert J. Foss, The Demise of the Homosexual Exclusion: New Possibilities
for Gay and Lesbian Immigration,29 HARV. Civ. RTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 439 (1994).

71.

See Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Backs Ban in Constitution on Gay Marriage,N.Y.

TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at Al.

72.
See, e.g., SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON (Andrew Sullivan, ed., 1997);
Michael Simon & Jean Albright, Same-Sex MarriageHot Topic at Town Hall Event, WINDY
CITY TIMES, Jan. 21, 2004, at 26; Sara B. Miller, Gays Want the Right, But Not Necessarily
the Marriage,CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Feb. 12, 2004, at 1.
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particular state 73; whether one state's refusal to recognize another state's
lawful same-sex marriage violates principles of comity or constitutional
privileges and immunities; how employers can provide domestic
partnership benefits to married same-sex couples without jeopardizing that
are married; and whether employers should now be able to require gay and
lesbian persons to marry (or to register as domestic partners in jurisdictions
where that is available) as a condition of eligibility to extend employee
benefits to same-sex partners in the same way as benefits might be
extended to an opposite-sex spouse.74

II.

A SURVEY OF IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS: How DID WE GET
WHERE WE ARE, AND WHERE IS IT THAT WE

ARE

GOING?

Although the struggle for same-sex marriage has been waged for 30
years or more, the stories of major successes in that struggle are only
relatively recent. This section surveys the traditional prohibition on samesex civil marriage, the development of registered partnerships and samesex civil marriage in Europe, attempts in the United States to win same-sex
marriage, and decisions that now recognize same-sex marriage in Canada
and the United States.
A.

TRADITIONAL PROHIBITION

The rights (and rites) of marriage have traditionally been denied to
same-sex couples. In a series of cases litigated in the early 1970s, courts
established a framework for rationalizing the denial of equal rights to gay
and lesbian couples. For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court found
that there was no denial of due process or equal protection by limiting "the

73.
See, e.g., Kevin H. Lewis, Equal Protection After Romer v. Evans:
Implicationsfor the Defense of Marriage Act and Other Laws, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 175, 187
(1997); Jason W. Hayes, Amendment One: The Nebraska Equal Protection Clause, 32
CREIGHTON L. REV. 611, 626-27 (1998); Leigh Jones, Lawsuit Highlights Conflicts in Rights
for Same-Sex Partners, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 20, 2003, at 4, available at WL
2/20/2003 TLI 4.
74.
See, e.g., Jeffrey G. Sherman, Domestic Partnershipand ERISA Preemption 76
TULANE L. REV. 373, 383 (2001); 0 Curse of Civil Unions!, 10 GAY & LESBIAN REV.
WORLDWIDE 8 (Nov.-Dec. 2003) (describing a same-sex couple from Illinois who moved to
Vermont and were "forced to get married" by registering as Domestic Partners under
Vermont law in order to be eligible for domestic partnership benefits from a state
government employer).
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state's classification of persons authorized to marry" in a way that excluded
same-sex couples. 75 The Kentucky Supreme Court found that marriage had
"always been considered as the union of a man and a woman and we have
been presented with no authority to the contrary. 76 A court in Washington
State found there was "a rational basis for the state to limit the definition of
marriage to exclude same-sex relationships. 77 The court found that samesex couples were not being denied the right to marry because of their sex,
but were denied marriage because of "the recognized definition" of
marriage as being a relationship that "may be entered into only by two
persons who are members of the opposite sex. 78 The court concluded that
the state's refusal to grant a marriage license to a same-sex couple was not
because they were males, "but rather it is based upon the state's recognition
that our society as a whole views marriage as the,,79
appropriate and desirable
forum for procreation and the rearing of children.
These cases have been
cited as persuasive authority, even in recent court decisions. Other courts,
citing various dictionaries almost as if they were binding rather than merely
persuasive sources of authority, also concluded that there is no right to
same-marriage because of these traditional dictionary definitions.8 °
In addition to the "definitional" objections raised to same-sex
marriage, some courts noted that historical and religious traditions "could
not possibly sanction any marriage between persons of the same sex
because of the vehement condemnation in the scriptures . . . of all
homosexual relationships. 81 Despite the secular nature of marriage,
religious traditions made
civil same-sex marriages "unthinkable and, by
82
definition, impossible."
The court decisions denying same-sex marriage are not just historical
anomalies of times long past. For example, the Court of Appeals of
Arizona recently held that "the fundamental right to marry protected by our

75.
Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed for
want of a substantialfederalquestion, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
76.
Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973). "It appears that appellants
are prevented from marrying, not by the statutes of Kentucky or the refusal of the County
Clerk of Jefferson County to issue them a license, but rather by their own incapability of
entering into a marriage as that term is defined." Id.
77.
Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Wash. App. Ct. 1974), review denied, 84
Wash. 2d 1008 (1974).
78.
Id. at 1192.
79.
Id. at 1195.
80. See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 315 (D.C. App. 1995).
81.
Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 1980), affd, 673 F.2d
1036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982).
82.
Id.
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does not encompass the right to marry a
federal and state constitutions
83
same-sex partner."
In addition to the traditional prohibition against same-sex marriage,
federal and state law reflected a traditional animus toward gay and lesbian
people generally, even when laws or policies purport to protect the rights of
gays and lesbians. 84 Gay and lesbian individuals were prohibited, for
example, from serving in the armed forces of the United States.85 They are
subject to discharge from the military if they enter into a same-sex
marriage or attempt to do so. 8 6 Gay and lesbian people have been denied a
variety of rights, and have been treated as criminals. In Bowers v.
Hardwick,8 7 for example, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against a due
process challenge to the Georgia sodomy statute, finding that gay and
lesbian persons do not have "a fundamental right to engage in homosexual
sodomy. 8 The majority there said that "[n]o connection between family,
marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the
other hand ha[d] been demonstrated ...., Claiming that proscriptions
against sodomy had "ancient roots" that were carried on in the history of
criminal penalties in various states, the majority asserted that "to claim that
a right to engage in such conduct is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at best,
facetious." 90 Although Bowers itself dealt only with the constitutionality of

83.

Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 465 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). The

court stated that "although many traditional views of homosexuality have been recast over
time in [Arizona] and [the United States], the choice to marry a same-sex partner has not
taken sufficient root to receive constitutional protection as a fundamental right." Id. The
case was decided by Arizona's intermediate appellate court on October 8, 2003, before the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reached its decision recognizing a right to samesex marriage.
84.
See Stephen Barr, White House ClarifiesStance on Gay Rights - Move Seeks to
End Flap Over Federal Staff Policy, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2004, at A7; Lisa Neff, White
House: Policy ProtectsFederalGay Workers, CHI. FREE PRESS, Apr. 7, 2004, at 3.

85.

See e.g., Barry Goldwater, The Gay Ban: Just Plain Un-American, in

HOMOSEXUALITY: DEBATING THE ISSUES 183 (Robert M. Baird & M. Katherine Baird, eds.,

Prometheus Books 1995); Randy Shilts, Homosexuality in the United States Armed Forces,
in HOMOSEXUALITY: DEBATING THE ISSUES 151 (Robert M. Baird & M. Katherine Baird,
eds., Prometheus Books 1995). See also GAYS IN UNIFORM: THE PENTAGON'S SECRET
REPORTS (Kate Dyer, ed., Alyson Publications 1990); GAYS AND THE MILITARY: JOSEPH
STEFFAN VERSUS THE UNITED STATES (Marc Wolinsky & Kenneth Sherill, eds., Princeton

Univ. Press
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

1993).
10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(3) (2000).
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Id. at 191.
Id.
Id. at 192-93.
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sodomy statutes, the decision was often cited to justify other acts of
discrimination against gay and lesbian persons. 9 1 This was particularly true
in jurisdictions that still had sodomy statutes. In those jurisdictions, the
Bowers decision might be cited as support for denying child custody,92 or
for denying employment to a gay or lesbian person.93 A common argument
was that if homosexual conduct could be criminalized, then those who are
identified by their participation in that criminal conduct could not
constitute a "suspect class" for equal protection or due process
challenges.94 In other countries as well, such as Canada (which legalized
same-sex marriages in 2003), same-sex sexual relations were illegal until
1969. 95
But it is not only laws on the books that did violence to gay and
lesbian persons; there are well-documented physical acts of violence and
discrimination against gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered persons. 96
The traditional prohibitions against same-sex marriage, and traditional
animus and discrimination against gay and lesbian people generally,
produced a situation where gay and lesbian persons were denied their rights
as individuals, and where same-sex couples were denied the rights that
Because gay and lesbian people
opposite-sex couples could enjoy.
challenged traditional assumptions about gender, gender roles, and gender
hierarchy, they were "viewed as unworthy of being accorded respect for
their basic human right to intimate life ...

Although there has been

progress in non-discrimination legislation designed to protect a few basic
rights, there is still a long way to go in many jurisdictions and on a number

91.
See, e.g., Diana Hassel, The Use of Criminal Sodomy Laws in Civil Litigation,
79 TEX. L. REV. 813 (2001); Heather C. Brunelli, The Double Bind: Unequal Treatment for
Homosexuals Within the American Legal Framework, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 201, 201 03 (2000).
92.
See, e.g., S.B. v. L.W., 793 So.2d 656, 662 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (Payne, J.,
concurring) (mother denied custody because of her lesbian relationship; concurring judge
cited Bowers to support a declaration that "the legislature has clearly set forth the public
policy of our State with regard to the practice of homosexuality.").
93.
See id.; Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997).
94.
See, e.g., Baker, 744 A.2d at 890 (Dooley, J., concurring). The Court's
subsequent decisions in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), and Lawrence v. Texas, 123
S. Ct. 2472 (2003), call into question all of the interim decisions that previously relied on
Bowers v. Hardwick.
95.
See EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1,
para. 40 (2003).
96.
See, e.g., CONSTANCE DENNEY ISRAEL, HATE CRIMES AGAINST GAYS/LESBIANS
(Monument Press 1992); Lisa Neff, Study: Anti-GLBT Harassment Widespread, CHI. FREE
PRESS, Jan. 21, 2004, at 10; Lisa Neff, FBI Reports Rise in GLBT Hate Crimes, CHI. FREE
PRESS, Nov. 5, 2003, at 11.
97.
MERIN, supra note 11, at 45.
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98
of legal issues affecting gay and lesbian families in the United States.
The debate in the United States has been inspired and informed by many
international and foreign developments toward recognizing same-sex
unions and other fundamental rights.

B.

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

The debate about same-sex marriages has not been one exclusive to
the United States, of course. Nor has the struggle for equal rights and fair
treatment of same-sex couples been a struggle fought only in this country.
There have been a number of important advances around the world,
particularly in Europe. These advances, though often overlooked in the
United States, helped to frame the same-sex marriage debate as a human
rights issue of equal access to legal rights.
In the late 1980s, a few European countries began to provide certain
legal protections to same-sex couples. Some countries adopted legislation
to provide for registered partnerships. Registered partnership statutes refer
to marriage statutes, but exempt out some provisions, effectively granting
some but not all of the benefits and protections of marriage. 99 They
provide, however, more legal benefits than "domestic partner" registries
that may be available in parts of the United States.'00
Denmark was the first country to adopt registered partnerships, and it
did so in 1989 after twenty years of debate on the issue.10 1 The legislation
was passed on June 1, 1989 and entered into effect on October 1, 1989.102
10 3
The law required that at least one of the partners be a Danish citizen.
Seven years later, the Danish legislation was extended to Greenland, a selfgoverning external territory of Denmark. 104 Ten years after the legislation
was passed, it was amended to allow for second-parent adoption,

98.
For a recent development that supported an employer's efforts to include gay
and lesbian persons as part of its diversity program, see Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,
358 F.3d 599 (9th Cir. 2004).
99.
See MERIN, supra note II, at 56.
100.
Some domestic partner registries in the United States provide no benefits
whatsoever, but private individuals may use them or organizations for certain
circumstances. See generally id. at 57-59.
101.
See id. at 56, 61-67; Bent Hansen & Henning Jorgensen, The Danish
Partnership Law: Political Decision Making in Denmark and the National Danish
Organizationfor Gays and Lesbians, in THE THIRD PINK BOOK: A GLOBAL VIEW OF LESBIAN

AND GAY LIBERATION AND OPPRESSION 86, 86-99 (Aart Hendriks et al. eds., 1993).
102.
See MERIN, supra note 11, at 67.

103.

Hansen & Jorgensen, supra note 10 1, at 95.

104.

See MERIN, supra note 11, at 67 & n.28.
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something that had been denied in the original legislation. 0 5 When the
legislation was first passed in 1989 without the right to adopt children, gay
and lesbian activists appeared to accept the temporary unequal status
because they could return to the legislature later after society became more
accustomed to the idea of lawful same-sex union. °6 It is interesting to
compare the situation in the United States, which has generally allowed
second-parent adoption by same-sex couples but denied those couples the
right to marry.' 0 7 Denmark had granted same-sex couples the right to
marry but denied same-sex couples the right to adopt.
The 1989 legislation had also required that at least one person in the
08
partnership be a permanent resident of Denmark and a Danish citizen.
The 1999 amendments now require only that those intending to register be
permanent residents of Denmark for the preceding two years.' °9 It is
expected that the Danish law will be further amended in the future to
provide for the full rights of marriage that are available to opposite-sex
couples." 10
Norway was the second country to enact registered partner legislation,
which became effective for same-sex couples in that country in August
1993."' The legislation refers to the Norwegian marriage statutes, but as
with the Danish legislation, the Norwegian legislation did not allow

See id. at 67-68, 73-75, 344-45.
105.
106.
There has always been debate as to whether it is preferable to change the law
first and have society become accustomed to the new situation, or whether it is preferable to
change societal values first and then enact a law that recognizes a more tolerant societal
norm. See, e.g., Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to
Make Social Change, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967 (1997).
The term "second parent adoption" recognizes a particular problem when same107.
sex couples adopt. For example, a parent who places a child up for adoption will normally
lose his or her own parental rights when the child is adopted. In same-sex couples,
however, a birth mother will not want to give up her own parental rights; she will want to
add a second mother because that will be in the best interests of the child. The most recent
recognition of the importance of allowing second parent adoption was in a case from
Indiana. See In re adoption of K.S.P., No. 56A03-0309-CV-375, 2004 WL 557345 (Ind. Ct.
App. Mar. 23, 2004)("We conclude that where.., the prospective adoptive parent and the
biological parent are both in fact acting as parents, Indiana law does not require a
destructive choice between the two parents. Allowing continuation of the rights of both the
biological and adoptive parent, where compelled by the best interests of the child, is the
only rational result.").
108.
See MERIN, supra note 11, at 70.
109.
See id. at 70, 77-78.
110.
See id. at 79-80. See also Ingrid Lund-Andersen, The Danish Registered
PartnershipAct, 1989: Has the Act Meant a Change in Attitudes?, in LEGAL RECOGNITION
OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

417 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenws eds., 2001).
See MERIN, supra note 11, at 80, 86, 89.
111.
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registered partners to adopt children.' 12 But approximately 800 other rules
from 120 laws applicable to married couples now also apply to same-sex
registered partners." 3 It is significant that the legislation passed even
though there was no evidence of popular majority support for its passage.
However, as one Member of Parliament noted, "the rights for minorities,
which this is all about, probably is the kind of case where we can trust least
in public opinion and opinion polls, and this is an area where we, as
politicians,4 have a responsibility to take the lead and establish the norms of
society."'

Sweden had given some recognition to same-sex couples as early as
1987, when it amended its family law to provide unmarried cohabitants
some limited rights in property acquired by either party while they were
living together - such as rights to a home and its furnishings - if the parties
were living in a "marriage-like" relationship." 5 In 1988, another law in
Sweden called the Homosexual Cohabitants Act extended to same-sex
couples the provisions of other laws, including laws relating to housing,
inheritance, and taxes. 1 6 In 1994, the Swedish parliament passed the
Registered Partnership Act, which entered into effect on January 1, 1995.'17
As with its neighbors Denmark and Norway, the Swedish legislation
granted all the rights of marriage except 1for
certain laws relating to
18
adoption, joint custody, and church weddings.'
Iceland passed a Registered Partnership Act that became effective in
June 1996.119 Iceland's law contains similar protections and exceptions as
the laws of its Scandinavian neighbors. 120 There is an important difference,
however, in that Iceland will allow registered partners to have joint
guardianship and custody of biological children, but only if the biological
parent had sole custody at the time of registration.12 1 It is again interesting

112. See id. 89, 92-93. See also id. at 345 (English translation of the legislation).
113. See MERIN, supra note 11, at 90.
114. See id. at 91.
115. See id. at 94-96.
116. Id. at 96-97.
117.
Id. at 98-99. See also id. at 346-48 (English translation of the legislation).
118. See MERIN, supra note 11, at 99. See also Hans Ytterberg, From Society's
Point of View, Cohabitation Between Two Persons of the Same Sex is a Perfectly Acceptable
Form of Family Life: A Swedish Story of Love and Legislation, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF
SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

427

(Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenws eds., 2001).
119. See MERIN, supra note II, at 103-04. See also id. at 348-49 (English translation
of legislation); Rex Wockner, Half of EU Recognizes Gay and Lesbian Couples, WINDY
CITY TIMES, Mar. 26, 2003, at 13.
120.
See MERIN, supra note 11, at 105-07.
121.
Id. at 107.
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to compare the situation to that in the United States, which generally allows
same-sex couples to adopt children, 2 2 but does not afford those same-sex
rights comparable to those available under a registered partnership law.
The Netherlands adopted registered partnership legislation that
became effective on January 1, 1998.123 The Dutch law allowed both
same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples to register. I1 4 In 2001, the
Netherlands became
the first country in the world to recognize civil same25
1
marriage.
sex
Finland adopted a registered partnership law in 2002.126 Benefiting
from the earlier experiences of its Nordic neighbors, Finland's lawmakers
were able to provide some additional benefits and protections to same-sex
couples. For example, artificial insemination services are available to
lesbian couples. 27 The law also left unaffected an earlier interpretation of
the Child Custody law that allowed same-sex couples to gain joint custody
of children. 2 8
There is, however, no right to adopt children. 129
Registration is available to those who resided in Finland for the previous
two years; the residency requirement is waived if one of the parties is a
citizen of Finland.1 30 The law also recognizes foreign partnerships
that are
3
valid under the laws of the country where they were contracted.' '
Other countries have also enacted various provisions to recognize
same-sex partnerships at the national level.

122.
Florida is the only state that prohibits any individual gay or lesbian person from
adopting children. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2002) ("No person eligible to adopt under this
statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual."). The constitutionality of that Florida
statute was recently affirmed in a widely-criticized decision, See Lofton v. Gilmore, No.
01-16723 (11 th Cir. Jan. 28, 2004). See also Lisa Neff, FloridaAdoption Ban Upheld, CHI.
FREE PRESS, Feb. 4, 2004, at 1; Gays Trying to Adopt Lose Case in Florida, CHI. TRIB., Jan.
29, 2004, § 1, at 8. Mississippi statutes prohibit same-sex couples from adopting. Miss.
CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(2) (Supp. 2000) ("Adoption by couples of the same gender is
prohibited."); S.B. v. L.W., 793 So.2d 656, 662 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (Payne, J.,
concurring) (denying custody to a lesbian mother).
123.
See MERIN, supra note 1I, at 111.
124.
See id. at 56.
125.
See, e.g., Kees Waaldijk, Small Change: How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage
Got Paved in the Netherlands, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A
STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 437 (Robert Wintemute & Mads
Andenas eds., 2001).
126.
See MERIN, supra note 11, at 56. See also id. at 349-50.
127.
MERIN, supra note 11, at 109.
128.
Id.at 109-10.
129.
Id. at 110.
130. Id.
131.
Id.
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In Hungary, the Common Law Marriage Act of 1996 extended the
definition of "common law marriage" to same-sex couples. 132 These
couples now have the same rights (and duties) as common law opposite-sex
couples.133 This legislation followed a decision in March 1995 from the
Hungarian Constitutional Court, which had ruled that it was "arbitrary and
contrary to human dignity . . .that the law (on common law marriages)
withholds recognition from couples living in an economic and emotional
union simply because they are [of the] same-sex."' 134 The court ordered the
parliament to make appropriate legislative changes, which it did in the
Common Law Marriage Act enacted on May 21, 1996. 35 The new
common law marriage in Hungary gives most of the rights of civil
marriage, including inheritance rights, pension and social security rights,
36
other common property rights, and the immunity from spousal testimony. 1
The Hungarian court's ruling came as somewhat of a surprise in light of the
well-documented discrimination and intolerance frequently faced by gay
and lesbian persons in Hungary. 137 Yuval Merin explains that the
Hungarian development was partially based on a belief that "it would be
politically and economically advantageous to appear socially tolerant" to
the European Union. 138 Although Hungary's road to common law samesex marriage is somewhat of an anomaly, 139 the Hungarian example is
nonetheless one that should not be forgotten because it is the current law in
Hungary to recognize common law same-sex marriages.
In Belgium, legislation passed in 1998 allowed for "statutory
cohabitation" starting in January 2000.140 The law regulates any two adults
who live together, including same-sex and opposite-sex couples. 14
Because the law applies to any two cohabitating adults, adult siblings who

132.
133.
134.

13 1.
See id. at 60.
See id. at 13 1; Lilla Farkas, Nice on Paper: The Aborted Liberalisation of Gay
MERIN, supra note 11, at

Rights in Hungary, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF

NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 563, 567 (Robert Wintemute & Mads

Andenms eds., 2001).
135.
MERIN, supra note 11, at 131.
136.
See id. at 131; Farkas, supra note 134, at 569-71.
137.
See, e.g., MERIN, supra note 11, at 132.
138.
Id.
139.
Id. at 134.
140.
See id. 60, 147. See also Olivier De Schutter & Anne Weyembergh, Statutory
Cohabitation Under Belgian Law: A Step Toward Same-Sex Marriage?, in LEGAL
RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND

INTERNATIONAL LAW 465 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenas eds., 2001).
141.
See MERIN, supra note 11, at 60.
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live together may also use the law. 142 There has never been a requirement
that those living together have sexual relations; if the nature of the
relationship is merely one of mutual support and dependence, it seems right
to include all adults living together in such a situation.
In France, the Pacte Civil de Soliaritjprovides fewer legal rights than
the registered partnership model of other countries, but more rights than the
American domestic partnership registries. 143 It was enacted in 1999.14" In
addition to creating a new institution for France, it defined "co-habitation"
as "a de-facto stable and continuous relationship between
two persons of
145
the opposite or same sex, who live together as a couple."'
Germany adopted legislation that recognized only a limited number of
rights for same-sex couples.'n6 The Law on Ending Discrimination Against
Same-Sex Communities: Life Partnerships became law on February 16,
2001 and entered into force on August 1, 2001.47 It created a new legal
institution called Lebenspartnerschaft (life partnership), 48 but it provides
only limited rights. 49 Other legislation that would have granted certain
economic benefits to same-sex couples was unsuccessful.1 50 Gay and
lesbian persons in Germany have not previously received any federal
recognition of their rights, and the legal situation of gay and lesbian
persons in Germany is still described
as lagging behind other countries that
15 1
partnerships.
same-sex
recognize

142.
See id. at 148.
143.
See id. at 59-60.
144.
Id. at 59, 141. Although the legislation does not allow same-sex couples to
have the full rights of marriage, the popular (mis)understanding among many living in
France is that their country allows "gay marriage."
145.
Id. at 141. See also Daniel Borillo, The "Pacte Civil de Solidaritj"in France:
Midway Between Marriage and Cohabitation, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX
PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 475 (Robert
Wintemute & Mads Andenws eds., 2001).
146.
See MERIN, supra note 11, at 60; Roland Schimmel & Stefanie Heun, The Legal
Situation of Same-Sex Partnershipsin Germany: An Overview, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF

A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN
589 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andemes eds., 2001).
147.
Schimmel & Heun, supra note 146, at 589.
148.
Id.
SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS:

149.

AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

575,

See, e.g., Rex Wockner, No Tax Break for German Gays, WINDY CITY TIMES,

Jan. 28, 2004, at 9 (noting that same-sex couples united under Germany's civil union law
cannot pay taxes as if they were married).
150.
See MERIN, supra note 11, at 60. See also Schimmel & Heun, supra note 146,
at 590.
151.
See MERIN, supra note Ii,at 142-43. See also Schimmel & Heun, supra note
146, at 575.
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In Portugal, legislation enacted in March 2001 to authorize
partnerships applies to both opposite-sex and same-sex couples. 52 The
Portuguese legislation does not provide as many rights as the legislation in
Belgium, France, Germany, or Hungary. 153 Portugal had earlier provided
some indirect rights for same-sex couples, such as in the housing law,
154
which gave surviving partners a preferential right to continue a lease.
The new legislation in Portugal offers some additional protections in
housing, employment benefits, and some property rights. 155
The first country to extend civil marriage to same-sex couples was the
Netherlands, which did so in legislation that became effective on April 1,
2001.156 The Dutch law states simply that "[a] marriage
can be contracted
157
sex."
same
the
of
or
sex
different
of
persons
two
by
The Dutch same-sex marriage legislation did not repeal the earlier
158
registered partnership legislation; both are allowed for the present time.
It is possible to convert a registered partnership into a marriage, and it is
possible to convert a marriage into a registered partnership. 59 There is
even anecdotal evidence that many opposite-sex married couples are
converting their marriages to registered partnerships not to take advantage
of any legal benefits that are unavailable to married couples, but to be able
to dissolve the registered partnership more easily than by obtaining a
divorce. The Netherlands also amended its laws to permit adoptions by
same-sex couples, a right that remains largely unavailable in nations with
registered partnerships. '60
Following the example of its neighbor, Belgium amended its law on
January 30, 2003 to provide the full rights of marriage to same-sex
couples.' 61 Unfortunately, the adoption law in Belgium was not also

152.
See MERIN, supra note 11, at 60, 134. See also Rex Wockner, Half of EU
Recognizes Gay and Lesbian Couples, WINDY CITY TIMES, Mar. 26, 2003, at 13.
153.
See MERIN, supra note 11, at 60. See also S. Predrag, LGBT News and Views
from Around the World: Belgium, LESBIAN NEWS, Jan. 2004, at 18.
154.
See MERIN, supra note 11, at 134.

155.
156.

See id. at 135-36.
Id. at 56. See also Kees Waaldijk, Small Change: How the Road to Same-Sex

Marriage Got Paved in the Netherlands, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX
PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 437 (Robert

Wintemute & Mads Andenws eds., 2001).
157.
MERIN, supra note 11, at 352 (English translation of legislation).
158.
See id. at 56, 115.
159.
See id. at 56.
160.
See id. at 119-23.
161.
See, e.g., Rex Wockner, Belgian Wedding Numbers Released, WINDY CITY
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2003, at 12.
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62
amended, so that same-sex couples can marry but cannot be co-parents)
In all other areas of the law, same-sex couples in Belgium have enjoyed the
full rights of marriage since the law entered into effect on June 16, 2003.163
In addition, after February 6, 2004, Belgium began to recognize marriages
between non-Belgian same-sex couples, as long as at least one partner lives
in or visits the country regularly. 164
In addition to the foreign legislative developments identified, other
nations to afford some-recognition to same-sex couples include

Australia, 165 New Zealand, 166 South Africa, 167 Israel, 168 and Brazil. 169 Other

jurisdictions are also making national or local progress toward providing

162.

See S. Predrag, LGBT News and Views from Around the World: Belgium,

LESBIAN NEWS, Jan. 2004, at 18.

163.
See, e.g., http://www.samesexmarriage.ca/equality/world.html#belgium (visited
April 12, 2004). See also Rex Wockner, Belgian Wedding Numbers Released, WINDY CITY
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2003, at 12.

164.
See, e.g., http://www.samesexmarriage.ca/equality/world.html#begium (visited
April 12, 2004).
165.
See Justice Michael Kirby, Same-Sex Relationships: An Australian Perspective
on a Global Issue, LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF
NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 7, 11-21 (Robert Wintemute & Mads

Andenes, eds., 2001); MERIN, supra note 11, at 59, 170-73. See also John Hart, Gay and
Lesbian Couple Immigration to Australia:Pressure Group Compromises and Achievements,
in THE THIRD PINK BOOK: A GLOBAL VIEW OF LESBIAN AND GAY LIBERATION AND
OPPRESSION 100 (Aart Hendriks et al. eds., 1993).

166.

See MERIN, supra note 11, at 59, 173-76; Rex Wockner, New Zealand Plans

Civil Unions, WINDY CITY TIMES, Feb. 18, 2004, at 5. See also Nigel Christie, The New

Zealand Same-Sex Marriage Case: From Aotearoa to the United Nations, in LEGAL
RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 317, 334-35 (Robert Wintemute & Mads AndenEes, eds., 2001).

"Aotearoa" is the Maori name for the islands we know as New Zealand.
167.
See MERIN, supra note 11, at 357; Craig Lind, Politics, PartnershipRights and
the Constitution in South Africa . . . (and the Problem of Sexual Identity), in LEGAL
RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 279, 289-90 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenes, eds., 2001). See

also Pierre de Vos, The Constitution Made Us Queer: The Sexual OrientationClause in the
South African Constitution and the Emergence of Gay and Lesbian Identity, in SEXUALITY
INTHE LEGAL ARENA 194 (Carl Stychin & Didi Herman, eds., 2000).

168.
See MERIN, supra note 11, at 356-57; Aeyal M. Gross, Challenges to
Compulsory Heterosexuality: Recognition and Non-Recognition of Same-Sex Couples in
Israeli Law, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL,

391 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenes, eds.,
2001).
169.
See MERIN, supra note 11, at 357-58; Marcelo Dealtry Turra, Brazil's Proposed
"Civil Unions Between Persons of the Same Sex": Legislative Inaction and Judicial
EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Reactions, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL,
EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

337 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenes, eds., 2001).
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70
some form of recognition for same-sex relationships.'
Other countries
72 Switzerland, 173
71
Spain,
Kingdom,'
United
the
seeing progress include
and the Czech Republic. 74 For whatever advances there are, however,
there are always other countries - such as Austria, 175 Ireland, 7 6 Italy, 177 and
other countries178 - where legal progress for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgendered persons seems difficult to achieve in any real measure. 179

170.
There are even reports of quite unexpected jurisdictions making progress
toward same-sex marriage. See, e.g., Rex Wockner, Taiwan Plans to Legalize [Same-Sex]
Marriage, WINDY CITY TIMES, Nov. 12, 2003, at 12. Where national progress is not being

made, there is sometimes progress at the local level.
171.
See S. Predrag, LGBT News and Views from Around the World: England,
LESBIAN NEWS, Jan. 2004, at 18; U.K. PartnerBill Introduced, CHI. FREE PRESS, Apr. 7,

2004, at 1. See also Rebecca Bailey-Harris, Same-Sex Partnershipsin English Family Law,
in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 605 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenes, eds., 2001).

172.
See Rex Wockner, Spanish Marriage Challenge Begins, WINDY CITY TIMES,
Nov. 12, 2003, at 12; MERIN, supra note 11, at 151-59. See also Nicolds Prrez Cdinovas,
Spain: The Heterosexual State Refuses to Disappear,in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX
PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 437 (Robert
Wintemute & Mads Andenxs, eds., 2001); Francesc Jaurena i Salas, The Law on Stable
Unions of Couples in the Catalonia Autonomous Community of Spain, in LEGAL
RECOGNITION

OF SAME-SEX

PARTNERSHIPS:

A STUDY

OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN

AND

INTERNATIONAL LAW 437 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenes, eds., 2001).

173.
See MERIN, supra note 11, at 156-58; Franqois E. Baur, At the End of the Fairy
Tale, Will Heidi Stay Single? Same-Sex Partnerships in Switzerland, in LEGAL
RECOGNITION

OF SAME-SEX

PARTNERSHIPS:

A STUDY

OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN

AND

INTERNATIONAL LAW 531 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenes, eds., 2001); S. Predrag,
LGBT News and Views from Around the World: Switzerland, LESBIAN NEWS, Jan. 2004, at
18.
174.
See MERIN, supra note 11, at 158-59.
175.
See, e.g., Helmut Gaupner, The First Will Be the Last: Legal Recognition of
Same-Sex Partnershipsin Austria, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A
STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 549, 561 (Robert Wintemute &

Mads Andenes, eds., 200 l)(lamenting that Austria has made little progress toward same-sex
marriage).
176.
See, e.g., Leo Flynn, From Individual Protection to Recognition of
Relationships? Same-Sex Couples and the Irish Experience of Sexual Orientation Law
Reform, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL,
EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 591 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenes, eds., 2001).

177.
See MERIN, supra note 11, at 155-56; Gioia Scappucci, Italy Walking a
Tightrope Between Stockholm and the Vatican: Will Legal Recognition of Same-Sex
PartnershipsEver Occur?, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY
OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 519 (Robert Wintemute & Mads

Anden.es, eds., 2001).
178.
See, e.g., Macedonia: Tolerance OK, But Not for Gays, THE ADVOC., Feb. 17,
2004, at 15.
179.
Indeed, in some countries progress is nowhere to be seen. See, e.g., Gary
Barlow, Egyptian Court Orders Jail for 21 Gay Men in Retrial, CHI. FREE PRESS, Mar. 19,
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C.
SUCCESS FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES, STOLEN
BY AMENDMENTS TO THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS OF HAWAI'I AND ALASKA

Advocates of same-sex marriage realized that a political consensus on
same-sex marriage was not realistic, even if the denial of the right to marry
was a violation of fundamental fairness. There were, instead, attempts to
have the courts recognize same-sex marriage. The first case to achieve
some measure of success was litigated in Hawai'i, 180 but a subsequent
8
amendment to the state constitution rendered that victory a hollow one.' '
Although the court ruling was mooted by the amendment, Baehr v.
Lewin' 82 remains significant as a spark that ignited widespread awareness
that same-sex
couples wanted - and deserved - recognition of their
1 83

relationships.
The case began in 1991, when several couples in Hawai'i sued for a
declaratory judgment that the denial of marriage licenses to same-sex
couples violated the privacy and equal protection provisions of the Hawai'i
State Constitution.
The Hawai'i Constitution provides that "[n]o person
shall . . . be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the

enjoyment of the person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the
exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex, or ancestry."'' 85 The couples
argued that the state's denial of marriage licenses to same-sex
86 couples
violated their right to privacy, equal protection, and due process.'
The Hawai'i Supreme Court, citing the U.S. Supreme Court's
antimiscegination decision in Loving v. Virginia,187 stated that marriage
was a vital personal right essential to the pursuit of happiness.1 88 The court
also found that the plain language of the Hawai'i Constitution prohibited
"state-sanctioned discrimination against any person in the exercise of his or
her civil rights on the basis of sex.' 89 The court found that the denial of a
marriage license to an individual because of the sex of the person they

2003, at 4; Rex Wockner, Egyptian Arrests Continue, WINDY CITY TIMES, Mar. 10, 2004, at
11.

180.

Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 53 (Haw. 1993).

181.

HAW. CONST. art. 1 § 23.

182.
852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
183.
The national and international dialogue on recognizing same-sex relationships
is, of course, a dialogue that will continue for many years.
184.

Baehr, 852 P.2d at 53.

185.
186.

HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5.
Baehr, 852 P.2d at 52.

187.

388 U.S. 1 (1967).

188.
189.

Baehr, 852 P.2d at 53.
Id. at 60.
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wanted to marry was discrimination based on sex.' 9° Consequently, under
the heightened scrutiny standard, the State of Hawai'i had the burden of
justifying the state's refusal to allow same-sex couples to marry.
Judge James S. Bums, a judge of the Hawai'i Intermediate Court of
Appeals who was sitting by designation on the Supreme Court, wondered
in a concurring opinion whether heterosexuality, homosexuality,
bisexuality, and asexuality were "biologically fated."' 9' Judge Bums wrote
that if people had no control over their sexual orientation, he would find
that the Hawai'i Constitution "probably bars the State from discriminating
against the sexual orientation difference by permitting opposite-sex
Hawai'i Civil Law Marriages and not permitting same-sex Hawai'i Civil
Law Marriages."' 192 If sexual orientation was not biological, in Judge
Burns' view the state could lawfully prohibit same-sex marriages without
violating the state constitution. 193
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Waller M. Heen, another judge of the
Hawai'i Intermediate Court of Appeals who was sitting by designation on
the Supreme Court, wrote that the Hawai'i marriage statutes treated all
persons alike in that they "applied equally to both sexes." 1 94 Judge Heen
found no effects of invidious discrimination based on sex because a man
could not marry another man, and a woman could not marry another
woman. He stated: "Neither sex is being granted a right or benefit the
other does not have, and neither sex is being denied a right or benefit the
other has."' 195 In his dissenting view, Judge Heen found that the statutory
classification was "designed to promote the legislative purpose of fostering
and protecting the propagation of the human race through heterosexual
marriage ....,,196

Although the Hawai'i Supreme Court could have declared
immediately that the marriage statutes violated the state constitution, the
court instead remanded the case to allow the state government to
demonstrate a compelling state interest in limiting marriage to opposite-sex
couples. 197 The state collected its reasons amid a flurry of local, national,
and international public debate on the merits of same-sex marriage.

190.
Id. at51.
191.
Id. at 69 (Bums, J.,
concurring).
192.
Id. at 91.
193.
Id. at 70.
194.
Id. at 71 (Heen, J., dissenting). This line of analysis is similar to stating that a
ban on interracial marriage treated all races equally, because every individual could still
marry a person of their own race (just as they can still marry a person of the opposite sex).
195.
Id. (Heen, J., dissenting).
196.
Id. at 74 (Heen, J.,
dissenting).
197.
Id. at 74.
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On remand, the state asserted that the sex-based classification of
marriage furthered "compelling state interests" such as promoting the wellbeing of children and families and that the limitation of marriage to
opposite-sex couples was "narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary
abridgements of constitutional rights.' 98 The Hawai'i Circuit Court
rejected the state's arguments as insufficient to justify a violation of rights
under the state constitution. 99 The court found that the state had "failed to
establish or prove that the public interest in the well-being of children and
families, or the optimal development of children[,] will be adversely
affected by same-sex marriage. ' 2° The decision was appealed to the
Hawai'i Supreme Court.2° 1
Fearing that the state would be unable to provide a compelling reason
for its line drawing, opponents of same-sex marriage moved to amend the
Hawai'i State Constitution to prohibit same-sex marriage. The Hawai'i
voters approved a proposed amendment on November 3, 1998. The new
section to the Hawai'i State Constitution provided: "The legislature shall
have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples. 20 2
The constitutional amendment deprived the plaintiffs of the
constitutional argument and mooted the case that was pending on appeal.
However, increased awareness of the issues led the state of Hawai'i to
create a "reciprocal beneficiary" compromise to provide a limited number
of important benefits, including hospital visitation, certain tax benefits
under state law, the ability to sue for certain torts, and certain inheritance
rights under state law.20 3
Meanwhile, in another part of the Pacific Ocean, the state of Alaska
took center stage in the same-sex marriage spotlight. In February 1998,
Alaska Superior Court Judge Peter Michalski ruled that two men - Jay
Brause and Gene Dugan - had a fundamental right to choose their life
partner, and that the State of Alaska had to show a compelling state interest

198.
199.
1996).

Id.
Baehr v. Miike, No. Civ. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3,

200.
Id. For a description of the trial testimony, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. &
NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER & THE LAW 1074-76 (2d ed., Foundation Press 2004).
201.
The appeal was filed in early 1997, but the Hawai'i Supreme Court did not rule
on the case until December 1999.
202.
HAW. CONST. art. 1,§ 23.
203.
HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-1 (Supp. 2003). See also Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller,
"Making a Mockery of Marriage" - Domestic Partnershipand Equal Rights in Hawai'i, in
SEXUALITY INTHE LEGAL ARENA 113, 115 (Carl Stychin & Didi Herman, eds., Anthlone
Press 2000).
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for banning same-sex marriage. 204 The potential recognition of same-sex
marriage in more than one state fueled fears that all states would eventually
have to recognize same-sex marriage. Rather than waiting for the state to
prove a compelling state interest to justify its disparate treatment of samesex couples, opponents of same-sex marriage replicated the strategy they
had used in Hawai'i and successfully organized an effort to amend the
Alaska State Constitution.2 5 The new provision stated, "a marriage may
exist only between one man and one woman. ' 2° The state constitutional
amendment effectively ended the ability to win same-sex marriage in
Alaska through the judicial system.
The success that anti-gay groups found in amending the state
constitutions of Hawai'i and Alaska underlie current attempts
to amend
2 8
27
other state constitutions and, indeed, the federal constitution. 0
D.

THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT

Alarmed by the prospect that Alaska, Hawai'i, or some other state
might actually legalize same-sex marriage or find unconstitutional the
continued prohibition against same-sex marriage, political forces at the
national and state level moved to "score points in an election year" by
enacting laws that purported to "defend" traditional marriage. 20 9 These
forces succeeded at the national level, even though there was not then any

204.
Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743
(Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998). See also Greg Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions: The New
Language of Marriage, 25 VT. L. REv. 15, 22-24 (2000) (describing personal difficulties
that the plaintiffs suffered after filing their successful challenge to the restriction against
same-sex marriage).
205.
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25.
206.
Id.
207.
See, e.g., Gays and Marriage, STATE LEGISLATURES, Jan. 2004, at 6; Pam
Belluck, The Gay-MarriageDebate Resumes in Massachusetts - Legislators Battle Again
Over Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2004, at A14; Gay Marriage Ban Advances in
Wisconsin, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 13, 2004, § I, at 10.
208.
See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Backs Ban in Constitution on Gay Marriage,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at AI; David D. Kirkpatrick, Bush Assures Evangelicals of His
Commitment to Amendment on Marriage,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2004, at A14; Cheney Backs
Gay Nuptial Ban, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 3, 2004, § I, at 9.
209.
See, e.g., Noel C. Paul & Amanda Paulson, Gay Marriage Divide Roils States,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Feb. 6, 2004, at 1;Donald P. Haider-Markel, The Marrying
Kind? Defense, Morality, Civil Rights, and Family: The Evolution of Lesbian and Gay
Issues in the U.S. Congress, in QUEER FAMILIES, QUEER POLITICS: CHALLENGING CULTURE

AND THE STATE 358, 358 (Mary Bernstein & Renate Reimann, eds., Columbia Univ. Press
2001).
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jurisdiction that recognized civil same-sex marriage. The federal Defense
of Marriage Act (DOMA) provided that:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of
any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various
administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States,
the word "marriage" means only a legal union between one
man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word
"spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is
21°
a husband or a wife.
In addition to prohibiting any recognition of same-sex marriage for
federal purposes (such as federal income tax, social security, immigration,
or any number of other rights or benefits recognized under federal law),
DOMA also purported to allow states the right to ignore a valid same-sex
marriage from another state.2 "
In addition to the federal DOMA statute, the forces opposing samesex marriage were also largely successful in a number of states that enacted
"baby-DOMA" statutes in an attempt to ensure that same-sex marriages
would not be recognized within their borders.212 For example, Arizona
amended its statutes to provide: "Marriage between persons of the same sex
is void and prohibited., 21 3 Mississippi amended its statutes to provide:
"Any marriage between persons of the same gender is prohibited and null
and void from the beginning. Any marriage between persons of the same
gender that is valid in another jurisdiction does not constitute a legal or
valid marriage in Mississippi.

'214

The Illinois statutes were amended to

declare that "[a] marriage between [two] individuals of the same sex is
contrary to the public policy of [Illinois].,, 215 The Ohio legislature passed a
DOMA statute that not only banned same-sex couples from marrying, but
also prohibited state agencies from extending benefits to the same-sex

210.
Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (creating I U.S.C. § 7).
211.
Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (creating 28 U.S.C. § 1738C). See also, e.g.,
Elisabeth Bumiller, Why America Has Gay MarriageJitters, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2003, §
4, at 1, 4. DOMA has been criticized as "codified ignorance, prejudice, and fear." Deborah
A. Batts, Repeal DOMA, 30 HuM. RTS. 2 (Summer 2003).
212.
See, e.g., David B. Cruz, "Just Don't Call It Marriage": The FirstAmendment
and Marriageas an Expressive Resource, 74 S.CAL. L. REv. 925,946 (2001).
213.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101 (C) (West 2000).
214.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1(2) (1994 & Supp. 2003).
215.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/212(a)(5), 5/213.1 (2002).
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partners of state employees.2 16 It was described as "one of the most
,,217
sweeping bans on same-sex unions in the country.
The advent of same-sex civil marriage brings with it the promise of
legal challenges to the federal and state legislation that purports to limit the
recognition of civil same-sex marriages that are lawfully performed.2" 1
Until now there has not been a live "case or controversy" with which to
challenge the constitutionality of the federal DOMA and the "babyDOMA" state statutes, although there have been some challenges to
particular aspects of state anti-gay legislation. 21 9 Fearing that a federal or
state court will declare these discriminatory federal and state statutes to be
unconstitutional, 220 opponents of same-sex marriage began calling for a
"Federal Marriage Amendment" 221 to the U.S. Constitution. 222 Even though
the effort to amend the federal constitution is unlikely to prevail because of
the extraordinary measures required to amend it,22 3 these efforts to

216.
James Dao, Ohio Legislature Votes to Ban Same-Sex Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
4, 2004, at A12; Ohio Legislators OK Gay-Union Ban - Measure Also Bars State Benefits
for Domestic Partners, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 4, 2004, § 1, at 14; Stevenson Swanson, Same-Sex
Marriage Leaping Into Election, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 15, 2004, § 1, at 1. See also H.B. 234 § 1,

124th Gen. Assembly (Ohio 2001) (proposing addition to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3101.01);
Katrina C. Rose, Three Names in Ohio: In re Bicknell, In re Maloney, and Hope for
Recognition That the Gay-Transgender Twain Has Met, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 89, 91
(2002).
217.
James Dao, Ohio Legislature Votes to Ban Same-Sex Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
4, 2004, at A 12.
218.
See generally, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense
of Marriage Act is Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. I (1997); Bonnie Miller Rubin, SameSex Couples See Some Light, But Conservatives Call State Ruling Slippery Slope, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 19, 2003, § 1, at 30.
219.
See Lisa Neff, Judge OKs [Nebraska] Marriage Suit, CHI. FREE PRESS, Nov.
19, 2003, at 10.
220.
See, e.g., Veronica C. Abreu, Note, The Malleable Use of History in
Substantive Due Process Jurisprudence: How the "Deeply Rooted" Test Should Not Be a
Barrier to Finding the Defense of Marriage Act Unconstitutional Under the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, 44 B.C. L. REV. 177 (2002).
221.
Bob Roehr, Tinkering With the Marriage Amendment, WINDY CITY TIMES, Nov.
19, 2003, at 5.

222.
See, e.g., Jan Crawford Greenburg, Gay Marriage Ban Rejected: Massachusetts
Court Throws Out State Law It Says Is Rooted In Prejudice, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19, 2003, § 1,
at 1, 30; Bonnie Miller Rubin, Same-Sex Couples See Some Light, But Conservatives Call
State Ruling Slippery Slope, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19, 2003, § 1, at 30; Bob Roehr, Bush's
'Union' Nixes Gays, WINDY CITY TIMES, Jan. 28, 2004, at 1; Lisa Neff, Bush: No to Gay
Marriage - Same-sex Unions Opposed in State of the Union, CHI. FREE PRESS, Jan. 28,
2004, at 1. See also Bob Roehr, Bush Urges $1.5 Billion for Hetero Marriage, WINDY CITY
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2004, at 1.
223.
See U.S. CONST. art. V.
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incorporate discrimination into the constitution must still be fought and
condemned.224
Efforts to amend state constitutions will also continue, reflecting an
animus and fear of extending the same rights of marriage to same-sex
couples. 225 In some states, those efforts will fail. In other states, those
efforts may succeed. Where a state constitution is amended to prohibit
same-sex marriage, that amendment should be challenged using the
226
authority of Romer v. Evans,6
where the U.S. Supreme Court found an
amendment to the Colorado State Constitution violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.
E.

ROMER V. EVANS

Long before the issue of same-sex marriage was in the minds of many
persons, there were successful efforts to add sexual orientation and gender
identity to the categories of non-discrimination in employment, housing,
and public accommodation. There were many unsuccessful efforts as well,
of course, but gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered persons did win
many legislative battles on the state and local levels. But that "success"
was sometimes met with a backlash. In Colorado, for example, opposition
arose to gay and lesbian people after a number of municipalities had
enacted ordinances prohibiting discrimination based on sexual
orientation.22 7 A ballot amendment to the Colorado State Constitution
removed the protections that local cities had enacted to prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation.2 28

224.
See, e.g., Preserving the Constitution, Chi. Trib., Mar. 7, 2004, § 2, at 8
(editorial) ("The Constitution was designed so that it would be changed only for important
purposes enjoying broad, lasting popular support. It's by no means clear that public
opposition to gay marriage is sufficient to overcome the hurdles of the amendment
process.").
225.
See, e.g., Tracy Baim, MarriageBattle in Illinois, WINDY CITY TIMES, Jan. 21,
2004, at I; Gary Barlow, State [Representatives]ProposeAnti-Gay Amendments, CHI. FREE
PRESS, Jan. 21, 2004, at 1; Illinois Marriage Legislative Fight, WINDY CITY TIMES, Jan. 28,

2004, at 4. But see also Gary Barlow, State Officers Oppose Anti-Gay Amendment, CHI.
FREE PRESS, Jan. 28, 2004, at I (noting opposition of state constitutional officers to a
proposed anti-gay amendment to the Illinois State Constitution). See also Utah to Face
Anti-Gay MarriageBill, CHI. FREE PRESS, Nov. 19, 2003, at 10.
226.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
227.
See, e.g., STEPHEN BRANSFORD, GAY POLITICS VS. COLORADO AND AMERICA:
THE INSIDE STORY OF AMENDMENT 2 (1994) (anti-gay account of political developments in
Colorado).
228.
See id.
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Ten years after its decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, the U.S. Supreme
Court found that the constitutional amendment to the Colorado State
Constitution violated the equal protection provisions of the federal
constitution.2 2 9 In Romer v. Evans,23 ° the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
laws singling out gay and lesbian persons for special discriminatory
treatment "raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is
born of animosity toward the class of persons affected. 23'
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the majority in Romer began by citing
Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion from Plessy v. Ferguson, where Justice
Harlan announced that the U.S. Constitution "neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens . ',,232KeJustice Kennedy wrote that although Justice
Harlan's words were not heeded when they were written, those words "are
now understood to state a commitment to the law's neutrality where the
rights of persons are at stake. ' ' 233 The rights at stake in Romer were the
rights of gay and lesbian persons.
The majority found that Amendment 2 to the Colorado Constitution
did more than repeal or rescind the rights that gay and lesbian persons had
won in various parts of the state. 234 The amendment had the effect of
prohibiting "all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level or state
or local government designed to protect the named class, a class we shall
refer to as homosexual persons or gays and lesbians., 235 The court found
that the amendment "withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific
legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids
reinstatement of these laws and policies" by enacting new local
ordinances.236 This put gay and lesbian persons in "a solitary class" where
only they could not use the political process to win protections from
discrimination against them.237 The amendment deprives gay and lesbian
persons from any remedy for discrimination they may suffer in access to
public accommodation, housing, insurance, health services, education, and
employment. 238 Indeed, the majority found it would be "a fair, if not

229.
230.
231.
232.

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
Id.
Id. at 634.
163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J.,dissenting). The "separate but equal"

doctrine in Plessy was overruled in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, 347

U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
233. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623.
234. Id. at 629.
235. Id. at 624.
236. Id. at 627.
237. Id..
238. See id. at 629.
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necessary, inference from the broad language of the amendment that it
[would have deprived] gays and lesbians even of the protection of general
laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination in governmental and
private settings. 2 39
The majority rejected the argument that the amendment only denied
"special rights" to homosexuals.24 ° Indeed, the court found "nothing
special" about the protections that the amendment removed from gay and
lesbian people. 24 As Justice Kennedy wrote: "These are protections taken
for granted by most people either because they already have them or do not
need them; these are protections against exclusion from an almost limitless
number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a
free society. 24 2
The court found that the amendment had no rational relationship to a
legitimate government end, and as such, that the amendment violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 43 The court gave
two initial reasons why the amendment failed the "rational basis" test.
First, the court found that the amendment had imposed an exceptional
and invalid form of legislation on a single group. 244 The court noted that a
law would ordinarily be sustained if it could be said to advance a legitimate
government interest, "even if the law seems unwise or works to the
disadvantage of a particular group, or if the rationale for it seems
tenuous. ,,245 Using a test that ensures that there is a relationship between
the legislative classification and an "independent and legitimate legislative
end," the court can "ensure that classifications are not drawn for the
purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law. '2 46 The
amendment before the court, however, "confound[ed] this normal process
of judicial review.' 24 7 The amendment identified individuals by a single
trait, and then denied those persons any protection under state or local law,
including the right later to seek legal protection from acts of
discrimination. 248 The court stated that it was "not within our constitutional
249
tradition to enact laws" that denied persons equal protection of the law.

239.
Id. at 630.
240.
Id. at 631. "To the contrary, the amendment imposes a special disability upon
those persons alone." Id.
241.
Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
242.
Id.
243.
Id. at 635.
244.
Id. at 632.
245.
Id.
246.
Id. at 633.
247.
Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
248.
Id. "The resulting disqualification of a class of persons from the right to seek
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Second, the court found that the "sheer breadth [of the amendment] is
so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems
inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class that it affects; it lacks
a rational relationship to legitimate state interests., 250 Although other
legislative amendments often refer to "legitimate public policies" that
purport to justify disadvantages those laws may inflict,251 the only
explanation for the law here was hatred of gay and lesbian persons, and of
the rights of others not to associate with them. "The primary rationale the
State offers for Amendment 2," the court noted "is respect for other
citizens' freedom of association, and in particular the liberties of landlords
or employers who have personal or religious objections to
homosexuality. ' 52 The state also cited "its interest in conserving resources
to fight discrimination against other groups.' 253 However, the court
credited neither argument. "The breadth of the Amendment" said the court
"is so far removed from these particular justifications that we find it
impossible to credit them., 254 Because the court could not identify any
"legitimate purpose or discrete objective" to support the amendment, the
court determined that the amendment was impermissible under the
Fourteenth Amendment.255 There was no rational basis to support
legislation that removed existing protections for gay and lesbian persons
and that further removed the ability of gay and lesbian persons to petition
the state or local government for the redress of grievances.
Justice Scalia, in "vigorous" and histrionic dissent, said that the
Supreme Court had "mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite., 256 Justice
Scalia argued that the legislation properly reflected the "modest attempt of
seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores against
the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those mores through

specific protection form the law is unprecedented in our jurisprudence." Id.
249.
Id. "Respect for this principle [of Equal Protection] explains why laws singling
out a certain class of citizens for disfavored legal status or general hardships are rare. A law
declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others
to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most
literal sense." Id.
250.
Id. at 632.
251.
Id. at 635.
252.
Id.
253.
Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
254.
Id.
255.
Id. "Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end
but to make them unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do. A State cannot so
deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws. Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection
Clause, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado is affirmed." Id. at 636.
256.
Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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use of the laws. 257 He said that the amendment did nothing more than
prohibit "special treatment of homosexuals," and that the court's
"unassailable" holding in Bowers v. Hardwick provided a rational basis for
the legislation.25 8 Justice Scalia accused the court of "[taking] sides in the
culture wars," and stated that the voters of Colorado "adopted an entirely
reasonable provision" that merely denies preferential treatment to
homosexuals.259
The decision in Romer found that homophobic legislation that denied
equal protection of the law could not withstand a rational basis challenge.
Romer would later be one of the decisions cited by the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court as support for allowing same-sex couples the equal
protections of marriage.
The Massachusetts court noted that like
"Amendment 2" to the Colorado Constitution, the prohibition against
same-sex marriage "impermissibly 'identifies persons by a single trait and
then denies them protection across the board.'",60
In finding that an anti-gay amendment was an unconstitutional
violation of equal protection, the Romer decision set the stage for
subsequent courts to question and strike down laws that discriminated
against gay and lesbian persons. The Romer decision was not always
interpreted expansively, however.26'

257.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
258.
Id. at 638, 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The proposition that the holding was
"unassailable" was proven wrong in the state court opinions that refused to follow it, the law
review articles that criticized it, and the U.S. Supreme Court's own decision that overruled
it. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003) (Bowers "was not correct when it
was decided, and it is not correct today.").
259.
Romer, 517 U.S. at 652-53 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
260.
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 (Mass. 2003)
(quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 633).
261.
In Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d
289 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 943 (1998), for example, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld a similar anti-gay amendment to the city charter of
Cincinnati. Id. The Sixth Circuit found that the amendment to the city charter did not
adversely affect gay and lesbian persons as much as the Colorado Amendment, in part
because the city charter affected only those people living in the city of Cincinnati rather than
the entire state of Ohio. See id. at 301. See also Bailey v. City of Austin, 972 S.W.2d 180,
190 (Tex. App. 1998). The court's efforts to distinguish Romer are unconvincing, however.
Discrimination is discrimination; animus is animus; and a violation of Equal Protection is a
violation of Equal Protection. The Sixth Circuit erred in not applying Romer to the
referendum before it, and the U.S. Supreme Court erred in not accepting the case for review
and reversal under Romer.
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F.
"COMMON BENEFITS" UNDER THE VERMONT STATE CONSTITUTION VERMONT CIVIL UNIONS

In 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court ruled that the Common Benefits
Clause of the Vermont Constitution required the state "to extend to samesex couples the common benefits and protections that flow from marriage
under Vermont law. 262 The case arose when a gay couple and two lesbian
couples sued Vermont after town clerks refused to issue marriage licenses
because of the state marriage laws.26 3 The couples had claimed that the
denial of marriage licenses violated the "Common Benefits Clause" of the
Vermont Constitution, which provides in relevant part that:
government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common
benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or
community, and not for the particular emolument or
advantage of any single person, family, or set of persons
264
who are a part only of that community ....
The couples argued that denying access to a civil marriage license
denied them "a broad array of legal benefits and protections incident to the
marital relation, including access to a spouse's medical, life, and disability
insurance, hospital visitation and other medical decisionmaking privileges,
spousal support, intestate succession, homestead protections, and many
other statutory protections. ' 6s
The Vermont Supreme Court stressed that it was deciding the case
under the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution, and not
its federal counterpart, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 266 The court noted that this provision

262.

Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999).

263.
Id.; David L. Chambers, The Baker Case, Civil Unions, and the Recognition of
Our Common Humanity: An Introduction and Speculation, 25 VT. L. REV. 5, 5 (2000).
264.
Baker, 744 A.2d at 867 (quoting VT. CONST. ch. 1,art. 7).

265.
Id. at 870.
266.
Id. The Court took considerable pride in relying on the state constitution instead
of the federal constitution: "Vermont's constitutional commitment to equal rights was the
product of the successful effort to create an independent republic and a fundamental charter

of government, the Constitution of 1777, both of which preceded the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment by nearly a century." Id. A state constitution may often provide
stronger protection than the federal constitution. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995);
MARK E. WOJCIK, ILLINOIS LEGAL RESEARCH 17 (Carolina Academic Press 2003).

State

constitutions may also identify rights that are not identified expressly in the federal
constitution. Id. See also Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 959 ("The Massachusetts Constitution
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of the state constitution "differs markedly" from its federal counterpart "in
its language, historical origins, purpose, and development. '267 Although
the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution might have a
similar purpose to that of the federal Equal Protection Clause, the Vermont
Supreme Court stated that its decisions
reflect "a very different approach
268
from current federal jurisprudence.,
In construing the particular language of the state constitution, the
Vermont Supreme Court said that its challenge was to remain faithful to the
historical motivating ideals of the framers of the Constitution, "while
addressing contemporary issues that [they] undoubtedly could never have
imagined. 269 In this context, the court first opined that the Vermont
Constitution provided an "affirmative and unequivocal mandate" that the
state government was "established for the common benefit of the people
and community as a whole., 270 The court also found that the Common
Benefits Clause did not prohibit the denial of rights to those without rights,
but instead prohibited "the conferral of advantages or emoluments upon the
privileged., 271 Recognizing that "the principle of inclusion" was one of the
standards to use when determining the constitutionality of a particular

protects matters of personal liberty against government incursions as zealously, and often
more so, than does the Federal Constitution, even where both Constitutions employ
essentially the same language.").
267.
Baker, 744 A.2d at 870. The court also noted that although the federal
constitution "may . . . supplement the protections afforded by the Common Benefits
Clause," the federal constitution did not "supplant" the Vermont State Constitution "as the
first and primary safeguard of the rights and liberties of all Vermonters." Id. (citing State v.
Badger, 450 A.2d 336, 347 (Vt. 1982), and State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 235 (Vt. 1985)).
268.
Id. at 871. The court described its approach as being "broadly deferential to the
legislative prerogative to define and advance governmental ends, while vigorously ensuring
that the means chosen bear a just and reasonable relation to the governmental objective." Id.
(emphasis original).
269.
Id. at 874.
270.
Id. Unlike the federal Equal Protection Clause, which provides that no state
may "deny" the equal protection of the laws, the Vermont Constitution provides that all
Vermonters should enjoy the common benefits of the government. The Vermont Supreme
Court stated that: "Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, whose origin and language reflect the
solicitude of a dominant while society for an historically-oppressed African-American
minority (no state shall "deny" the equal protection of the laws), the Common Benefits
Clause mirrors the confidence of a homogeneous, eighteenth century group of men
aggressively laying claim to the same rights as their peers in Great Britain, or, for that
matter, New York, New Hampshire, or the Upper Connecticut River Valley." Id.
271.
Baker, 744 A.2d at 874. "The same assumption that all the people should be
afforded all the benefits and protections bestowed by government is also reflected in the
second section [of the Common Benefits Clause], which prohibits not the denial of rights to
the oppressed, but rather the conferral of advantages or emoluments upon the privileged."
Id.
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statute, the Vermont Supreme Court stated that the essence of the Common
Benefits Clause was "a vision of government that afforded every
Vermonter its benefit and protection and provided no Vermonter particular
advantage. 2 72
Thus guided by an approach that reflected a principle of inclusion, the
Vermont Supreme Court expressed difficulty with "the rigid, multi-tiered
analysis evolved by the federal courts under the Fourteenth Amendment"
and federal court labels such as "suspect," "quasi-suspect," and "nonsuspect" when determining what level of judicial scrutiny to give to a
challenged statute.273 274
Against this framework, the court looked at the state government's
purpose "in drawing a classification that includes some members of the
community within the challenged law but excludes others., 275 The court
asked whether the limitation of civil marriage to opposite-sex couples was
"reasonably necessary to accomplish the State's claimed objectives. 276 In
making this determination, the court stated that it would consider:
(1)
The significance of the benefits and protections of
the challenged law;
(2)
Whether the omission of members of the
community from the benefits and protections of the
challenged law promoted the government's stated goals;
and

272.
Id. at 875. After further review of the historical context behind the Vermont
State Constitution, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded that the framers were principally
concerned not with the extension of civil rights, "but with equal access to public benefits
and protections for the community as a whole. The concept at the core of the Common
Benefits Clause was not the eradication of racial or class distinctions, but rather the
elimination of artificial governmental preferments and advantages.
The Vermont
Constitution would ensure that the law uniformly afforded every Vermonter its benefit,
protection, and security so that the social and political preeminence would reflect
differences of capacity, disposition, and virtue, rather than governmental favor and
privilege." Id. at 876-77.
273.
Id. at 878. The Vermont Supreme Court stated that in harmony with the
"guiding principle of affording the protection and benefit of the law to all members of the
Vermont community," it would "examine the nature of the classification to determine
whether it is reasonably necessary to accomplish the State's claimed objectives." Id.
274.
Baker, 744 A.2d at 878.
275.
Id.
276.
d.
HeinOnline -- 24 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 629 2003-2004

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

(3)
Whether the government's classification
"significantly underinclusive or overinclusive. '27 7

[Vol. 24

was

The Vermont Supreme Court acknowledged that the answers to these
questions would not necessarily serve as a substitute for the exercise of
"reasoned judgment" by the court, stating that balancing the interests of
individual liberty with those of society "does not lend itself to the precision
of a scale. 21 8
The principle purpose asserted to justify excluding same-sex couples
was the governmental interest in "furthering the link between procreation
and child rearing. ' 279 The State of Vermont argued that it had "a strong
interest ...

in promoting a permanent commitment between couples who

have children to ensure that their offspring are considered legitimate and
receive ongoing parental support." 280 The State argued that the Vermont
Legislature was justified "in using the marriage statutes to28 send a public
message that procreation and child rearing are intertwined., 1
The Vermont Supreme Court agreed that the State did have "a
legitimate and long-standing interest in promoting a permanent
commitment between couples for the security of their children," and said
that there was little doubt that most births today resulted from natural
conception between one man and one woman.282 But the court found that it
was "equally undisputed that many opposite-sex couples marry for reasons
unrelated to procreation, that some of these couples never intend to have
children, and that others are incapable of having children. 283 Because
marriage is available to opposite-sex couples who never intend to have
children, the court found that the Vermont marriage statute "extends the
benefits and protections of marriage to many persons with no logical
connection to the stated governmental goal." 2 4

277. Id. at 879.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 881.
280. Id. The State argued further that the Vermont Legislature "could reasonably
believe that sanctioning same-sex unions 'would diminish society's perception of the link
between procreation and child rearing ...[and] advance the notion that fathers or mothers..
are mere surplusage to the functions of procreation and child rearing." Id.
281. Id.
282. Baker, 744 A.2d at 88 1.
283. Id. (emphasis original). The court stated that "if the purpose of the statutory
exclusion of same-sex couples is to 'further[ ] the link between procreation and child
rearing,' it is significantly underinclusive." Id.
284. Id.
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In addition to finding that the marriage laws offered benefits to many
heterosexual couples who had no intention to raise children, the court
found that "a significant number of children today are actually being raised
by same-sex parents, and that increasing numbers of children are being
conceived by [same-sex] parents through a variety of assisted-reproductive
techniques. 2 85 The court noted that the Vermont Legislature recognized
the growing number of gay and lesbian parents, and that it had "acted
affirmatively to remove legal barriers so that same-sex couples may legally
adopt and rear the children conceived through such efforts. 286
The Vermont Supreme Court found that if the State's purpose in
limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples was really to legitimize children
and provide for the security of those children, then the Vermont marriage
statutes excluded many same-sex couples that have children that deserve
those same protections. 287 The court found that excluding same-sex
couples from the legal protections incident to marriage "exposes their
children to the precise risks that the State argues the marriage laws are
designed to secure against. ' 288 The court also found that the State offered
"no persuasive reasoning" to support "the bare assertion" that allowing
same-sex couples to marry would render mothers and fathers
a "mere
289
surplusage to the functions of procreation and child rearing.,
Finding little support in the state's arguments to continue denying the
benefits of marriage to same-sex couples, the Vermont Supreme Court
turned to the interests of the same-sex couples who were denied the
benefits and protections of marriage. As in the Hawai'i Supreme Court
decision that would have recognized same-sex marriage, the Vermont
Supreme Court looked for guidance in Loving v. Virginia, the U.S.
Supreme Court decision that struck down Virginia's anti-miscegenation
law. In that decision, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that "[tihe freedom to

285.
Id.
286.
Id. at 882. (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102(b) (2002), a statute that
allows the partner of a biological parent to adopt if it is in the child's best interest; VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-112 (2002), a statute vesting the family court with jurisdiction over
parental rights and responsibilities when unmarried persons who adopt a minor child end
their domestic relationship).
287.
Id.
288.
Baker, 744 A.2d at 882 (emphasis original). The court continued: "In short, the
marital exclusion treats persons who are similarly situated for purposes of the law,
differently." Id. (emphasis original).
289.
Id. Noting that many opposite-sex couples rely on non-traditional methods of
conception, the court found that "there is no reasonable basis to conclude that a same-sex
couple's use of the same technologies would undermine the bonds of parenthood, or
society's perception of parenthood." Id.
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marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights. '290 The
Vermont Supreme Court found that this language (as well as the holding
itself in Loving v. Virginia) showed that "access to a civil marriage license
and the multitude of legal benefits, protections, and obligations that flow
from it significantly enhance the quality of life in our society. 29 1 The
court also found that the state marriage laws provided "significant public
benefits and protections,, 292 including:
"
*
*
*
*
*
*

*
*

*
*
*
*

The right to receive a portion of the estate of a
spouse who dies intestate;
Protection against disinheritance through elective
share provisions;
Preference in being appointed as the personal
representative of a spouse who dies intestate;
The ability to sue for the wrongful death of a
spouse;
The ability to sue for loss of consortium;
The right to workers' compensation benefits;
The right to spousal benefits guaranteed by statute
to public employees, including health, life,
disability, and accident insurance;
The opportunity to be covered as a spouse under
group life insurance policies;
The opportunity to obtain health insurance as the
insured's spouse under an individual health
insurance policy;
The right to claim an evidentiary privilege for
marital communications;
Homestead rights and protections;
The presumption of joint ownership of property,
and the right of survivorship;
Hospital visitation and other rights that arise
during the medical treatment of a family member;
and

290.
291.

Id. at 883 (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).
Id.

292.

Id.
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0

The right to receive (and the obligation to provide)
spousal support, maintenance, and the division of
property if there is a separation or divorce. 93

The court recognized that even this extensive listing was only a partial
list of the benefits that are unavailable to same-sex couples who are denied
the right to marry, and ruled that the state would have to show a public
concern of sufficient weight to justify the denial of these significant
benefits and protections.294
The state did not succeed in showing that the denial of benefits was
justified. The court found that the rationale of protecting children and
"furthering the link between procreation and child rearing" did not justify
the denial of benefits to same-sex couples, because many opposite-sex
couples had no children and many same-sex couples did.295 The court
considered other arguments that the state raised concerning the raising of
children by opposite-sex couples, but the court rejected these arguments
because Vermont allowed the adoption of children by same-sex couples. 9 6
This policy choice, according to the court, rendered meritless the argument
that Vermont favored opposite-sex over same-sex parents, or that the State
disfavored the use of artificial reproduction technologies.297 The court also
rejected arguments that recognizing same-sex marriage "might foster
marriages of convenience or otherwise affect the institution in
'unpredictable' ways," because even if true those arguments could not
provide a "reasonable and just basis for the statutory exclusion. 2 98

293.
Id. at 883-84.
294. Baker, 744 A.2d at 884. "The legal benefits and protections flowing from a
marriage license are of such significance that any statutory exclusion must necessarily be
grounded on public concerns of sufficient weight, cogency, and authority that the justice of
the deprivation cannot seriously be questioned." Id..
295.
Id. The court stated: "The laudable governmental goal of promoting a
commitment between married couples to promote the security of their children and the
community as a whole provides no reasonable basis for denying the legal benefits and
protections of marriage to same-sex couples, who are no differently situated with respect to
this goal than their opposite sex counterparts. Promoting a link between procreation and
childrearing similarly fails to support the exclusion." Id. (emphasis original).
296.
Id. at 884-85 (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102 (2002)). The court noted
that "[a]t the same time, the Legislature provided additional legal protections in the form of
court-ordered child support and parent-child contact in the event that same-sex parents
dissolved their 'domestic relationship."' Id. at 885 (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-112
(2002)).
297.
Id. at 885.
298.
Id. The court stated: "It would, for example, serve no useful purpose to remand
this matter for hearings on whether marriages of convenience . . . would result from
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The Vermont Supreme Court held that the language the framers used
and the broad underlying principle of inclusion in the benefits of
government supported a change to the civil marriage law of Vermont. "[I]n
the faith that a case beyond the imagining of the framers of our
Constitution may, nevertheless, be safely anchored in the values that
infused it, we find a constitutional obligation to extend to plaintiffs the
common benefit, protection, and security that Vermont law provides
opposite-sex married couples., 299 The court held that same-sex couples
were entitled to have access to the "same benefits and protections" that
Vermont law afforded to married, opposite-sex couples. 300 The court saw
its ruling not only as "the fulfillment of constitutional responsibility" 30 1 but
also as "a recognition of our common humanity. 30 2
Although some have mistakenly assumed that the effect of the
Vermont decision was to legalize same-sex marriage, the Vermont
Supreme Court stopped short of requiring the state to issue marriage
licenses to same-sex couples. Neither did the court rule that a denial of a
marriage license to a same-sex couple would violate equal protection or
other constitutionally protected rights.30 3 The constitutional violation came
not in the particular form of union for same-sex couples, but in the denial
of common benefits that were available to opposite-sex couples. The
Vermont Supreme Court required the state legislature to provide some
means of extending the constitutionally required common benefits and
protections of marriage to same-sex couples, in whatever way it found to
fulfill that mandate. 30 4 As guidance for the legislature, the court identified
statutory schemes in Hawai'i, Denmark, and Norway as starting points for
a revised legislative solution, but the court noted that even these suggested
alternatives omitted certain significant benefits that would be
constitutionally required under the Common Benefits Clause of the

providing same-sex couples with the statutory benefits and protections accorded oppositesex couples under marriage laws. For the reasons we have stated in this opinion, it is not a
failure of proof that is fatal to the State's arguments, it is a failure of logic." Id. n. 14.
299.
Id. at 886.
300.
Baker, 744 A.2d at 886.
301.
Id. at 888.
302.
Id. at 889.
303.
Id. at 867, 886.
304.
Id. at 867. The Vermont Supreme Court stated: "Whether this [extension of
the benefits and protections of marriage] ultimately takes the form of inclusion within the
marriage laws themselves or a parallel 'domestic partnership' system or some equivalent
statutory alternative, rests with the [Vermont State] Legislature. Whatever system is
chosen, however, must conform with the constitutional imperative to afford to all
Vermonters the common benefit, protection, and security of the law." Id.
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Vermont State Constitution. 3 05 The court allowed the marriage statutes to
remain in place while the legislature considered an appropriate alternative.
The court also retained jurisdiction over the case as a way of ensuring
legislative action. The court warned that if the legislature did not act to
grant the common benefits and protections of marriage, the plaintiffs could
petition 3the
Vermont Supreme Court to order the issuance of marriage
6
licenses. 0
In a separate decision that concurred with the result but dissented from
the failure to grant an immediate remedy to the same-sex couples who were
the plaintiffs in the case, Justice Johnson would have granted the relief
requested and enjoined the defendants from denying marriage licenses to
same-sex couples.3 °7 Justice Johnson wrote that "allowing plaintiffs to
obtain a license would further the overall goals of marriage, as defined by
the majority - to provide stability to individuals, their families, and the
broader community by clarifying and protecting the rights of married
persons. ,,308 Justice Johnson also wrote separately to describe the challenge
to the denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples as "a straightforward
case of sex discrimination. ' 3°
Based upon the mandate of the Vermont Supreme Court, the Vermont
legislature voted to allow civil unions between same-sex couples.31 °

305.
Id. at 886-87.
306.
Baker, 744 A.2d at 887, 889.
307.
Id. at 898 (Johnson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
308.
Id. at 902 (Johnson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
309.
Id. at 904-05 (Johnson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). As Justice
Johnson explained:
A woman is denied the right to marry another woman because her
would-be partner is a woman, not because one or both are lesbians.
Similarly, a man is denied the ight to marry another man because his
would-be partner is a man, not because one or both are gay. Thus, an
individual's right to marry a person of the same sex is prohibited solely
on the basis of sex, not on the basis of sexual orientation. Indeed,
sexual orientation does not appear as a qualification for marriage under
the marriage statutes. The State makes no inquiry into the sexual
practices or identities of a couple seeking a license.
Id. at 905 (Johnson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Under this standard, Justice
Johnson found that the State had failed to show that its classification was narrowly tailored
to further important interests; not only did the rationalizations offered by the State fail to
satisfy any heightened form of judicial scrutiny, but Justice Johnson found that the
rationalizations also "fail[ed] to satisfy the rational-basis test as articulated under the
[Vermont] Common Benefits Clause." Id.. (Johnson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
310.
See An Act Relating to Civil Unions, 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91 (codified at
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-07 (2003)).
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Howard Dean, the then-governor of Vermont, said that when he signed the
legislation in April 2000, it was "in the long run the right thing for Vermont
and for the United States of America.' 3 1 He stated a belief that "this bill
enriches all of us, as we look with new eyes'3 12at a group of people who have
been outcasts for many, many generations."
The Vermont Civil Union law entered into effect on July 1, 2000. The
law allowed Vermont citizens who entered into civil unions - and who
remained in the state - "virtually all the state-created rights and
responsibilities given to married couples. 3 13
G.
CANADADIAN COURTS RECOGNIZE A RIGHT FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES
TO MARRY

The debate on same-sex marriage was, of course, not a debate limited
to any one country. Other countries were also dealing with the demands of
same-sex couples to have the same rights, benefits, and protections of civil
marriage. While the United States continued to debate the propriety of
same-sex marriage, provincial appellate courts in Canada ruled that the bar
against same-sex marriage violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.31 4
The first appellate court to so rule was the British Columbia Court of
Appeal, which ruled on May 1, 2003 in the case of EGALE Canada, Inc.316
v.
315 EGALE, a Canadian advocacy group,
Canada (Attorney General).

along with several same-sex couples, sued in British Columbia for a
declaration that the issuer of marriage licenses 3 17 could issue licenses to
same-sex couples, and that there was no enforceable legal bar to the

311.
Lisa Neff, Dean: Faith Guided on Civil Unions Act, CHI. FREE PRESs, Jan. 14,
2004, at I.
312.
Id. He stated later that he was also guided by his Christian faith, which helped
him decide to sign the legislation. He stated: "The hallmark of Christianity is to reach out to
people who have been left behind. So there was a religious aspect to my support of civil
unions." Id. at 13.
313.
Barbara J. Cox, But Why Not Marriage: An Essay on Vermont's Civil Unions
Law, Same-Sex Marriage,and Separatebut (Un)equal, 25 VT. L. RaV. 113, 116 (2000).

314.
EGALE Canada, Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] 13 B.C.L.R.4th 1
(B.C. C.A.); Halpern v. Toronto (City), [2003] 172 O.A.C. 276.
315.
EGALE Canada, Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] 13 B.C.L.R.4th I
(B.C. C.A.).
316.
Id. "EGALE" is the acronym for "Equality for Gays and Lesbians
Everywhere." It is a national organization "committed to the advancement of equality for
lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgendered people in Canada. Id. at para. 16.
317.
Id. The issuer of marriage licenses was the British Columbia Director of Vital
Statistics. Id. at para. 24.
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marriage of same-sex couples.3 18 The couples had been denied marriage
licenses on the basis that there was a "common law bar to same-sex
marriages," and they were told that only the federal government could
remove that common-law prohibition against same-sex marriage "by
enacting legislation'3 1to
9 redefine marriage or to change the rules concerning
capacity to marry.
The Canadian same-sex couples affirmed that they wanted to marry
for the same reasons common to those who enter opposite-sex marriages:
love, family support, social recognition, legal protection, financial and
emotional security, religious and spiritual fulfillment, providing a
supportive atmosphere for children, and to strengthen their commitment to
their relationship. 320 The trial court dismissed their petition, 32 1 and the
parties appealed to the British Columbia Court of Appeal.322
Madam Justice Prowse noted that the trial court had considered
affidavits from the same-sex couples and from a variety of experts in the
fields of comparative religion, history, anthropology, ethics, law,
sociology, gender studies, linguistics, lesbian and gay studies, theology,
education, economics, and philosophy.32 3 She noted that the trial court was
also aware of recent legal developments in Canada that extended rights
previously available only to married couples, including expanded access to
support, guardianship, adoption, pension entitlement, and medical decisionmaking.3 24 She found that the trial court correctly determined that although
there was no explicit statutory prohibition against same-sex marriage, there
was a common law bar to same-sex marriage "by virtue of the common law
definition of marriage as 'the voluntary union for life of one man and one
woman, to the exclusion of all others. 325 This "common law bar" operated

318.
Id. at paras. 8, 14.
319.
Id. at para. 24. The Attorney General for British Columbia had filed a petition
with the British Columbia Supreme Court in July 2000 seeking a declaration that same-sex
marriage was allowed, but the petition was withdrawn in July 2001 after a change in
government. Id. at para. 25.
320.
Id. at para. 15.
321.
See EGALE Canada, Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) [2001] 95 B.CL.R.3d
122 (B.C. S.C.). The trial court found, in part, that "[u]nder Canadian law, marriage is a
legal relationship between two persons of [the] opposite sex" and that this legal relationship
of marriage "[did] not extend to same-sex couples." Id. at para. 8.
322.
EGALE Canada, Inc., 13 B.C.L.R.4th 1, para. 23. Additional parties were
granted leave to intervene in the case, on condition that they not seek costs, and that they
would carry any additional costs of their intervention. Id.
323.
Id. at paras. 34-35. Many of the experts were also experts in the concurrent
litigation in Ontario. See id. para. 36.
324.
Id. at para. 37.
325.
Id. at para. 56.
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as a "legal disqualification" for same-sex couples to marry.326 This
determination was not the end of the analysis, however; it was only the
beginning.
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides in section
15(1) that: "Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the
right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race,
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical
disability. 32 7 It is true that "sexual orientation" is not specifically listed as
an example of illegal discrimination, but the language of the Charter does
not protect only those categories listed.32 8 Under the Charter "every
individual is equal," including gay and lesbian persons.329 "Sexual
orientation" is an "analogous ground" of non-discrimination under the
Charter.33 °
Madam Justice Prowse found that the denial of marriage licenses to
same-sex couples violated the same-sex couples' right to equality under
section 15 of the Canadian Charter.33 1 Her finding that the denial of
marriage licenses to same-sex couples violated the Charter was also what
the trial court had found, but the trial court had determined that the
violation was reasonably justified under section 1 of the Charter.332 The
trial court judge had concluded that "the salutary effects of retaining the
common law definition of marriage far outweighed the deleterious effects
of changing that definition," particularly because other legal developments
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation had "narrowed or
minimized the differences between same-sex and opposite-sex
relationships. ' 3
Madam Justice Prowse did not agree with the trial court that the denial
of marriage licenses to same-sex couples could be justified, however. She
noted that the government had to prove that its interest was "pressing and

326.
Id. at para. 57-58.
327.
CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS § 15(l).
328.
See generally, EGALE Canada, Inc., 13 B.C.L.R.4th I.
329.
Id.
See EGALE Canada, Inc. 13 B.C.L.R.4th I, para. 82. See also Egan v. Canada,
330.
[199512 S.C.R. 513, para. 13 ; M. v. H., [199912 S.C.R. 3, para 64.
331.
See EGALE Canada Inc., 13 B.C.L.R.4th 1, para. 95.
Id. at para. 102. Section I of the Charter provides that "The Canadian Charter
332.
of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society." CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS § 1.
EGALE Canada Inc., 13 B.C.L.R.4th 1, para. 105.
333.
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substantial. 334 To prove this, in turn, the government needed to satisfy a
three-part proportionality test, proving that:
(1)
The means are rationally connected to the objective;
(2)
The
impugned
provision
impairs
the
constitutionally protected right no more than necessary;
and
(3)
The deleterious effects of the impugned provision
are proportional both to the salutary effects and to the
importance of the governmental objective that was
identified as pressing and substantial.335
Justice Prowse stated that although there was a body of authority
supporting the proposition that the purpose of marriage was procreation,
she found that there was evidence "that the emphasis on procreation as
being at the core of marriage has been displaced to a considerable degree
by the evolving view of marriage and its role in society .... She found
that "procreation (including the rearing of children) resulting from sexual
intercourse between a husband and wife[] [could] no longer be regarded as
a sufficiently pressing and substantial objective" that would satisfy the
analysis required under Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.3 37 She was "not satisfied," in other words, "that denying samesex couples the right to marry because of their inability to procreate 'as
between themselves"' would satisfy the first stage of analysis required
under section 1 of the Charter.338 Accordingly, Madam Justice Prowse
found that the common law bar to same-sex marriage could not be justified
under section I of the Charter.339
As to a remedy for that unjustifiable violation, Madam Justice Prowse
wrote that she would grant a declaration "that the common law bar against
same-sex marriage is of no force or effect because it violates rights and
freedoms guaranteed by [section] 15 of the Charter and does not constitute
a reasonable and demonstrably justified limit on those rights and freedoms
within the meaning of [section] 1 of the Charter.'' 4 She would also
"reformulate the common law definition of marriage" as "the lawful union

334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

Id. at para. 116.
Id.
Id. at para. 124.
Id.
Id.
EGALE Canada Inc., 13 B.C.L.R.4th 1,para. 135.
Id. at para. 158.
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of two persons to the exclusion of all others., 341 However, she wrote that
she would suspend both of those remedies (to grant the declaration and to
reformulate the common law definition of marriage) until July 12, 2004,
"solely to give the federal and provincial governments time to review and
revise legislation to bring it into accord with this decision. 342 Justices
Mackenzie and Low agreed with Madam Justice Prowse to allow the
appeals and the appropriate remedy.343
The following month, on June 10, 2003, the Court of Appeals for
Ontario issued its own decision in Halpern v. Toronto, also finding that the
denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples was a violation of section
15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and that the violation
was unjustifiable under section 1 of the Charter. 344 However, unlike the
court in British Columbia, the Ontario court found no reason to delay its
decision.34 5
In the Halpern case, several same-sex couples applied for marriage
licenses from the Clerk for the City of Toronto. 346 The clerk did not deny
the marriage licenses, but held the applications in abeyance while she
applied to the court for directions on whether to issue the marriage
licenses. 34 7 Around the same time, the Metropolitan Community Church of
Toronto ("MCCT") started using "the ancient Christian tradition of
publishing the banns of marriage" as an alternative under to a municipal
marriage license.? The pastor at the MCCT published the banns for two
same-sex couples, registered the marriages in the Church Register, and
issued marriage certificates to the two couples. 349 The MCCT submitted
the required documentation to the Office of the Registrar General of
Ontario, which refused to accept the documents because of "an alleged
federal prohibition against same-sex marriages., 350 The MCCT filed a
court challenge to that act, and its case was consolidated with the other case
of the same-sex couples who were waiting for their marriage licenses.35'
A panel at the Divisional Court first hearing the cases held
unanimously on July 12, 2002 that the common law definition of marriage

341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

Id. at para. 159.
Id. at para. 161.
Id. at paras. 164, 182.
Halpern v. Toronto (City), [2003] 172 O.A.C. 276, para. 142.
See id. at para. 154.
Id. at para. 10.
Id.
Id. at para. 11.
Id. at paras. 12-13.
Halpern v. Toronto (City), [2003] 172 O.A.C. 276, para. 14.
Id. at paras. 14-15.
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as the "lawful and voluntary union of one man and one woman to the
exclusion of all others" was a violation of section 15(1) of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and that the violation was not justified
under section 1 of the Charter.352 However, the panel was not unanimous
as to the remedy. The compromise position of the lower court was to allow
the Parliament two years to amend the common law rule in a way that
would permit same-sex marriage. 53 A similar remedy had been ordered in
a Qu6bec case that had also found that the prohibition against same-sex
marriage violated section 15(1) of the Charter and that the violation was
unjustifiable under section 1 of the Charter, but that stayed the declaration
of invalidity for two years.354
The Ontario appellate court agreed with the lower court that there was
a common law rule against recognizing same-sex marriages.355 The court
disagreed, however, that the definition of marriage was unchangeable.
Using the doctrine of progressive interpretation, the court recalled a
familiar analogy that described the fundamental law as something that
could grow like a living tree, rather than something that was static or frozen
at the time it was first written.356 The word
"marriage," therefore, did not
3 57
have a "constitutionally fixed meaning.9
The Ontario appellate court found that the national and provincial
governments of Canada "chose to give legal recognition to marriage," and
in so doing, "built a myriad of rights and obligations around the institution
of marriage. 35 8 Having done so, however, the governments created 359
a
situation that denied those rights (and obligations) to same-sex couples.
The court recognized that "a distinction had been made" between same-sex
couples and opposite-sex couples. 360
The court rejected as circular
36 1
reasoning the argument that marriage is heterosexual because it "just is.,,
Continuing its own analysis, the court found that "the common law
requirement that marriage be between persons of the opposite sex does not

352.
Id. at para. 16.
353.
Id. at para. 17.
354.
Id. at para. 32; Hendricks c. Quebec (Procureur g6ndral), [2002] R.J.Q. 2506.
The Qudbec Court of Appeal in March 2004 affirmed that the traditional definition of
marriage was discriminatory against same-sex couples. Colin Campbell, Canada: Quebec
Court Upholds Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2004, at A5.
355.
Halpern v. Toronto (City), [2003] 172 O.A.C. 276, at para. 37.
356.
Id. at paras. 42-44.
357.
Id. at para. 46.
358.
Id. at para. 69.
359.
Id.
360.
Id. at para. 70.
361.
Halpern v. Toronto (City), [2003] 172 O.A.C. 276, para. 71.
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accord with the needs, capacities and circumstances of same-sex
couples. 362 The court found that the prohibition against obtaining
marriage licenses violated "the dignity of persons in same-sex relationships
,,363

Having found a violation under section 15(1), the Ontario court
considered next whether the violation could be justified under section 1 of
the Charter. 364 The test that the court used required "the party seeking to
uphold the impugned law" to prove "on a balance of probabilities" that: (1)
the objective of the law is pressing and substantial; and (2) the means
chosen to achieve the objective are reasonable and demonstrably justifiable
in a free and democratic society. 365 The second part of the test requires
that: (a) the violation of rights is rationally connected to the stated objective
of the law; (b) the impugned law only minimally impact the Charter
guarantee; and (c) proportionality between the effect of the law and its
objective, so that attaining
the objective will not be outweighed by the
366
abridgement of the right.
In considering the arguments to preserve the opposite-sex definition of
marriage, the court found that there was no valid objective to maintaining
marriage as "an exclusively heterosexual institution., 367 As the court
noted, "Stating that marriage is heterosexual because it always has been
heterosexual is merely an explanation for the opposite-sex requirement of
marriage; it is not an objective that is capable of justifying the infringement
of a Charterguarantee. 368 Marriage could continue to be heterosexual, but
this presented no reason why marriages could not also be homosexual as
well.
Opponents argued that traditional marriage served three basic
purposes: (1) uniting the opposite sexes; (2) encouraging the birth and
raising of children; and (3) companionship. 369 The court rejected each of
these arguments.

362.
Id. at para. 95.
363.
Id. at para. 108. The court concluded that "the common-law definition of
marriage as 'the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all
others' violates [section] 15(l) of the Charter." Id.
364.
Id. Section I of the Charter, for ease of reference, provides: "The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only
to such reasonable limits prescribed by the law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society." CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS § I.
365.
Halpern v. Toronto (City), [2003] 172 O.A.C. 276, at para. 113.
366.
Id.
367.
Id. at para. 117.
368.
Id. (emphasis original).
369.
Id. at para. 118.
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First, the court found that the purpose of "uniting members of the
opposite sex" suggested that the uniting of persons of the same sex was of
lesser importance. 370 The court rejected this argument instantly because "a
purpose that demeans the dignity of same-sex couples is contrary to the
values of a free and democratic society and cannot be considered to be
pressing and substantial. 3 7'
Second, the court found that the purpose of encouraging the birth and
raising of children is "a laudable goal" properly regarded as pressing and
substantial, but the court failed to see how keeping marriage as an
exclusively heterosexual institution furthered this goal. 372 "Heterosexual
married couples will not stop having or raising children because same-sex
couples are permitted to marry," noted the court, while at the same time "an
increasing percentage of children are being born to and raised by same-sex
couples. 37 The court rejected the suggestion that the law should favor
only "natural" procreation, as that was "not a sufficiently pressing and
substantial objective to justify infringing the equality rights of same-sex
couples. 374
Third, the court found that the goal of promoting "companionship"
was not a pressing and substantial objective for the failure of the marriage
laws to cover same-sex marriages. 375 "Encouraging companionship
between only persons of the opposite sex," said the court, "perpetuates the
view that persons in same-sex relationships are not equally capable376of
providing companionship and forming lasting and loving relationships.,
Reviewing these three benefits of marriage, the court considered
whether there was a "rational connection" for excluding same-sex couples
from the benefits of marriage.3 7 7 The court rejected assertions that the
rational connection was "self-evident" in the effectiveness of marriage "in
bringing the two sexes together, in sheltering children, and in providing a
stable institution for society', 378 The court said that its difficulty with this

370.
Id. at para. 119.
371.
Halpem v. Toronto (City), [20031 172 O.A.C. 276, para. 119.
372.
Id. at paras. 120-21.
373.
Id. at para. 121.
374.
Id. at para. 122. "A law that aims to encourage only 'natural' procreation
ignores the fact that same-sex couples are capable of having children." Id.
375.
Id. at para. 124.
376.
Id.
377.
Halpern v. Toronto (City), [2003] 172 O.A.C. 276, para. 127. "Under the
rational connection component of the proportionality analysis, the party seeking to uphold
the impugned law must demonstrate that the rights violation is rationally connected to the
objective, in the sense that the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage is required to
encourage procreation, childrearing, and companionship." Id.
378.
Id. at para. 128.
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argument was that the same-sex couples were not seeking to abolish
marriage, but were seeking access to these rights and benefits as well.379
The benefits of marriage, self-evident as they may be, were not selfevidently available only to opposite-sex couples. 380 Gay men and lesbians
who entered into same-sex relationships could also have children by
adoption or artificial means, and gay men and lesbians "are as capable of
providing companionship to their same-sex partners as persons in oppositesex relationships. 3 8 1
Finally turning to the remedy for the violation of Charter rights, the
court found that the remedy that would "best" correct the situation was to
"declare invalid the existing definition of marriage to the extent that it
refers to 'one man and one woman,' and to reformulate the definition of
marriage as 'the
voluntary union for life of two persons to the exclusion of
382
others."
of
all
The court rejected the suggestion that the legislature be given time to
reformulate the common law definition of marriage; the court stated that
deference to the legislature was unnecessary in this instance because it was
the courts who first came up with the common law definition of marriage,
and this new definition did not conflict with the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. 383 The court also rejected the suggestion that it should allow
some time before implementing this new definition. 384 Although the court
identified several instances where it would be proper to delay a declaration
of invalidity if that declaration would unintentionally injure others, but here
the court found no evidence that giving immediate effect to its order would
"pose any harm to the public, threaten the rule of law, or deny anyone of
the benefit of legal recognition of their marriage. 38 5 The court accordingly
declared a new definition of marriage, ordered the Clerk of the City of
Toronto to issue marriage licenses to the same-sex couples, and ordered the
Registrar General of the Province of Ontario to accept the marriage
certificates tendered by the MCCT. 386 Same-sex marriage thus became
legal in Ontario on June 10, 2003.

379.
Id. at para. 129.
380.
Id. at paras. 129-32.
381.
Id. at para. 131. The court rejected some remaining arguments on similar
grounds, finding that reasons for heterosexual marriage did not support limiting marriage to
heterosexuals. See id. at paras. 133-42.
382.
Id. at para. 148.
383.
Halpern v. Toronto (City), [2003] 172 O.A.C. 276, para. 149.
384.
Id. at para. 152.
385.
Id. at para. 153.
386.
Id. at para. 156.
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Seeing that the Ontario appellate court had ordered the immediate
granting of marriage licenses to same-sex couples, the plaintiffs in British
Columbia moved to have the court there enter its order right away, finding
again that the denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples violated the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.387 The court agreed that there
was no further reason to suspend its order, noting that it was "common
ground that the federal government ha[d] instructed its counsel not to
appeal either the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Halpern or the
decision of [the British Columbia Court of Appeal]. 38 8 On July 8, 2003,
British Columbia became the second Canadian province to legalize samesex marriage. On March 19, 2004, the Quebec Court of Appeal also
affirmed a lower court ruling that had found that the traditional definition
of marriage was discriminatory against same-sex couples.389
The Canadian court rulings allowed gay couples - including couples
from the United States - to obtain marriage licenses and be legally married
in two provinces of Canada. 390 Same-sex couples in the United States
traveled to Canada to marry, 391 and local newspapers across the United
States carried announcements of same-sex couples who married in
Canada.392 Those marriage announcements of course did not describe the
legal difficulties couples might have when they returned to the United
States, or information on how those couples could enjoy any tangible
benefits of a lawful foreign marriage that their home states refused to
recognize.

387.
EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] 15 B.C.L.R.4th 226
(judgment of July 8, 2003).
388.
Id. at para. 4.
389.
Colin Campbell, Canada: Quebec Court Upholds Gay Marriage,N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 20, 2004, at A5; Mike King, Canada: Marriage Comes to Quebec, Oregon, THE
ADVOC., Apr. 27, 2004, at 20.
390.
Lisa Neff, Canadian Prime Minister Stands by Gay Marriage Bill, CHI. FREE
PRESS, Sept. 3, 2003, at 6 (also praising former Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien's
plan to introduce federal legislation in Canada, because "the courts have been telling us that
the notion of separate but equal has no place in Canada.").
391.
See, e.g., Alan Bayless, Chicago Gay Couple Tie the Knot in Canada, CHI.
SuN-TIMES, Jan. 14, 2004; Harvey Brownstone, Marrying Man, OUT, Jan. 2004, at 10 (letter
from the first openly gay judge in Canada reporting personally on dozens of marriages of
same-sex couples, "approximately half of whom have been Americans").
392.
See, e.g., Dean Hamer, Joseph Wilson, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1I, 2004, § 9, at I1
(reporting marriage in Vancouver of two men from the United States); Zvi-Dann, Fisher
Marry in Toronto, CHI. FREE PRESS, Sept. 3, 2003, at 18. The publication by national and
local newspapers of announcements of same-sex weddings and civil union ceremonies is a
relatively recent and welcome development. Other couples were married in private
ceremonies that were not announced in American newspapers.
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There are still some open legal issues surrounding same-sex marriage
in Canada. 393 Nevertheless, same-sex couples who married in Ontario or
British Columbia were recognized in other Canadian provinces as being
lawfully married. 394 However, same-sex couples who were married in
Canada were unable to challenge their home state's failure to recognize
their lawful Canadian marriages as a violation of the "full faith and credit
clause" of the United States Constitution. That clause, by its terms, applies
only to other states of the United States:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every
other State. And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records
and
395
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
Although the word "State" may be understood in public international
law to mean another country or nation, the context of word "State" as used
in the Full Faith and Credit Clause
of the U.S. Constitution is limited to
396
other states of the United States.
Even though the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not apply to
Canadian judgments, the Canadian same-sex marriages should have been
granted legal recognition as a matter of comity. "Comity" is a legal
principle of accommodation that invokes "neighborliness" and "mutual
respect" of one country for the other.397 Because Canada did not restrict its
marriage law to Canadian citizens, the need for international comity might
arguably have been even greater than the need to recognize marriages from
the Netherlands or Belgium, which initially restricted marriage only to

393.
See, e.g., Canadian Court Asked to Consider Marriage Questions, CHI. FREE
PRESS, Feb. 4, 2004, at 11.
394.
Canadian provinces that did not themselves allow same-sex marriage appeared
nonetheless willing to accept the legality of same-sex marriages performed elsewhere in
Canada. See, e.g., Rex Wockner, Nunavut Protects Gays, Backs Marriage, WINDY CITY
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2003, at 11 (also reporting that the newest Canadian province of Nunavut
had voted to extend antidiscrimination legislation to claims based on sexual orientation).
395.
U.S. CONST. art. IV § 1. The couples could, however, still argue that the states
should recognize their Canadian marriages under principles of comity.
396. Id.
397.

IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 28 (6th ed. 2003).

Professor Brownlie, a member of the International Law Commission, notes that the term
"comity" is also used in international law: "(1) as a synonym for international law; (2) as
equivalent to private international law (conflict of laws); (3) as a policy basis for, and source
of, particular rules of conflict of laws; and (4) as the reason for and source of a rule of
international law." Id.
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citizens and permanent residents. However, even those marriages, being
lawful marriages in the nations where they were performed, were also
entitled to respect and recognition by the government and by the private
sector.398
When the same-sex couples who married in Canada returned to the
United States, they found that there was social recognition, but little if any
formal legal recognition of their union. There is anecdotal evidence,
however, that many private employers, companies, private organizations,
and even some local municipal governments did recognize the validity of
the Canadian marriages for certain purposes. For example, individuals who
had married a same-sex partner in Canada were able to claim health
insurance and other employee benefits similar to those afforded to
colleagues who had married a member of the opposite sex.399 Others may
have used copies of their Canadian marriage certificates to obtain family
rates at health clubs, access to other special programs, or access to a
hospital or emergency room to visit a sick or injured partner. These
couples used their new marriage certificates to try to obtain some of the
benefits of marriage that opposite-sex couples take for granted or do not
even recognize as benefits.
H.

LAWRENCE V. TEXAS AND THE DEATH OF BOWERS V. HARDWICK-THE

VICTORY OF DUE PROCESS

In a landmark decision issued in June 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court
found that a conviction under a Texas criminal statute for sodomy between
two consenting adults was an unconstitutional violation of the Due Process
Clause. 4°° In finding the Texas statute to be unconstitutional, the majority
preferred to find a violation of the Due Process Clause rather than a
violation of Equal Protection, even though the Court's earlier decision in

398.
Imagine, for example, that a same-sex couple married in Canada, Belgium, or
the Netherlands was involved in an automobile accident in the United States. Would it
really make sense to keep one partner out of the emergency room or to otherwise deny
hospital visitation privileges to a same-sex spouse?
399.
Employers offer a broad range of benefits and policies that are fairly
characterized under the umbrella of "employee benefits." Employee benefits that are not
traditionally recognized as such may include, for example, bereavement leave policies that
would allow an employee to take time off to attend the funeral of a parent of a same-sex
partner. Some companies in the past have allowed only married employees to take such
leave, or have required gay and lesbian employees to use personal vacation time as their
bereavement leave (while not making a similar requirement of unmarried heterosexual
employees).
400.
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
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Romer v. Evans made the Equal Protection challenge "a tenable
argument." 40 1 In basing its ruling on the Due Process Clause, the U.S.
Supreme Court avoided a situation where the sodomy statute applicable
only to homosexual sodomy would simply be redrafted to apply to both
heterosexual and homosexual acts of sodomy. 4 2 The Court also wanted to
take the opportunity to erase one of its most embarrassing mistakes, its
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.4 °3
The Lawrence decision was the culmination of a legal battle that arose
when police officers in Texas were sent to a private home in response to a
reported weapons disturbance. 404 The police entered the home of John
Geddes Lawrence; they found him engaged in a sexual act with Tyron
Garner. 4°5 They arrested both men, held them overnight in custody, and
charged them with a violating the Texas statute that prohibited "deviate
4 6
sexual intercourse. "'
The men challenged the statute as a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and a similar
clause in the Texas Constitution. 4°7 After the trial court rejected their
constitutional challenges, the men entered pleas of nolo contendere and
were each fined $200 and assessed court costs of $141.25.408
The Texas Court of Appeals considered the constitutionality of the
Texas sodomy statute under both the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the state constitution, rejecting
the challenges in a divided en banc opinion.4°9 The majority opinion
concluded that under the principles of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick required rejection of the men's
Due Process arguments. 410 The Bowers decision was one of the most
heavily criticized decisions ever issued by the U.S. Supreme Court.4'

401.
Id. at 2482. Justice O'Connor, however, based her concurring opinion on an
equal protection challenge to the Texas sodomy statute. See id. at 2484-88 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
402.
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
403.
476 U.S. 186 (1986).
404.
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475.
405.
Id. at 2475-76.
406.
Id. at 2476.
407.
Id.
408.
Id.
409.
Lawrence v. Texas, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App. 2001).
410.
As the U.S. Supreme Court later noted, "Bowers then being authoritative, this
was proper." Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2476.
411.
For example, one author wrote that "if Bowers were our only example, it would
be difficult to defend the ability of the judiciary to engage in a process of reasoned
decisionmaking." Daniel 0. Conkle, The Second Death of Substantive Due Process,62 IND.
L.J. 215 (1987). William Eskridge and Nan Hunter observed that the case "quickly became
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Justice Kennedy's opinion for the majority in Lawrence found that the
rationale of Bowers could not "withstand careful analysis. ' 41 2 He dissected
the majority opinion in Bowers and the concurring opinion by Chief Justice
Burger with a number of specific criticisms:
1. By saying that the issue before it was whether the U.S.
Constitution conferred a "fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage
in sodomy," the Bowers Court disclosed its "own failure to appreciate the
extent of the liberty at stake. 413 The issue put forth by the Bowers Court
"demean[ed] the claim" put forward by the two men, "just as it would
demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the
right to have sexual intercourse.'414

2. The Bowers court had earlier asserted: "Proscriptions against
[consensual sodomy] have ancient roots."4' 5 The Lawrence majority noted
that academic writings and many of the amicus briefs set forth
"fundamental criticisms of the historical premises relied upon by the
majority and concurring opinions in Bowers."4 16 While not resolving the
historical debate, the Lawrence court refused to adopt the same "definitive
conclusions upon which Bowers placed such reliance.",4 17 After reviewing
several sources, the Lawrence court found that earlier prosecutions for
sodomy were not directed toward consensual acts between adults, but
"typically involved relations between men and minor girls or minor boys,
relations between adults involving force, relations between adults
48
implicating disparity in status, or relations between men and animals.",
The Lawrence court noted that it was "not until the 1970's that any State
singled out same-sex relations for criminal prosecution, and only nine
States have done so."' 9 The Lawrence court thus found that "the historical

one of the most criticized opinions in the history of the Court, with virtually no defenders in
the academy or established bar." WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY,
GENDER, AND THE LAW 61 (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 2004).

They also observe that "the

contemptuous tone of its language seems, ironically, to have been its own undoing as a
legitimate attempt at interpretation." Id. See also, e.g., Susan Ayres, Coming Out:
Decision-Making in State and Federal Sodomy Cases, 62 ALB. L. REV. 355, 368-70 (1998);
Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and PoliticalValues: Searchingfor the Hidden
Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073, 1081-97 (1988).
412.
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483.
413.
Id. at 2478.
414.
Id.
415.
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192.
416.
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478.
417.
Id.

418.
419.

Id. at 2479.
Id.
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grounds relied upon in Bowers are more complex than the majority opinion
and concurring opinion by Chief Justice Burger indicate. ' ' 2 °
3.
Although powerful voices have condemned homosexual conduct
as being immoral, the Lawrence Court found that the issue was not whether
these voices of condemnation were sincere, but whether the majority could
use the criminal law to enforce its views on the whole of society. 42 This
point considered the power of the majority to impose its will on the entire
society through coercive use of the criminal laws.
4. Although Chief Justice Burger cited "Judeao-Christian moral and
ethical standards" in his concurring opinion, the Lawrence Court found that
the laws and traditions of the last half-century were relevant to its
analysis. 2 These more recent references showed "an emerging awareness
that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to
conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex. ' ' 23 Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion commented that "[t]his emerging recognition
should have been apparent when Bowers was decided. 424
5. Bowers claimed that before 1961, all 50 states had outlawed
sodomy and, at the time of the Court's decision, there were still sodomy
laws in 24 states and the District of Columbia.425 The Lawrence court
noted that state legislatures and state supreme courts had repealed and
invalidated same-sex marriage laws since Bowers was decided; of the 25
States that then had sodomy laws, only 13 jurisdictions remain. 6
Furthermore, of these 13 remaining sodomy jurisdictions, only four enforce
their laws only against homosexual conduct. 427 There was also a history of
non-enforcement of these laws; the State of Texas had earlier admitted in
1994 that it had not prosecuted any consenting adults acting in private.428
The admitted failure to prosecute any consensual violations of the sodomy
statute suggested that the law was being kept on the books for its coercive
effects rather than for legitimate law enforcement purposes.
6. Lawrence criticized the failure of the Bowers Court to consider
relevant foreign precedent available at the time of the Bowers decision.

420.

Id. at 2480.

421.

Id.

422.
Id. (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) ("[H]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending
point of the substantive due process inquiry.")).
423.
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480.
424.
Id.
425.
Id. at 2481.
426.
Id.
427.
Id.
428.

Id.
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First, the Bowers Court had ignored the Wolfenden Report from the United
Kingdom,42 9 which had advised the British Parliament in 1957 to repeal the
sodomy laws.43 ° Second, the Bowers Court had ignored a highly relevant
Court decision from the European Court of Human Rights, Dudgeon v.
United Kingdom.43 Although the European case was only persuasive, the
Lawrence Court said that it undermined the "premise" that "the claim put
forward [in Bowers] was insubstantial in our Western civilization.4 32
7. Lawrence noted that after Bowers was decided, the European
Court of Human Rights did not follow Bowers, but its own decision in
Dudgeon.433 The Lawrence Court also noted that other nations also took
action to affirm and protect the "right of homosexual adults to engage in
intimate, consensual conduct., 434 As the Lawrence Court noted, other
countries accepted this right "as an integral part of human freedom," while
the United States made no showing that "the governmental interest in
circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent. 435
8. The Lawrence Court noted that two principal cases decided after
Bowers placed into doubt its continued viability. First, in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,436 the United States
Supreme Court "reaffirmed the substantive force of the liberty protected by
the Due Process Clause" and "confirmed that our laws and tradition afford
constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education. '' 37 Applying that case, the Lawrence Court stated that
"[p]ersons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these

429.

THE WOLFENDEN

OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION

REPORT:

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL

(Stein & Day, Inc. 1963).

430.
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481.
431.
Id. (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981))..
432.
Id. The use of foreign and international legal precedent by the United States
Supreme Court in resolving legal disputes is a welcome development, because it allows the
United States to examine and learn from the experience of other nations that have
considered issues similar to those before the Court.
433.
Id. (citing three decisions of the European Court of Human Rights-P.G. &
J.H. v. United Kingdom, no. 44787/98, Eur. Ct. H.R., § 56 (2001); Modinos v. Cyprus; 259
Eur. Ct. H.R. (1993); and Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1988)).
434.
Id.
435.
Id. The foreign authorities cited by the Court did not control the outcome in the
case, but the Justices' willingness to look at the collective force of a contrary view to
Bowers helped convince them that Bowers was incorrectly decided. Those who doubt the
potential persuasive influence of foreign and international authorities should consider
whether the Court might have reached a different result if other nations of the world had
followed Bowers.
436.
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
437.
Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2481.
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[personal] purposes, just as heterosexual persons do. ' 3 8 Second, the
United States Supreme Court's invalidation of an anti-gay amendment to
the Colorado State Constitution in Romer4 39 also raised doubts as to the
continued viability of Bowers. Romer found that "class-based legislation"
directed against gay and lesbian persons violated the Equal Protection
Clause, and that the anti-gay amendment had "no rational relation to a
legitimate governmental purpose." 440 The decisions in Romer and Planned
Parenthooderoded the foundations of Bowers.441
9. The Lawrence Court recognized that criticism of Bowers in the
United States "has been substantial and continuing, disapproving of its
reasoning in all respects, not just as to its historical assumptions."" 2 While
criticism alone would not be enough to reverse a Supreme Court decision,
the majority found the sustained and substantial criticism to be "of greater
significance" given that subsequent44 3United States Supreme Court decisions
eroded the foundations of Bowers.
10. The Lawrence Court also recognized that state courts had refused
to follow the decision when interpreting state constitutional provisions that
paralleled the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 444 The
courts of Arkansas," 5 Montana, 446 Tennessee," 47 Kentucky, 44 8 and even
Georgia 4 9 - where the Bowers case first arose - had rejected the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Bowers.
With ten reasons to overturn Bowers, the Court reminded itself that
the principle of stare decisis was not "an inexorable command., 450 The
Court also took into consideration the reality that the holding in Bowers
"had not induced detrimental reliance comparable to some instances where
recognized individual rights are involved. 45' The majority in Lawrence

438.
Id.
439.
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
440.
Id. at 634.
441.
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
442.
Id. at 2482-83.
443.
Id. at 2483.
444.
Id.
445.
Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002).
446.
Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997).
447.
Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. App. 1996).
448.
Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
449.
Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (1998).
450.
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483.
451.
Id. Furthermore, there was "no individual or societal reliance on Bowers of the
sort that could counsel against overturning its holding once there were compelling reasons
to do so. Bowers itself causes uncertainty, for the precedents before and after it contradict
its central holding." Id.
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emphasized that the case before it involved consenting adults, acting in the
privacy of their home. 452 The case involved neither public conduct nor
commercial sex.45 3 Nor did the case involve "whether the government
must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons
seek to enter. '4 54 As Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority, the case
involved:
two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each
other, engaged in sexual practices common to a
homosexual lifestyle.
The petitioners are entitled to
respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean
their existence or control their destiny by making their
private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under
the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage
in their conduct without intervention of the government.
"It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of
personal liberty which the government may not enter."
[Citation omitted.]
The Texas statute furthers no
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into
the personal and private life of the individual.45 5
Finding that the Texas statute was an unconstitutional violation of the
Due Process Clause, the Court also overruled Bowers, stating
that it "was
456
not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today.,
Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, agreed that the Texas
statute was unconstitutional but she did not join the Court in overruling
Bowers, a decision in which she had voted with the majority. Instead of
accepting the Substantive Due Process claims put forth, Justice O'Connor
found that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.4 57 Because the Texas "deviate sexual intercourse
statute ' 458 prohibited consensual conduct only when done by two
individuals of the same gender, Justice O'Connor found an Equal
Protection Clause violation in that the Texas statute prohibited sodomy
between same-sex partners but not opposite-sex partners.

452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.

458.

Id. at 2484.
Id.
Id.
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
Id.
Id. (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.06(a) (2003).
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Justice O'Connor noted that the Texas statute made gay and lesbian
persons "unequal in the eyes of the law by making particular conduct - and
only that conduct - subject to criminal sanction."'' 9 She also noted that
even though the criminal sanctions themselves might be relatively
insignificant, the consequences of a sodomy conviction would require
individuals to register as sex offenders and would disqualify them from
practicing a variety of° professions, "including medicine, athletic training,
and interior design."4
Justice O'Connor noted that the State of Texas had attempted to
justify the statute and its negative effects by arguing that it satisfied
"rational basis review because it furthers the legitimate governmental
interest of the promotion of morality." 46 1 However, Justice O'Connor had
difficulty in accepting that a statute targeted only at homosexuals showed
"[m]oral disapproval of this group," and that this governmental
disapproval, "like a bare desire to harm this group, is an interest that is
insufficient2 to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection
46
Clause.,
Justice O'Connor also rejected the State's argument that the statute
did not discriminate against homosexual persons, but rather only
homosexual conduct. 46 3 She noted that being called a homosexual in Texas
provided a cause of action for defamation per se because it "impute[s] the
commission of a crime. ' 4 4 She also noted that the State of Texas
"admitted that because of the sodomy law, being homosexual carries the
presumption of being a criminal. ' 65 Although a state could "assign certain
consequences to a violation of its criminal law," Justice O'Connor found

459.
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2485 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
460.
Id. at 2485-86.
461.
ld. at 2485.
462.
Id. ("Indeed, we have never held that moral disapproval, without any other
asserted state interest, is a sufficient rationale under the Equal Protection Clause to justify a
law that discriminates among groups of persons."). Id.
463.
Id. at 2486.
464.
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2487 (citing Plumley v. Landmark Chevrolet, Inc., 122
F.3d 308, 310 (5th Cir. 1997), and Head v. Newton, 596 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Tex. App.
1980)). The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that a person:
who publishes a slander that imputes to another conduct constituting a
criminal offense is subject to liability to the other without proof of
special harm if the offense imputed is of a type which, if committed in
the place of publication, would be (a) punishable by imprisonment in a
state or federal institution, or (b) regarded by public opinion as
involving moral turpitude.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 571 (1965).
465.
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2487 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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that the State could not "single out one identifiable class of citizens for
punishment that does not apply to everyone else, with moral disapproval as
the only asserted state interest for the law." 466 She wrote "so long as the
Equal Protection Clause requires a sodomy law to apply equally to the
alike, such a
private consensual conduct of homosexuals and heterosexuals
4 67
law would not long stand in our democratic society.
Justice Thomas, dissenting from the finding that the Texas statute was
an unconstitutional violation of Substantive Due Process, wrote that the
Texas statute was "uncommonly silly" and that "[p]unishing someone for
expressing his sexual preference through noncommercial consensual
conduct with another adult does not appear to be a worthy way to expend
valuable law enforcement resources." 68 Justice Thomas would have urged
the Texas legislature to repeal the law, but he dissented from the
declaration of unconstitutionality because he could find no general right of
privacy within the Constitution. 469
Justice Scalia, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Thomas and
Chief Justice Rehnquist, criticized the overruling of Bowers and said that
the majority's decision now called into question all state laws "against
bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation,
adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity. '470 He called this "a
massive disruption of the current social order" that was somehow greater
than if the Court had overruled Roe v. Wade.47 1
After levying further criticisms of the majority opinion and Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion, Justice Scalia announced his view that the
Lawrence decision was "the product of a Court, which is the product of a
law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to the so-called
homosexual agenda, by which I mean the agenda promoted by some
homosexual activists directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium that has
traditionally attached to homosexual conduct. '4 72 As support for this, he

466.
Id.
467.
Id.
468.
Id. at 2498 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
469.
id. In the same-sex marriage debate, others would later seize upon this theme
to argue that same-sex marriage was a matter for legislators to decide rather than "unelected
judges."
dissenting).
470.
Id,at 2490 (Scalia, J.,
471.
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2491 (Scalia, J.,dissenting) ("What a massive
disruption of the current social order, therefore, the overruling of Bowers entails. Not so the
overruling of Roe, which would simply have restored the regime that existed for centuries
before 1973, in which the permissibility of and restrictions upon abortion were determined
legislatively State-by-State."). Id.
Id. at 2496.
472.
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recalled his earlier observation that the Association of American Law
Schools will deny membership to any law school that allows potential
employers to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. 47
Justice Scalia asserted that the United States Supreme Court had
"taken sides in the culture war, departing from its role of assuring, 4as
74
neutral observer, that the democratic rules of engagement are observed.
Justice Scalia claimed that he had no objection to gays and lesbians using
the political process to achieve legislative victories, but he objected to the
Court's declaration that gay and lesbian people have protectable rights.475
He warned that the Lawrence decision might lead to the recognition of
same-sex marriage:
"[t]oday's opinion dismantles the structure of
constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between
heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in
marriage is concerned. ' 76
Newspaper reports of the decision gave more space to Scalia's
dissenting views than to the majority decision; this is not surprising given
the harsh rhetoric of his dissent and its dire warnings of impending societal
doom. However, the majority decision fundamentally changed the legal
landscape of the law regarding sexual orientation by reasserting that gay
and lesbian persons also could enjoy substantive due process rights. The

473.
Id. Justice Scalia of course failed to note the continuing debate over the
Solomon Amendment, which has had the effect of reinserting military recruiters on campus
despite the military's exclusion of gay and lesbian persons.
474.
Id. at 2497. According to Justice Scalia:
Many Americans do not want persons who openly engage in
homosexual conduct as partners in their business, as scoutmasters for
their children, as teachers in their children's schools, or as boarders in
their home. They view this as protecting themselves and their families
from a lifestyle that they believe to be immoral and destructive. The
Court views it as "discrimination" which it is the function of our
judgments to deter. So imbued is the Court with the law profession's
anti-anti-homosexual culture, that it is seemingly unaware that the
attitudes of that culture are not obviously "mainstream"; that in most
States what the Court calls "discrimination" against those who engage in
homosexual acts is perfectly legal; that proposals to ban such
"discrimination under Title VII have repeatedly been rejected by
Congress [citations omitted]; that in some cases such "discrimination" is
mandated by federal statute, see 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1) [(2000)]
(mandating discharge from the armed forces of any service member who
engages in or intends to engage in homosexual acts); and that in some
cases such "discrimination" is a constitutional right, see Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale, (530 U.S. 640 (2000)).
Id.
475.
Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2497 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
476.
Id.
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United States Supreme Court not only reversed Bowers, but also called into
question the validity of any case that had ever cited Bowers to support
discriminatory acts against gay and lesbian persons. The Lawrence
decision also set the stage for the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,
which delayed its decision on same-sex marriage in order to study the
Lawrence decision.
J.

SAME-SEX MARRIAGE FINALLY COMES TO THE UNITED STATES:

GOODRIDGE V. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled on November 18,
2003, that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts could no longer deny
marriage licenses to same-sex couples seeking to marry. 4 7 The court
found that the exclusion of marriage for same-sex couples failed to pass the
rational basis test for both Due Process and Equal Protection.478 The
decision was hailed as the wedding bell that might be heard around the
world.479
The court recognized that there were two competing views on the
question before it. In one view, the court recognized that many persons
hold strong religious, moral, and ethical convictions that marriage should
be limited to the union of one man and one woman.48 ° In the other view,
the court recognized that many believe that gay and lesbian persons should
be treated no differently than their neighbors. 481 Neither view resolved the
legal dispute before the court, a question of first impression left unresolved
by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence.4 82
The Goodridge case involved seven same-sex couples from five
Massachusetts counties; the couples had been in committed relationships
for four, eleven, thirteen, twenty, thirty, and thirty-five years,
respectively.4 83 Each of the couples had homes where they lived as

477.

Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941; Jan Crawford Greenburg, Gay Marriage Ban

Rejected: Massachusetts Court Throws Out State Law It Says Is Rooted In Prejudice, CHI.

TRIB., Nov. 19, 2003, § 1, at 1.
478.
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 960.
479.
Tracy Baim, Massachusetts Marriage Victory, WINDY CITY TIMES, Nov. 19,
2003, at I. See also, e.g., Lisa Neff, Court Rules for Marital Rights-Court Sets Deadline
for Action on Gay Marriage Ruling, CHI. FREE PRESS, Nov. 26, 2003, at 1.

480.

Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948.

481.

Id.

482.
Id.
483.
Id. Each couple had been in a relationship that far outlasted the well-publicized
55-hour marriage of Britney Spears to Jason Allen Alexander. See William Hageman,
Wedding Fling Leaves Nothing But Regret, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11, 2004, § 13, at 1.
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couples, or as families with children. 84 They were well-established
members of the community. They worked as business executives, lawyers,
educators, and therapists.48 5 They were active in local church, school, and
community groups.486 Additionally, they wanted to marry.487
City clerks in five different counties refused to issue marriage licenses
to the seven same-sex couples, on the ground that Massachusetts did not
permit same-sex marriage. 488 The couples then sued the Department of
Public Health and the Commissioner, alleging that the refusal to issue the
necessary licenses was a violation of several provisions of the
Massachusetts State Constitution.4 89
The trial court granted summary judgment to the Department and
Commissioner, holding that the plain language of the marriage statutes did
not permit same-sex couples to marry, and rejecting constitutional
arguments that the refusal to issue marriage licenses offended the Liberty,
Freedom, Equality, and Due Process provisions of the Massachusetts
Constitution. 490
The trial court also found that the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights did not guarantee a fundamental right to marry a
person of the same sex, and that the prohibition against same-sex marriage
"rationally further[ed] the Legislature's legitimate interest in safeguarding
the 'primary purpose' of marriage, 'procreation."' 4 9 After the trial court

484.
485.
486.
487.

Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 949.
Id.
Id.
As Hillary Goodridge, the lead plaintiff in the case, explained:
Julie and I thought we were married, until a number of events
[happened] when we realized we were not . . . and there's a big
difference. Sadly, it's during moments of crisis--death, disability,
economic hard times - that we see what a difference it is to not have
marriage. In our case, I had to cry and lie my way into the neonatal
intensive care unit to see our newborn Annie when she had some serious
complications, as I had no legal relationship to her. I had to do the same
thing to get in to see Julie. Finally, it was our daughter asking why we
were not married that spurred us to go down to City Hall and apply for a
marriage license.
Arnold, supra note I.
488.
Goodridge,798 N.E.2d at 950.
489.
Id.
490.
Id.
491.
Id. The trial court stated that the Legislature could "rationally limit marriage to
opposite-sex couples" because those couples are "theoretically ...capable of procreation,"
do not necessarily rely on "inherently more cumbersome" noncoital means of reproduction,
and are "more likely than same-sex couples to have children, or more children." Id.
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granted summary judgment for the Department, the parties sought and
obtained direct appellate review.49 2
The arguments presented to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts were similar to those presented at trial. In its opinion, the
court recognized that the state marriage licensing statutes restricted the
right to marry by forbidding the marriage of individuals within certain
degrees of consanguinity, polygamous marriages, and marriages where one
of the parties has communicable syphilis.4 93

Massachusetts law also

restricts the circumstances for persons under the age of eighteen to
marry. 494 However, the court described these restrictions on marriage as
being minimal "gatekeeping" provisions.4 95 Other provisions of the
licensing statutes provide that marriage applicants can file standard
information forms and medical certificates in any city or town clerk's
office, pay a fee, and have a copy of their subsequent marriage certificate
sent to the registrar as a public record.496 As the Supreme Judicial Court

noted, "for all the joy and solemnity that normally attends a marriage," the
law governing the ability of parties to marry was basically "a licensing
law.

497

There was no issue of infringing upon religious freedom.
Massachusetts, like other states, never required a religious ceremony in
order to validate a marriage.498 The court noted that it was not necessary to
marry in a church or other religious building; couples could always marry
get married in the town hall or before a judge.4 99
The court found that civil marriage, being regulated by the state, was
also an institution that "anchor[ed] an ordered society by encouraging
stable relationships over transient ones. ' 5° Civil marriage also confers
"enormous private and social advantages" upon those who marry. 50 ' For
example, some of the statutory benefits of marriage include a variety of

492.
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 950.
493.
Id. at 951-52.
494.
Id. at 952.
495.
Id. at 95 1.
496.
Id. at 952.
497.
Id.
498.
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954.
499.
Id. Marriage was not strictly a religious institution, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court noted, but a civil institution "created and regulated through the exercise of the
police power," which is the "old-fashioned term for the Commonwealth's lawmaking
authority, as bounded by the liberty and equality guarantees of the Massachusetts
Constitution and its express delegation of power from the people to their government." Id.
500.
Id.
501.

Id.
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rights relating to property.5 °2 Other rights, equally as important, related to
other benefits available only through marriage.0 3 Finally, there were

502.

Some of these property rights include:
* the ability to file a joint state income tax return, which may result in a
lower tax burden where one spouse earns less;
o tenancy by the entirety (a form of property ownership that provides
spouses with certain protections against creditors, and allows for the
automatic transfer of property to a surviving spouse without the need for
probate);
* homestead protection, which allows spouses and children to secure,
under Massachusetts law, up to $300,000 equity from creditors;
* rights of intestate succession, the automatic rights to inherit the
property of a spouse who dies without a will;
e rights of elective share and dower, which may be exercised after the
death of a spouse who made a will that does not adequately provide for
the surviving spouse;
" the ability of a spouse to collect wages owed to a deceased employee;
" the ability to continue certain businesses of a deceased spouse;
" the ability to claim health insurance benefits under a spouse's medical
insurance policy;
o the ability to continue, for a limited time, health coverage for the
spouse of a person who is laid off or dies;
" preferential options under the state pension system;
" preferential benefits under the state medical program;
" the ability to prevent placing a lien on the former home of a long-term
care patient if the patient's spouse still lives in that home;
" access to veteran's spousal benefits and preferences;
" financial protections for the spouses of certain state government
employees, including firefighters, police officers, and prosecutors, if
those employees are killed in the line of duty;
" the equitable division of property upon divorce;
" temporary and permanent fights to receive alimony;
" the right to receive support if the married couple separates, even when
that separation does not result in a divorce; and
o the right to bring claims for wrongful death and loss of consortium,
and for funeral expenses, burial expenses, and punitive damages
resulting from tort actions. Id. at 955-56 (citations omitted).
503.
These additional rights include:
* presumptions of legitimacy and parentage of children born to a
married couple;
o evidentiary fights in civil and criminal cases, including the
prohibition against spouses testifying against one another about what
was said to each other in private conversations;
o bereavement and medical leave to allow an employee to care for
individuals related by blood or marriage;
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significant benefits available only to those children whose parents were
married. 504 The court recognized that despite the strong public policy to
abolish distinctions between marital and nonmarital children, there was "a
measure of family stability and economic security" not enjoyed by children
whose parents are not married. °5
The court's extensive list of benefits available only through marriage
was, by the court's own admission, incomplete. 6 Furthermore, even this
list of public benefits largely cannot fully take into account the benefits and
support available to married couples and families through private
companies, schools, community groups, and other non-governmental
institutions. These private sector benefits and support mechanisms are
regularly denied to those who cannot marry.
Having surveyed some of the benefits available only to those who can
marry, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court noted that the state
constitution protected "matters of personal liberty as zealously, and often
more so, than does the Federal Constitution, even where both Constitutions
employ essentially the same language.' 50 7 This higher level of protection

* an automatic "family member" preference to make medical decisions
for an incompetent or disabled spouse who did not execute a health care
power of attorney;
e access to "predictable rules" when married parents divorce, including
rules for child custody, visitation, support, and removal of children to
another state;
* priority rights to administer the estate of a spouse who dies intestate,
and the requirement to consent to the appointment of any other person
who might be appointed as the administrator;
" the right to dispose of the body of a deceased spouse; and
" the right to be buried in a lot or tomb owned by a deceased spouse.
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 956.
For additional discussion of the rights of surviving partners in same-sex relationships, and of
the difficulties that arise when the wishes of a "traditional family" conflict with the "nontraditional spouse," see generally Mark E. Wojcik, DiscriminationAfter Death, 53 OKLA. L.
REV. 389 (2000).
504.
"Where a married couple has children, their children are also directly or
indirectly ... the recipients of the special legal and economic protections obtained by civil
marriage." Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 956.
505.
The court noted: "Some of these benefits are social, such as the enhanced
approval that still attends the status of being a marital child. Others are material, such as the
greater ease of access to family-based State and Federal benefits that attend the
presumptions of one's parentage." Id. at 956-57. It might even be argued that children of
divorced parents have potentially greater benefits than those available to children of parents
who cannot marry.
506.
See id. at 955.
507.
Id. at 959. See also MARK E. WOJCIK, ILLINOIS LEGAL RESEARCH 17 (Carolina
Academic Press 2003).
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under the state constitution, said the court, was "not surprising," given the
nature of our federal system of government. °8
Recognizing that the state constitution provided a stronger framework
for analysis of the claims asserted in the case before it, the court noted that
the case involved the "two freedoms" found in the individual Liberty and
Equality protections in the Massachusetts Constitution. These two
freedoms were the "'freedom from' unwarranted government intrusion into
protected spheres of life and [the] 'freedom to' partake in benefits created
by the State for the common good.,, 5 09 The court found that both of these
freedoms were involved in the same-sex marriage challenge. First, an
individual's Liberty and Due Process rights include among the most basic
rights the freedom to decide whether and whom to marry, how to express
sexual intimacy, and whether and how to establish a family.51 ° Second, the
court stated that "central to personal freedom and security" was "the
assurance that the laws will apply equally to persons in similar
situations." 5''
Finding that both of these constitutional freedoms applied to the
claims before the court, the court stated that the state constitution "requires,
at a minimum, that the exercise of the State's regulatory authority not be
'arbitrary or capricious.' 51 2 The court stated that under both guarantees of
liberty and equality, the state's regulatory authority must "at very least,
serve 'a legitimate purpose in a rational way' a statute
must 'bear a
51 3
reasonable relation to a permissible legislative objective.'
Because the same-sex couples challenged the marriage statute under
both equal protection and due process grounds, the court had first to
determine the appropriate standard of review. 1 4 Where the statute

508.
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 959. "Fundamental to the vigor of our Federal
system of government is that 'state courts are absolutely free to interpret state constitutional
provisions to accord greater protection to individual rights than do similar provisions of the
United States Constitution."' Id. (quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995)).
509.
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 959.
510.
Id. It is interesting to see what cases the Massachusetts court cited in support of
this proposition. Those cases are Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481; Planned Parenthood,505
U.S. at 851; Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152-53 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972), and Loving, 388 U.S. 1.
511.
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 959. The court stated that "[t]he liberty interest in
choosing whether and whom to marry would be hollow if the Commonwealth could,
without sufficient justification, foreclose an individual from freely choosing the person with
whom to share an exclusive commitment in the unique institution of civil marriage." Id..
512. ld. at 959.
513.
Id. at 960 (citations omitted). Where a law could not "satisfy the basic
standards of rationality," that law was void. Id.
514.
Id. at 960.
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concerned a "fundamental right" or a "suspect classification," the court said
that it would invoke "strict judicial scrutiny."5" 5 However, for statutes that
do not involve a fundamental right or suspect class, the court said it would
use the "rational
basis test" to determine whether the statute was
16
constitutional.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court here used the "rational
basis" standard. 51 7 For alleged due process violations, the "rational basis"
standard requires that statutes have "a real and substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals, or some other phase of the general
welfare., 518 For alleged violations of the Equal Protection Clause, the
"rational basis" standard requires the state to prove that "an impartial
lawmaker could logically believe that the classification would serve a
legitimate public purpose
that transcends the harm to the members of the
519
disadvantaged class."
The state advanced three reasons to justify its refusal to issue marriage
licenses to the same-sex couples.
The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts rejected each of the three reasons.
First, the state argued that the trial court judge had ruled correctly
when it stated that the primary governmental interest in denying marriage
to same-sex couples was "the traditional notion that marriage's primary
purpose is procreation., 520 The Supreme Judicial Court found that the
marriage laws "do not privilege procreative heterosexual intercourse
between married people above every other form of adult intimacy and

515.
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 960. It is generally assumed (although not always
correctly so) that statutes subject to "strict judicial scrutiny" will be found unconstitutional,
because the special nature of the rights or class of persons affected provides a high standard
that is difficult for legislative actions to infringe upon.
516. Id. It is often assumed that statutes challenged as being only "rational" have a
good chance of surviving a constitutional challenge. It does not matter that the court would
have picked a different solution to a particular social problem, or even that a better system
might be available. The rational basis standard generally requires only that the legislative
solution not be irrational.
517.
id. The court used the rational basis test even though the right to marry might
be fairly characterized as a fundamental right that should implicate a higher standard of
review. Because the court found that the statute did not meet even the rational basis test,
the court did not reach the question of whether gay and lesbian persons were a suspect class,
or whether the ight to marry a persons of the same gender was a fundamental right. Id. at
961.
518. Id. at 960. Commentators opposed to same-sex marriage will be likely to argue
that the ban does indeed implicate "morals." See id. Having a particular sexual orientation
does not make one moral or immoral, however.
519. Goodridge,798 N.E.2d at 960.
520. Id. at 961.
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every other means of creating a family.",52 1 As the court stated: "[f]ertility
is not a condition of marriage, nor is it grounds for divorce. ''522 The court
could have also said that marriage licenses do not expire if the married
couple does not have children. Instead of a focus on fertility that was urged
by the state, the court found that the essence of marriage was the mutual
commitment of the partners:
People who have never consummated their marriage, and
never plan to, may be and stay married. People who
cannot stir from their deathbed may marry. While it is
certainly true that many, perhaps most, married couples
have children together (assisted or unassisted), it is the
exclusive and permanent commitment of the marriage
partners to one another, not the begetting of children, that
is the sine qua non of civil marriage.523
The court recognized that it was "hardly surprising" that civil
marriage had "developed historically as a means to regulate heterosexual
,,524
Furthermore, denying rights to
conduct and to promote child rearing.
illegitimate children, and the stigma attached traditionally to
homosexuality, also helped to "cement the common and legal
understanding of marriage as an unquestionably heterosexual
institution., 525 But because same-sex couples now also have children by
adoption, from previous marriages, or by artificial insemination, the
historical development of marriage as a heterosexual institution was, by
itself, an insufficient reason for continuing today to limit marriage to
opposite-sex couples. The court described it as "circular reasoning, not

Id.
521.
Id. Furthermore, "[p]eople who have never consummated their marriage, and
522.
never plan to, may be and stay married." Id.
id. (internal citations and footnotes omitted)
523.
524.
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961 n.23:
It is hardly surprising that civil marriage developed historically as a
means to regulate heterosexual conduct and to promote child rearing,
because until very recently unassisted heterosexual relations were the
only means short of adoption by which children could come into he
world, and the absence of widely available and effective contraceptives
made the link between heterosexual sex and procreation very strong
indeed.
525.
Id.
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analysis, to maintain that marriage must remain a heterosexual institution
because that is what it historically has been. 526
Giving further consideration to the state's first argument that the
primary purpose of marriage was to raise children, the court found that the
state "affirmatively facilitates bringing children into a family regardless of
whether the intended parent is married or unmarried, whether the child is
adopted or born into a family, whether assistive technology was used to
conceive the child, and whether the parent or her partner is heterosexual,
homosexual, or bisexual. 527 The court noted that gay and lesbian persons
in Massachusetts can adopt children, and that medical insurance coverage
for assisted reproductive technology was not limited to married couples,
but was also available to single individuals, unmarried couples, and samesex couples.528
The court then turned to the state's second stated reason for denying
marriage to same-sex couples, which was that that limiting marriage to
opposite-sex couples "ensures that children are raised in the 'optimal'
setting. ' '529 The court agreed that "[p]rotecting the welfare of children is a
paramount State policy," but the court found that denying marriage to
same-sex couples did nothing to further this stated policy. 530 Citing statutes
and cases that allowed for grandparent visitation, "de facto" parents, and
coparent adoption, the court noted that the state had "moved vigorously to
strengthen the modern family in its many variations. 53' The court also
noted that it had repudiated the common-law power of the state to provide
different levels of protection to children based on the conditions of their

526.
527.

Id.
Id. at 962. The court reasoned:
If procreation were a necessary component of civil marriage, our
statutes would draw a tighter circle around the permissible bounds of
nonmarital child bearing and the creation of families by noncoital
means. The attempt to isolate procreation as "the source of a
fundamental right to marry," [citing the dissenting opinion of Justice
Cordy], overlooks the integrated way in which courts have examined the
complex and overlapping realms of personal autonomy, mariage,
family life, and child rearing. Our jurisprudence recognizes that, in
these nuanced and fundamentally private areas of life, such a narrow
focus is inappropriate.

Id.
528.
Id. at 962, n.24.
529.
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 962.
530.
Id. ("Restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples ...
this policy.").
531.
Id. at 963.
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birth.532 Simply put, the "best interests of the child" no longer depend upon
a parent's sexual orientation or marital status.533
Continuing its analysis of the state's second reason to limit marriage
to opposite-sex couples, the court found that the state had not shown that
denying marriage to same-sex couples would increase the number of
persons seeking to enter opposite-sex marriages to have children.534 The
state had also conceded that gay and lesbian persons can be "excellent"
parents. 535 The court found that there was "no rational relationship
proffered goal of
between the marriage statute and the Commonwealth's
'536
unit.
rearing
child
'optimal'
the
protecting
Beyond the state's proffered interest in providing an "optimal"
environment for raising children, the court found that the state's refusal to
allow same-sex couples to marry made it "infinitely harder" for gay and
lesbian parents to raise their children.53 7 The court also found that the
"enhanced income provided by marital benefits" was "an important source
of security and stability for married couples and their children," but that the
state denied those benefits to same-sex couples with children.538 Because
of the "wide range of public benefits" and protections available only to
married couples, the court rejected the state's argument that the denial of
marriage to same-sex couples was merely a matter of "inconvenience. 53 9
The court recognized that there was a "sizeable class of parents raising
children" and that these parents had "absolutely no access to civil marriage
and its protections because they are forbidden from procuring a marriage
license. ' '54° Rejecting the state's second argument, the court stated that it
was neither rational nor permissible "to penalize children by depriving
them of State benefits because the State disapproves of their parents' sexual
orientation. 541
The third reason put forward by the state to justify its failure to
recognize same-sex marriage was the purported desire to conserve "scarce
State and private financial resources. 542 The state argued that the marriage

532.
Id.
533.
Id.
Goodridge,798 N.E.2d at 963.
534.
535.
Id. Four of the plaintiff couples were parents. Id.
Id.
536.
Id.
537.
Id.
538.
539.
Goodridge,798 N.E.2d at 964.
Id. at 963-64.
540.
Id.
541.
542.
Id. In other settings, some wondered whether there was a paper shortage in
Massachusetts, such that the state was trying to conserve the sheet of paper it would
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restriction was rational because the legislature 543 could logically.., assume
that same-sex couples are more financially independent than married
couples and thus less needy of public marital benefits, such as tax
advantages, or private marital benefits, such as employer-financed health
plans that include spouses in their coverage. 5 "
The court rejected this third argument as well, stating that the
"absolute statutory ban on same-sex marriage bears no rational relationship
to the goal of economy. 545 The court rejected the state's stereotype that
same-sex couples are all financially successful and financially independent,
stating that the state's argument ignored couples supporting children and
other dependents, such as aging parents. 546 The state could not argue that
those dependents were "less needy or deserving than the dependents of
married couples. 547 The court noted that the state marriage laws did not
require any showing of financial dependence; instead, "the benefits [of civil
marriage] are available to married couples regardless of whether they
' 548
mingle their finances or actually depend on each other for support.,
Civil marriage also created "legal dependency" between the spouses,
something549that is simply unavailable to those who are prohibited from
marrying.
Other arguments, not as strong as the first three, were also considered
and rejected by the court. The court considered and rejected an argument
that allowing same-sex couples to marry would "trivialize or destroy the
institution of marriage as it has historically been fashioned., 550 The court
did not deny that it was changing the institution of marriage, but it denied
that its decision would disturb the "fundamental value of marriage in our
society. 55' Instead of destroying the institution of marriage, the court was
making it available to more people. The court's words are instructive on
this point:
Here, the plaintiffs seek only to be married, not to
undermine the institution of civil marriage. They do not
want marriage abolished. They do not attack the binary

otherwise have used to issue the marriage license.
543.
The Massachusetts legislature is called the "General Court."
544.
Id.
545.
Id.
546.
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 963-64.
547.
Id. at 964.
548.
Id.
549.
Id. at 964 n.27.
550.
Id. at 964-65.
551.
Id. at 965.
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nature of marriage, the consanguinity provisions, or any of
the other gate-keeping provisions of the marriage licensing
law. Recognizing the right of an individual to marry a
person of the same sex will not diminish the validity or
dignity of opposite-sex marriage, any more than
recognizing the right of an individual to marry a person of
a different race devalues the marriage of a person who
marries someone of her own race. If anything, extending
civil marriage to same-sex couples reinforces the
importance of marriage to individuals and communities.
That same-sex couples are willing to embrace marriage's
solemn obligations of exclusivity, mutual support, and
commitment to one another is a testament to the enduring
place of marriage in our laws and in the human spirit.552
The court thus rejected the argument that the plaintiffs were seeking to
destroy marriage because marriage was precisely the remedy they were
seeking. The plaintiffs did not want the court to strike down the marriage
laws.553 They wanted access to the same rights of civil marriage available
to others.
The court also considered and rejected the argument that the decision
to extend or deny marriage rights to same-sex couples was purely a
legislative decision. "To label the court's role as usurping that of the
legislature," wrote the court, was to "misunderstand the nature and purpose
of judicial review. 554 Although the court acknowledged that it should
defer to the legislature to act on particular social and policy issues, the
question of whether a statute was unconstitutional was a question that was
within "the traditional and settled role of courts. 555
The court also considered and rejected the argument that recognizing
same-sex marriage would "lead to interstate conflict. 556 The court did not
predict whether other states would recognize same-sex marriages from
Massachusetts, but stated that "[t]he genius of our Federal system is that
each State's Constitution has vitality specific to its own traditions, and that,
subject to the minimum requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, each

552.
553.
554.
555.
556.

Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 965 (citations omitted).
Id. at 969.
Id. at 965.
Id.
Id. at 967.
HeinOnline -- 24 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 668 2003-2004

2004]1

SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

State is free to address difficult issues of individual liberty in the manner its
own Constitution demands. 557
Finally, the court considered and rejected the argument raised by
several amici that the same-sex marriage ban reflected "community
consensus that homosexual conduct is immoral. 558 In rejecting this
argument, the court noted the state's "strong affirmative policy of
preventing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation., 559 The
existence of laws and policies that condemn acts of discrimination based on
sexual orientation and gender identity show that there is no "community
consensus" on the immorality of homosexuality; indeed, the court might
have further noted that there are even now some religious groups with
openly gay and lesbian clergy. 56° But the court made a more important
point by not mentioning the presence of openly gay and lesbian clergy; by
its silence on this point, the court emphasized that "morality" is not the
standard by which to measure equal rights.
The court concluded that the state had failed "to articulate a
constitutionally adequate justification" that would support its continued
refusal to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples. 56 1 The court found
that the refusal to issue marriage licenses worked "a deep and scarring
hardship on a very real segment of the community for no rational
reason. ' 562 The justifications offered for the ban on same-sex marriage
suggested to the court that the same-sex marriage ban was "rooted in
persistent prejudice" against gay and lesbian persons, and that the law
should not give effect to those private biases.563

557.
Id.
558.
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 967.
559.
Id. In addition to citing the state non-discrimination legislation as support for
this proposition, the court cited the statutory provisions that punished hate crimes against
gay and lesbian persons and the court decision that decriminalized private consensual sex
between adults of the same sex. See id.
560. See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Methodists Put Pastor on Trial for Declaring
Herselfa Lesbian, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2004, at Al; Matthew Preusch & Laurie Goodstein,
Jury of Methodists Clears Gay Minister Over Relationship, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2004, § I,
at 1; Shannon Dininny, Views Mixed on Pastor'sAcquittal - Methodists Likely to Debate in
April on Homosexuality, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 22, 2004, § 1, at 11; In Ceremony, Gay Bishop
Takes Over New Hampshire Diocese, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2004, at A13; Gay Bishop is
Welcomed, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 8, 2004, § 1, at 10; Tracy Bairn, Gay Bishop Takes Charge,
WINDY CITY TIMES, Nov. 5, 2003, at 1; Episcopal Church Consecrates Gay Bishop, CHI.

FREE PRESS, Nov. 5, 2003, at 13; Bruce C. Steele & John Caldwell, Person of the Year:
Bishop V. Gene Robinson, THE ADVOC., Dec. 23, 2003, at 34. See also Archbishop Bruce
Simpson, Rescuing Christfrom the "Christians," THE ADVOC., Dec. 23, 2003, at 44.
561.
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968.
562.
Id.
563.
Id. (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
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Turning to the appropriate relief for this constitutional violation, the
court looked to the Ontario court decision that found that the ban on samesex marriage there violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. 564 The court there refined the common-law meaning of
marriage, a remedy that allowed same-sex couples to then marry in
Ontario. Finding that remedy to be appropriate for Massachusetts as well,
the court revised the common-law definition of marriage: "We construe
civil marriage to mean the voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to
the exclusion of all others. 565
The revised definition, according to the court, provided the
appropriate redress for the plaintiffs' constitutional injury while furthering
the aim of marriage "to promote stable, exclusive relationships. '566 The
court stated that the new definition advanced the legitimate interests
advanced by the state by providing a stable setting to raise children and for
conserving state resources.56 7 With this new definition, the court declared
that the denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples violated the
Massachusetts Constitution. The court made no declaration that the denial
violated the United States Constitution; such a declaration may have
allowed the state to seek further review before the United States Supreme
Court. Because the case was limited to finding a violation of the state
constitution, there would be no further federal review.56 8
The court vacated the summary judgment that had been previously
entered for the state, and remanded the case to the trial court for entry of
judgment consistent with its opinion. But in a surprising side note that
gave some legislators hope of working out a compromise for civil unions
instead of marriage, the court stayed entry of its judgment for 180 days "to
permit the Legislature to take such action as it may deem appropriate in
light of this opinion." 569 As the court later clarified, the purpose of the stay
was to give the legislature time not to create a alternative system of civil
union similar to that in Vermont, but to amend the existing state statutes to
allow same-sex marriages. 570 The 180-day period ran until May 17,
2004,57 the date that marks the 50th anniversary of the United States

564.
Id. at 969 (citing Halpern, 172 O.A.C. 276).
565.
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969.
566.
Id.
Id.
567.
568. This point of federalism and constitutional law had been lost on commentators
who urged that the matter go before the United States Supreme Court.
569.
Id. at 969-70 (citing Michaud v. Sheriff of Essex County, 458 N.E.2d 702
(Mass. 1983)).
570. See In re Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004).
571.

See, e.g., John Leland, In Gay-Marriage Ruling, Boom for Provincetown, N.Y.
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Supreme Court's historic decision in Brown v. Board of Education.572 And
just as "separate" was not "equal" in Brown, a proposed alternative system
of civil union or domestic partnership is not equal to the full rights of
marriage. 57
Justice Greaney concurred in the result and remedy ordered by the
court, but wrote separately to state that the case should be resolved using
traditional equal protection analysis. He wrote that "[t]he right to marry is
not a privilege conferred by the State, but a fundamental right that is
protected against unwarranted State interference. 57 4 He found that the
marriage statute discriminated because of sex, in violation of the
Declaration of Rights, as the Massachusetts Equal Rights Amendment
amended it. Because the marriage statutes provide that marriage was a
union of only one man and one woman, Justice Greaney found that the
statutes create a classification based on the sex of the persons who want to
marry. 575 "As a factual matter," he wrote, "an individual's choice of
marital partner is constrained because of his or her own sex. ,,576 He found
the argument "disingenuous, at best, to suggest that . . . an individual's

right to marry has not been burdened at all, because he or she remains free
to choose another partner ... of the opposite sex.
Having found a fundamental right of marriage and a sex-based
classification, Justice Greaney stated that the enforcement of the marriage
statutes "as they are currently understood is forbidden by our [State]
Constitution unless the State can present a compelling purpose ...

that can

be accomplished in no other reasonable matter. '578 Applying this strict
scrutiny to the justifications advanced by the state to justify the ban on
same-sex marriage, Justice Greaney found that those justifications were

TIMEs, Jan. 21, 2004, at Al ("The 180-day period ends May 17, a date that has become
etched in the minds of Provincetown's couples, business owners and town officials.").
572.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
573.
As but one example, an opposite-sex couple that is married can travel from state
to state (or outside the country) and have their marriages recognized without the need to get
married again each time they cross over a state line (or go to another country). The legal
status of domestic partnerships and civil unions for same-sex couples is still as yet
uncertain, as the rights for those forms of union may be held to be limited to the
jurisdictions that granted them. But even where state, local, or foreign governments may
refuse to recognize a same-sex civil union or domestic partnership, those relationships may
still be recognized by private entities. For example, a private employer in Illinois may
choose to recognize a Vermont Civil Union for purposes of a partner's eligibility for certain
employee benefits.
574.
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 970 (Greaney, J., concurring).
575.
Id. at 971

576.

Id.

577.
578.

Id.
Id. at 972
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insufficient. Additionally, he described the treatment of children with
same-sex parents as creating a "caste-like system" in which the children of
same-sex couples could not "partake of legal protections and social benefits
for granted by children in families whose parents are of the opposite
taken579
sex."
As important as the legal analysis is in Justice Greaney's opinion,
however, it will be long remembered for its plea to the "thoughtful
580
citizens" of Massachusetts, asking them to accept the court's decision.
He wrote:
The plaintiffs are members of our community, our
neighbors, our coworkers, our friends. As pointed out by
the court, their professions include investment advisor,
computer engineer, teacher, therapist, and lawyer. The
plaintiffs volunteer in our schools, worship beside us in our
religious houses, and have children who play with our
children, to mention just a few ordinary daily contacts. We
share a common humanity and participate together in the
social contract that is the foundation of our
Commonwealth. Simple principles of decency dictate that
we extend to the plaintiffs, and to their new status, full
acceptance, tolerance, and respect. We should do so
because it is the right thing to do.58'
Justice Greaney's words are admittedly dicta, but they express a
positive hope that thoughtful individuals would see that the court was
fulfilling its constitutional mandate and that society, as a whole, would
extend to each citizen the equal protection and equal courtesy of the law.
There were three dissenting opinions. First, Justice Spina wrote that
there was no denial of equal protection or due process. He believed that the
prohibition on same-sex marriage did not deny anyone equal protection of
the law based on gender, because men and women could each select
marriage partners of the opposite sex.582 He likewise found that the
prohibition on same-sex marriage did not deny due process of law, because
each person "is free to marry a person of the opposite sex. 583 He also

579.
580.
581.
582.
583.

Id.
Goodridge,798 N.E. 2d at 973 (Greaney, J., concurring).
Id.
Goodridge,798 N.E.2d at 973 (Spina, J., dissenting).
Id.
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wrote (as would Justice Cordy, who also dissented 584) that the issue of
same-sex civil marriage was an issue for the legislature rather than the
courts.5 8 5

Second, in his dissenting opinion, Justice Sosman found that the
state's arguments were rational, and that the state did not have to afford
586
"the full benefits of marriage on every household raising children.'
While acknowledging that there are same-sex couples with children, Justice
Sosman wrote that under the rational basis test, the legislature had to have
only "some rational basis for concluding that, at present, those alternate
family structures have not yet been conclusively shown to be the equivalent
of the marital family structure ....
He believed it was "rational" for
the state legislature to wait until there was more conclusive proof that the
redefinition of marriage would not bring with it "unintended and
undesirable social consequences. 5 88 Justice Sosman would have found
that the denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples would have passed
the rational basis test.
Third, in his dissenting opinion, Justice Cordy wrote that the marriage
statutes carried a presumption of constitutional validity to which the court
should defer. 589 He agreed with the other dissenting justices that the statute
was constitutional. He stated that although there was a deep history and
tradition of marriage, there was no such history or tradition of same-sex
marriage. 590 He did not believe that laws should be found to have a rational
basis simply because they are "of ancient origin," but the fact that a large
number of states have followed the same tradition - and have followed it
for some time - should at least play some part in determining whether the
legislation had a rational basis. 59' Justice Cordy argued that marriage
provides "the important legal and normative link between heterosexual
intercourse and procreation on the one hand and family responsibilities on
the other.,592 He also believed that the "marital family" was "the foremost
setting for the education and socialization of children. 5 93 Justice Cordy
argued that if there was to be a change to the marriage statutes, it should be

584.
585.
586.
587.
588.
589.
590.
591.
592.
593.

Infra, notes 593-98, and accompanying text.
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 974 (Spina, J., dissenting).
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 978-79 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 979.
id. at 982.
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 983 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 987.
id. at 990.
Id. at 995.
Id. at 996.
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a change effected by the legislature. "So long as the question is at all
debatable," he wrote, "it must be the Legislature that decides. 594
There have been calls to amend the Massachusetts Constitution to
prohibit same-sex marriage before the court's ruling goes into effect.595
However, the state constitution cannot be so easily amended. Because a
proposed constitutional amendment must be approved during two
legislative sessions before it goes before the voters, the Massachusetts
Constitution
could not be amended before November 2006, at the
596
earliest.
Lawmakers searched for ways to avoid complying with the Goodridge
decision.5 97 Using the 180-day window that the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court afforded to the legislature,598 lawmakers introduced
legislation to create civil unions in an attempt to avoid the mandate of the
Goodridge decision. 599 The proposed legislation would have prohibited
"marriage" but would allow same-sex couples to form "civil unions with all
' 6°
'benefits, protections, rights and responsibilities' of marriage.
Although civil unions are undoubtedly meaningful to those who enter
them for the purpose of celebrating their domestic partnerships, gay and
lesbian activists in Massachusetts (as well as activists from other states)
would not be satisfied with anything less than the full marriage rights (and
rites) that were ordered in the Goodridge decision. The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, answering a question submitted to them by the
Senate,6° 1 told the Senate that only "marriage" would satisfy the
constitutional requirements outlined in the courts' earlier decision in
Goodridge.602
The legislation proposed by the Massachusetts Senate stated that its
purpose was to preserve "the traditional, historic nature of and meaning of

594.

Id. at 1004.

595.

See, e.g., Rallying Against Marriage in the Bay State, THE ADVOC., Feb. 17,

2004, at 17.
596.
See, e.g., Mubarak Dahir, Waiting at the Altar, THE ADVOC., Dec. 23, 2003, at
30, 31.
597.
See, e.g., Pam Belluck, Gays' Victory Leaves Massachusetts Lawmakers
Hesitant, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2003, at A25.
598.
See Goodridge,798 N.E.2d at 969-70.
599.
See, e.g., Legislation: Can [Massachusetts] Dodge Marriage?,THE ADVOC.,
Feb. 3, 2004, at 14.
600.
Opinion of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 566 (quoting Mass. S.B. 2175).
601.
See MASS. CONST. Part II, c. 3, art. 2 (as amended by art. 85) ("Each branch of
the legislature, as well as the governor or the council, shall have the authority to require the
opinions of the justices of the supreme judicial court, upon important questions of law, and
upon solemn occasions.")
602.
Opinion of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 569.
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the institution of civil marriage." 6 3 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court found "constitutional difficulty" with the bill's stated purpose,
because the bill did nothing to "preserve" the civil marriage law. 60 4 To the
contrary, the proposed legislation preserved on the "constitutional
infirmity" identified in the court's earlier opinion.60 5 The legislation did
nothing to cure constitutional defects in the state's prohibition against
same-sex marriage, and instead "exaggerated" the "same defects of
rationality" in limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples.6 °6 There was
nothing rational in creating a separate system to "advance" or "preserve"
the state's "legitimate interests in procreation, child rearing, and the
conservation of resources. ' °7 It did not matter if the rights to be conferred
by the proposed legislation were the same as marriage in all but name,60 8
because the bill "would have the effect of maintaining and fostering a
stigma of exclusion that the Constitution prohibits.",60 9
The state
constitution "does not permit such invidious discrimination," said the court,
"no matter how well intentioned." 610
The court recognized that there may be "personal residual prejudice
against same-sex couples," but stated that the existence of such prejudice
would not be a reason to "insist on less than the Constitution requires. ,,611
The court could not have missed the political storm that its decision
created,61 2 but such public pressure was not a reason for the court to shirk
its constitutional responsibility to interpret the state constitution. Neither

603.
Id.
604.
Id.
605.
Id. The court stated that the issue was "not a matter of social policy but of
constitutional interpretation. As the court concluded in Goodridge, the traditional, historic
nature and meaning of civil marriage in Massachusetts is as a wholly secular and dynamic
legal institution, the governmental aim of which is to encourage stable adult relationships
for the good of the individual and of the community, especially its children. The very nature
and purpose of civil marriage, the court concluded, renders unconstitutional any attempt to
ban all same-sex couples, as same-sex couples, from entering into civil marriage." Id.
606.
Opinion of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 569.
607.
Id.
608.
As the court stated: "The bill's absolute prohibition of the use of the word
'marriage' by 'spouses' who are the same sex is more than semantic. The dissimilitude
between the terms 'civil marriage' and 'civil union' is not innocuous; it is a considered
choice of language that reflects a demonstrable assigning of same-sex, largely homosexual,
couples to second-class status." Id. at 570.
609.
Id.
610.
Id.
611.
Id. at 571.
612.
See, e.g., Noel C. Paul & Amanda Paulson, Gay MarriageDivide Roils StatesA New Ruling by Massachusetts' Top Court and a Constitutional Convention Here Next
Week are Escalatinga National Debate,CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Feb. 6, 2004, at I.
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was the likelihood of legal complications that will arise on the federal level,
or that may arise in other jurisdictions when same-sex couples that marry in
Massachusetts travel to other states.6 13 The court was concerned only with
the issue before it, and it found that even if the Senate's proposed civil
union legislation ameliorated the discrimination suffered by same-sex
couples, it did not eliminate the unconstitutional denial of marriage
licenses.614 In the Goodridge decision, the court found that even using "the
more lenient rational basis test," the state had presented nothing to justify
the prohibition against same-sex marriage.61 5 In the proposed legislation,
there was likewise no rational reason that supported "the different
nomenclature. 6 16 Nothing less than marriage will suffice.6 17

Justice Martha B. Sosman, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice
Francis X. Spina, argued that because the proposed legislation provided all
of the benefits of marriage without using the word "marriage," the issue
had turned into "a squabble over the name to be used. ' 618 Justice Sosman
' 619
described this as "a pitched battle over who gets to use the 'm' word.
This, she found, was not a quarrel "of any constitutional dimension
whatsoever., 620 She and Justice Spina would have found that the proposed
legislation did not violate the equal protection or due process provisions
of
62 1
the state constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.
Justice Robert J. Cordy, writing separately, also argued that the court
should withhold its judgment in order to give the legislature more time to
deliberate about the benefits that should be extended to same-sex couples in
Massachusetts. 622 He did not believe that the state had to prove even a
rational basis for coming up with a new name to describe the unions of
same-sex couples differently from the marriages allowed to opposite sex
couples.623

As expected, the advisory ruling from Massachusetts fueled further
debate about the issue of same-sex marriage. As after the initial Goodridge

613.
Opinion of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 57 1.
614.
See id.
615.
See id. at 569 n.3.
616.
Id.
617.
See Jennifer Peter, Court Demands Gay Marriage--MassachusettsOpinion
Says Civil Unions Won't Cut It, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Feb. 5, 2004, at 3.
618.
Opinion of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 572 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
619.
Id. A popular cable television show called "The 'L' Word" depicting the lives
of lesbians began to air a few weeks before the court's decision.
620.
Id.
621.
Id. at 579-80.
622.
Id. at 581 (Spina, J., dissenting).
623.
Id.
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decision, calls were made again to amend the Massachusetts Constitution
and to enact a federal constitutional amendment to prohibit same-sex
marriage. 624 The issue of same-sex marriage is poised to become a divisive
issue in the upcoming national election.6 25
The court's Goodridge decision stated that there was no rational basis
for denying marriage to same-sex couples. The court's advisory opinion to
the Massachusetts Senate said that the court meant what it said in
Goodridge,and that the state had to prepare for issuing marriage licenses to
same-sex couples.
Even though the issue appears to be settled, there are still many
questions that will need to be resolved in Massachusetts, such as the legal
status of couples who come from other states to marry in Massachusetts.6 26
III.

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

A New Jersey trial court upheld the state's ban on same-sex marriage
in a decision issued on November 5, 2003.627 The court ruled that the New
Jersey Constitution contained no protections for same-sex marriage.628
Nevertheless, within three months of that decision, the governor of New
Jersey signed domestic partnership legislation that affords legal recognition
to same-sex couples. 629 The legislation could be seen as an effort to thwart
a successful appeal of the trial court's decision against same-sex marriage.
The legislation provides same-sex couples with hospital visitation rights, an
inheritance tax exemption, state income tax benefits, and domestic
partnership benefits for state employees.63 °
New Jersey, unlike Massachusetts, was not under an order to amend
its marriage laws. The Massachusetts legislature may have averted the

624.
See, e.g., Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Gives New Push to Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TiMEs, Feb. 5, 2004, at Al ; Katharine Q. Seelye, Conservatives Mobilize Against Ruling on
Gay Marriage,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2003, at A25.
625.
See, e.g., Terence Hunt, Bush, Kerry Each Take Issue With Judges, CHI. SUNTIMES, Feb. 5, 2004, at 3.
626.
See Massachusetts May Not Wed Gay Couples From 38 States, CHI. FREE
PRESS, Apr. 7, 2004, at 7. See also Marc Santora, New York's Laws Said to Support Some
Gay Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2004, at Al.
627.
Lewis v. Harris, No. MER-L-15-03, 2003 WL 2319114 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Nov. 5,
2003).
628.
Id.
Lisa Neff, New Jersey Governor Signs PartnersBill, CHI. FREE PRESS, Jan. 14,
629.
2004, at 1; S. 2820, 210th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2003).
630.

Lisa Neff, New Jersey Assembly Approves PartnershipBill, CHI. FREE PRESS,

Jan. 7, 2004, at 7; S. 2820, 2 10th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2003).
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same-sex marriage decision had it enacted a civil union law before the
Goodridge decision. Having waited too long to act, however, the
Massachusetts legislature could not avoid the judicial decision that ordered
same-sex marriage in that state. The New Jersey legislature, by acting
before a court in that state ruled in favor of same-sex marriage, hoped to
avert a result similar to that in Massachusetts.
That small debate in New Jersey frames one point of the same-sex
marriage - who should have the right to decide? Is it the legislature, or the
courts? While legislatures can indeed act to protect the rights of
individuals and couples, the legislative record in many states has more
often been one that reflects enactactments of discrimination rather than
protection.
Same-sex couples have long been denied the benefits and protections
of civil marriage. For years many couples have tried to work around this
denial, doing what they could to create for themselves as many legal
protections as might be possible with wills, contracts, powers of attorney
for property, durable powers of attorney for health care, joint checking and
investment accounts, joint ownership of property, and other forms of
domestic partnership agreements. 63' Some individuals have also changed
their names to take the name of their partner or to take a new, joint name.
Nevertheless, even the most extensive use of these legal measures pales in
comparison to the wide array of benefits and protections available through
civil marriage. On the federal level alone, marital status affects more than
1,000 federal laws.632
As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court noted in its advisory
opinion to the Massachusetts Senate, even legislation that purports to
provide every benefit and protection - except for the word "marriage" itself
- still fails the rational basis test for due process and equal protection under
that state's constitution.6 33
There has been, and will be, opposition to same-sex marriage.
Whatever form this opposition takes, it essentially boils down to the same
fundamental point - some people want the right to exclude others from

631.
See, e.g., Jennifer Tulin McGrath, The Ethical Responsibilities of Estate
Planning Attorneys in the Representation of Non-Traditional Couples, 27 SEATTLE U.L.
REv. 75, 84 (2003); Afshin A. Asher, Estate Planning for Same-Sex Couples, LESBIAN
NEWS, Jan. 2004, at 31.

632.
See, e.g., Theodora Ooms, The Role of the Federal Government in
Strengthening Marriage, 9 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 163, 170 (2001) (citing a 1997 report
from the General Accounting Office that identified 1,049 federal laws where marital status
was a factor).
633.
Opinion of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 569-72.
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marrying. They attempt to claim injury from any limitation of what they
see as their own fundamental right to discriminate against others.
Some states will amend their state constitutions to prohibit same-sex
marriage. Amending the state constitution successfully derailed the
prospect of celebrating same-sex marriages in Hawai'i and in Alaska. A
number of states enacted state legislation to deny same-sex marriage; these
statutes will now be challenged when same-sex couples marry in
Massachusetts and travel to other states. Because opponents of same-sex
marriage know that these challenges are coming, they are working to pass
multiple layers of other discriminatory legislation. They recognize that a
state or federal court may declare unconstitutional a law that refuses to
recognize a same-sex marriage. Other jurisdictions are passing (or
proposing) statutory alternatives to marriage (such as the Vermont Civil
Union Law, or the Hawai'i Reciprocal Benefits Law, or the recent New
Jersey Domestic Partnership Law) in the hope that such legislation will
appease same-sex couples who would otherwise pursue constitutional
challenges.634 While such an alternative solution may have been acceptable
even a year or two ago, same-sex couples have suddenly and irreversibly
realized that they too are entitled to exactly the same benefits and
protections of marriage as opposite sex couples.
Same-sex couples have already married in the Netherlands, Belgium,
and Canada. Now they will marry in the United States as well. Same-sex
married couples will travel to other states; they will demand that their
marriages be recognized. Many private employers and businesses will
likely recognize these marriages. Some employers may even begin to
require gay and lesbian employees to marry as a condition of obtaining
employee benefits for a same-sex partner. 635 Families will attend same-sex
weddings. Same-sex couples will share wedding photos. Individuals in
same-sex marriages will love and care for their partners. They will raise
children with love and support, just as they do now, but with the legal
protections of marriage that provide protection and security for those
children.
The legal landscape for the coming constitutional challenges has
changed dramatically. We know that gay and lesbian persons have the
same rights to equal protection of the law, because that essentially was the
lesson underlying Romer.636 We know that gay and lesbian persons have

634.
See, e.g., S. 2820, 210th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2003).
635.
See, e.g., 0 Curse of Civil Unions, 10 GAY & LESBIAN REV. WORLDWIDE 8
(Nov.-Dec. 2003).
636.
517 U.S. 620 (declaring amendment to Colorado State Constitution to violate
Equal Protection Clause).
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the same rights to due process of the law, because that was essentially the
lesson of Lawrence.6 37 Both Romer and Lawrence found that homophobic
legislation could not pass the rational basis test to withstand the
constitutional challenges in those cases. Justice Scalia had, of course,
warned in his dissenting opinion in Lawrence that the ruling would likely
lead to ac court finding a right to same-sex marriage, 638 just as the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts did just a few months later.
There are, not unexpectedly, calls for constitutional amendments to
prohibit same-sex marriage, even in Massachusetts. 639 Those calling to
amend state constitutions to prohibit same-sex marriage seem to have
largely forgotten that the United States Supreme Court ruled in Romer that
an amendment to a state constitution can violate equal protection when the
law is motivated by nothing more than animus. 64° That is the situation we
have here, where calls to "preserve" marriage by amending state
constitutions or enacting further layers of discriminatory legislation are
merely attempts to perpetuate violations of equal protection, due process,
privacy, and liberty. 64' Such measures, when obviously motivated by pure
homophobic hate and fear, cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.
At some point opposite-sex couples will realize that the sanctity of
their marriages are not threatened by the marriage of same-sex couples who
are not seeking to destroy the institution of marriage, but to share in its
benefits and protections. Many fears about same-sex marriage will simply
be found to be irrational. For some time already, we have had among us
same-sex couples who married in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Canada.
The presence of those married couples in the United States has not
destroyed our country or the institution of civil marriage. It is time now to
recognize that same-sex couples deserve the same recognition and
protection of the law afforded to opposite-sex couples.
Opinions do change. It was only in 1967 that the United States
Supreme Court ruled in Loving that the prohibition on interracial marriage
violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 42 California had reached that same result in 1948, 643

637.
123 S. Ct. 2472 (finding Texas sodomy statute to violate Due Process Clause
and overruling Bowers v. Hardwick).
638.
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
639.
See Pam Belluck, Setback is Dealt to Gay Marriage - Massachusetts Takes
Step for a ConstitutionalBan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2004, at Al. The proposed amendment
will not by itself prevent gay marriages, because it must be passed again in the 2005-06
legislative session, and then by popular referendum of the Massachusetts voters. Id.
640.
Romer, 517 U.S. 620.
641.
See Opinion of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 569.
642.
Loving, 388 U.S. 1.
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showing that states can sometimes reach the right result faster than the
federal government. Nonetheless, it took many years for the California
decision to be accepted nationally.
The issues of interracial marriage parallel those of same-sex marriage,
although many persons distinguish the two situations. 644 But the track of
acceptance may well prove to be the same. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts has now twice decreed that same-sex couples must have the
right to marry in that jurisdiction. The court did not decree that persons
must enter into same-sex relationships, 6 " nor did the court order religious
groups to perform same-sex marriages. The court's order requires only that
the state grant marriage licenses to those same-sex couples who want to
marry.
Other states will follow that decision, finding that equal protection,
due process, privacy, and other rights particular to state constitutions are
indeed valuable concepts worth preserving and defending. They will reject
arguments that there is a fundamental right to discriminate against the
rights of others to marry, and they will question more seriously the
argument as to how one couple's marriage threatens other couples. Once
people actually have the chance to meet married same-sex couples, they
will get quite used to the idea. The gay and lesbian community "will
achieve the right to a marriage license because the legal and moral
conclusion can be none other than that it is right." 646 The same-sex
marriage debate now, magnified during an election year, will subside.
Judges, legislators, and other policymakers will behave differently when
they are standing face to face with a lawfully married same-sex couple that
is demanding no special right, but only the right to be treated the same as
other married couples. 647 The laws being passed now will fall from the
books, just as we no longer have laws prohibiting interracial marriage.
Years from now, we will wonder why we worried about same-sex
marriage.
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Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
644.
See generally David Ehrenstein, The Black Divide - African-Americans Who
Refuse to Support Equal Marriage Rights for Gays and Lesbians are Shoving Their Own
History Back Into the Closet, THE ADVOC., Apr. 27, 2004, at 34.
645.
The Onion, a satirical newspaper, joked in one issue that the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts had ordered all citizens of that state to enter into gay marriages.
Massachusetts Supreme Court Orders All Citizens to Gay Marry, THE ONION, Feb. 26-Mar.
3, 2004, at I.
646.
Terry Bean, Only in Oregon, THE ADVOC., Apr. 27, 2004, at 10.
647.
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